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A B S T R A C T
This thesis investigates the effect of two different forms of coopera-
tive behaviour on the emergence and evolution of language. A recent
paradigm in evolutionary linguistics views language as a complex dy-
namic system whose emergence and development can be explained as
the product of the interplay between cognitive, biological and social
constraints. These researchers have generally acknowledged the vital
role played by cooperation in the emergence of language: homo sapiens
would not have developed language without a willingness to cooper-
ate at levels which are particular to humans. Cooperation, however,
is itself the subject of an evolutionary process, it is also an adaptive
system.
There are many forms of cooperative behaviour. This thesis studies
the impact on language of two opposing forms: altruism and mutual-
ism. We define altruism as an individual’s willingness to cooperate
with another agent regardless of the cost to itself. On the other hand,
an individual displaying mutualistic behaviour will decide to cooper-
ate with another agent only if it can expect to obtain a benefit from
the interaction.
The methodology in based on computer simulations of agents sit-
uated in an environment. The agents interact with each other, com-
municate about and perform costly joint actions, and are rewarded
if they perform the action successfully. They do this by playing a
coordination language game: an interaction model which allows us to
measure the effect of environmental and communication costs on the
emergence of a common language.
This document discusses the results obtained from two types of
studies:
vii
1. Type I investigates emergence of a common language in two
separate populations, one made up exclusively of altruistic agents,
while the other consists solely of mutualistic agents. Through
this type of study we can observe whether, and under what
conditions, language emerges in isolated populations.
2. Type II simulates emergence in a single mixed population, in
which altruistic and mutualistic agents interact with each other.
This allows us to investigate whether one type of behaviour will
provide individuals with a fitness advantage.
Both types of study are used to simulate the emergence of:
• holistic languages, which map a single utterance to a whole
meaning;
• compositional languages, in which the semantic value of the ut-
terance is determined by the semantic value of its parts.
Results indicate a strong relation between costs and the effect of
cooperative behaviour on the development of a common language.
Neither strategy displays significant differences if environmental and
communication costs are low with respect to the reward obtained.
As costs increase altruistic agents develop a common language much
faster than mutualistic agents, and altruism grants agents a selective
advantage in terms of fitness. If the costs are too high, however, altru-
istic agents are penalised harshly, and mutualism becomes advanta-
geous. In this case, populations do not develop a common language.
viii
Su lenguaje y las derivaciones de su lenguaje – la religión, las le-
tras, la metafísica – presuponen el idealismo. El mundo para ellos
no es un concurso de objetos en el espacio; es una serie heterogénea
de actos independientes. Es sucesivo, temporal, no espacial. No hay
sustantivos en el conjetural Ursprache de Tlön, de la que proceden
los idiomas “actuales” y los dialectos: hay verbos impersonales, cali-
ficados por sufijos (o prefijos) monosilábicos de valor adverbial. Por
ejemplo: no hay palabra que corresponda a la palabra luna, pero hay
un verbo que sería en español lunecer o lunar. Surgió la luna sobre
el río se dice hlör u fang axaxaxas mlö o sea en su orden: hacia arriba
(upward) detrás duraderofluir luneció. (Xul Solar traduce con brevedad:
upa tras perfluyue lunó. Upward, behind the onstreaming it mooned.)
– Jorge Luis Borges Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius
Ein Wort, du weißt: eine Leiche
– Paul Celan
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 evolution and evolutionary linguistics
Herodotus tells us in his Histories (Herodotus, 2013) of how Psamtik
I, king of Egypt, attempted to determine the original language of
mankind. He ordered that two newborn babies be left in the care of a
shepherd and that no one speak to them, hypothesising that their first
word would be uttered in the root language of all people. When one
of the babies cried βεκóς, similar to the Phrygian word for “bread”,
Psamtik inferred that Phrygian was the oldest of all languages.
This anecdote provides us not only with an example of early scien-
tific ingenuity, it also gives us a measure of what a daunting task
it is to trace the origins of language. Scientists and philosophers
have attempted to tackle this question from different and increasingly
specialised perspectives. Rousseu, in the purely speculative Essai sur
l’origine des langues (Rousseau, 2013), derived language from human’s
innate capacity for musical melody. Herder (2015) contributed to the
foundations of comparative philology. Humboldt (1999) carried out
in On language one of the first attempts at a systematic study of com-
parative linguistics, hinting at the joint development of language and
mental powers. Language is the external appearance of a people’s
spirit (“die äußerliche Erscheinung des Geistes der Völker”), it is the
embodiment of the collective imagination, culture, education and so-
cial practices of its speakers. Mental and social development cannot
be understood without language development, and vice versa: the
two are inextricably intertwined.
1
2 introduction
Recent times have seen many different lines of research contribut-
ing to tracing the origins and evolution of language. Of these, we can
identify three broad categories that relate to the work presented here.
1. Some researchers try to identify cognitive capacities required for
language. What cognitive skills allowed humans to develop a
language when no other species could? How did these cognitive
skills develop? Evolutionary psychologists and neuroscientists
have focused on brain size evolution (Loritz, 1999), suggesting a
co-evolutionary coupling between brain and language (Deacon,
1997).
Tomasello’s work tests and compares cognitive abilities of chil-
dren and higher apes (see e.g. Tomasello and Brooks, 1999; Tomasello,
2003; Tomasello, 2014). What sets human beings apart, and what
allows for the development of symbolic communication, is their
unique capacity to cooperate.
Human communication is thus a fundamentally coop-
erative enterprise. (. . . ) If we are to understand the ul-
timate origins of human communication, both phylo-
genetically and ontogentically, we must look outside
of communication itself and into human cooperation
more generally. It turns out that human cooperation
is unique in the animal kingdom in many ways. (. . . )
For reasons we do not know, at some point in human
evolution individuals who could engage with one an-
other collaboratively with joint intentions, joint atten-
tion, and cooperative motives were at an adaptive ad-
vantage. Cooperative communication then arose as
a way of coordinating these collaborative activities
more efficiently. (Tomasello, 2008, p. 6).
The cognitive capacity to think in terms of we, to be able to
engage in joint intentional activities, is a prerequisite for the
emergence of language.
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2. Social and environmental conditions which can explain emergence
of language.
Anthropologists and cultural paleontologists have investigated
and suggested different possible social scenarios which might
have contributed to the development of symbolic communica-
tion. A common thread running through virtually all of these
theories is that an instinct for cooperative interaction, present in
early human societies and young children but not in apes (Moll
and Tomasello, 2007), is required for the emergence of language.
Boyd and Richerson (2009) have suggested that the rapidly vary-
ing climates of the Middle and Upper Pleistocene may have
caused the transition to altruism, favouring the natural selection
of behaviours that enabled individuals to act collectively, learn-
ing from each other and coordinating their actions to reach a
common goal.
Bickerton and Szathmáry (2011), on the other hand, argue that
climate changes in East Africa during the late Pliocene created
drier and more variable conditions, giving rise to large areas
of savanah. This caused a change in human behaviour, which
transitioned from catchment scavenging to territory scavenging.
To access megafauna carcasses in the face of severe
competition required that human ancestors communi-
cate in ways no other primate had done, and cooper-
ate to a degree unknown among other primates.
Also, parties having to cover greater areas and butcher large
carcasses while driving off competitive scavengers must have
required much larger groups. The carcass finder had to commu-
nicate information that lay far outside of the sensory range and
convince other group members to engage in an activity which
potentially required a great expense of energy.
Dunbar (1998) suggests that language emerged and evolved
from gossip, as a form of social cohesion that substitutes groom-
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ing. Boyd and Mathew (2015) proposed a similar functional ex-
planation of language evolution: symbolic communication might
have developed as a way of ensuring that all members in the
group cooperated and did not profit from the effort of the other
members. Third party monitoring through language can help
establish a reputation within a group, increasing the evolution-
ary fitness of those with a good reputation.
3. Computer and mathematical modelling of emergence and evolution
of language. Researchers have employed agent-based computer
simulations to study language as an adaptive complex system
(Beckner et al., 2009; Steels, 1997c; Steels, 2000a; Gong et al.,
2004). Language evolution can be understood as a dynamical
system, a complex phenomenon emerging out of a multitude of
simple interactions between agents. Evolutionary linguists have
developed frameworks based on agents engaged in linguistic
interactions to identify contributing elements in language evolu-
tion. Steels (1995) simulated the emergence and self-organisation
of a shared lexicon in a group of agents without a centralised
authority. Other authors (see e.g. Kirby, 1998; Hurford, 2000a;
K. Smith et al., 2003) have investigated whether grammar-based
languages can emerge as a result of the poverty of the stimu-
lus for language learners. Language games have also been em-
ployed to simulate optimal evolution of grammar acquisition
(Komarova, Niyogi, et al., 2001), communication costs (Čače and
Bryson, 2007), or fitness benefits of language learning (Niyogi
and Berwick, 1997).
1.2 language and cooperation
Some time about 200,000 years ago one population of Homo began liv-
ing in new ways which enabled it to spread out across the world, out-
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competing other populations and leaving descendants that are known
today as Homo sapiens. The individuals of this species developed cog-
nitive skills which allowed them to (Tomasello, 1999):
• produce a wide range of goal adapted stone tools;
• use symbols to communicate and to structure their social lives,
including not only linguistic symbols but also artistic symbols
such as stone carvings and cave paintings;
• engage in new kinds of social practices and organisations, with
new forms of rituals such as ceremonial burials and other forms
of religious, political and commercial institutions.
A common hypothesis is that cooperative communication began
almost certainly in mutualistic collaborations: ones in which individu-
als cooperated only in order to obtain benefits to themselves (Hurford,
2007; Tomasello, 2008). Only later did individuals begin to share infor-
mation and resources more freely, helping other individuals without
obtaining a benefit, or even incurring a cost to themselves, in what is
known as altruism.
1.2.1 Coordinated behaviour
The ability to coordinate collaborative activities more effectively pro-
vided individuals with an evolutionary advantage (E. A. Smith, 2010;
Tomasello, 2008). E. A. Smith (2010) identifies several ways in which
language helps in collective activities:
I. Language simplifies difficult coordination problems.
II. It reduces costs of monitoring and enforcing adherence to col-
lective norms.
III. Symbolic communication enhances the broadcast efficiency of
signals.
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IV. Language facilitates positive assortment of individuals who ad-
here to similar norms and conventions.
Bratman (1992) enumerates several mental attitudes for shared co-
operative activity, including meshing of sub-plans to carry out the
joint action, as well as a commitment to help the other and a com-
mon belief in the activity.
Cooperation can potentially be rewarding, but it is definitely costly.
Individuals must expend energy, abandon their own activity and
spend time and effort coordinating the joint action. In adverse en-
vironmental conditions the cost of carrying out a cooperative activity
may be very high, requiring lengthy travel or potential risks. Also,
difficult activities require greater cognitive efforts to coordinate and
to communicate effectively.
Language and cooperation are intertwined. Language would not
have evolved without some kind of cooperation. On the other hand,
an efficient language makes cooperation more effective. If we con-
sider communication as a cost, then we can model the effects of this
coupling between cooperation and language. Cooperating would con-
tribute to making the language more effective, thus reducing the cost
of communicating. At the same time, an increasingly effective lan-
guage would gradually decrease the cost of cooperating, thus con-
tributing to the fitness of cooperators, granting them a selective ad-
vantage. The more agents communicate, the more it is in their interest
to cooperate, thus refining language more and more.
Cooperation can be seen as a long-term investment: individuals
who are prepared to pay the cost of cooperating may develop a more
refined tool with which to cooperate. Language would make cooper-
ation cheaper, producing future savings which could provide cooper-
ative individual with an edge.
However, if communication is too costly, then coordinating actions
may prove to be too high an investment. Being too willing to cooper-
ate would end up with neither cooperators nor knowledge.
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1.3 impact of cooperative behaviour on the emergence
of language
In this document I investigate and measure the impact of altruistic be-
haviour on the emergence and evolution of language within a group
of agents engaged in language games. More specifically, I determine
whether, and under what conditions, language could emerge in pop-
ulations of altruistic and mutualistic agents. Also, whether a popu-
lation made up of both types of agents could develop a common
language, and whether the language itself would facilitate the pre-
dominance of one strategy over the other. Finally, I explore the effect
of varying environmental and communication costs on the behaviour
of the population and on the convergence to a common language.
To do this I have developed a language game in which agents de-
cide whether to help other agents. The protocol of the game enables
us to measure the effects of both costly actions and costly communi-
cations.
1.4 outline of the thesis
The next two chapters provide a background review of the literature.
Chapter 2 discusses recent research on mathematical and computa-
tional models of language evolution. Several models are presented in
greater detail due to their proximity to the model used in this thesis.
I describe models inspired by evolutionary biology, as well as models
in which agents interact in an environment and models in which lan-
guage transmission occurs from adults to children. The methodology
employed in the research presented in this thesis makes use of ele-
ments from several of these fields. The main conceptual addition to
common language game models is to transform the interaction into a
sequence of costly decisions made by the agents. Agents must decide
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whether to engage in an interaction based on the costs of previous
interactions.
Chapter 3 offers an overview of the literature on the evolution of
cooperation. It traces a history of efforts by evolutionary scientists
to identify the mechanisms that make the natural selection of altru-
istic behaviour possible. I present game theoretical models that test
these mechanisms and determine the selective constraints they are
subjected to. This is followed by a review of models of helping be-
haviour, as well as recent literature on the main subject of this thesis:
the effect of different cooperation strategies on the emergence and
evolution of language.
The next three chapters are the bulk of this thesis. Chapter 4 de-
scribes the methodology employed. I introduce the language game,
describe its payoff function and its interaction protocol. I have per-
formed four different experiments. They are designed to form a se-
quence of increasing linguistic complexity, the first two modelling
a holistic language while the remaining two model a compositional
language. Both sets of two experiments follow the same pattern. The
first experiment investigates convergence to a common language in
two separate groups of agents, one made up exclusively of altruistic
agents while the other consists exclusively of mutualistic agents. In
the second type of experiment, the population is mixed, so that al-
truistic and mutualistic agents interact with each other. The model
features a revision protocol by which the agents can review their co-
operation strategy to imitate more successful agents. In this case the
results focus not only in language convergence, but also in whether
one strategy dominates the other and spreads throughout the whole
population.
Chapter 5 describes the first two experiments modelling a holis-
tic language. I discuss the internal language of each agent, as well
as their learning mechanism. I then present and discuss the results
of each experiment. Results show that altruistic populations require
fewer interactions to develop a common language as soon as envi-
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ronmental and linguistic costs increase above a limiting value with
respect to the profit that agents can obtain from performing an ac-
tion. A population of mutualistic agents does not develop a com-
mon language if the costs are above a given limit. Similarly, a mixed
population of agents displaying both types of cooperation strategies
will favour altruism if the costs are within limiting values. Above
those, agents will favour mutualistic behaviour and the population
will likely not develop a common language.
In the same way, chapter 6 presents the last two experiments, in
which agents develop a compositional language. Agents have meth-
ods to produce and parse utterances, as well as induce a grammar
from expressions they receive. Similarly to the experiments with holis-
tic language in chapter 5, altruistic populations develop a more re-
fined and extended compositional language than mutualistic popula-
tions as soon as environmental and linguistic costs increase above a
certain set of values.




M O D E L L I N G L A N G U A G E E V O L U T I O N
In his Theory of Harmony, Schönberg (2003) argues that music rules
were set down by pedagogues and theorists, painstakingly compiling
the practices of the great composers into a system. Composers were
too busy composing music to think about the rules they were creating.
Scientific research follows a similar path. Excited by the possibilities
offered by a relatively novel method, scientists research. At some later
point they begin to categorise, classify and evaluate, taking stock of
the progress made so far. In recent years research in language evolu-
tion has relied more and more on modelling as a way to hypothesise
and test possible conditions of language emergence and evolution.
Several authors have compiled reviews of the different models and
methods employed (Vogt, 2009; Jäger et al., 2009; Nolfi and Mirolli,
2010; Grifoni et al., 2016). This chapter follows the lines established
by them. It first discusses one of the main assumptions shared by
most models, that language evolves as a complex adaptive system.
Next follows on overview of the models, first by describing those
based mainly on mathematical methods, then computational models.
Finally, I present in greater detail several models that are closely con-
nected with the methodology used in this thesis, before summarising
the chapter.
2.1 language as a complex adaptive system
A crucial element of language is its social function. Language is used
for human social interaction: its origins, development and structure
depend on its role in human social life (Tomasello, 2008). Understand-
ing how language has evolved in the human linage requires a holistic
11
12 modelling language evolution
approach which includes investigating the combined effect of many
interacting constraints, such as the structure of thought processes,
perceptual biases, cognitive limitations and socio-pragmatic factors.
A Complex Adaptive System (CAS) arises from the interaction of
many individual components as they adapt and learn from each other
(Holland, 2006). The system uses its own experience as data, particu-
larly the effect of those experiences on the system itself. A CAS iden-
tifies regularities in that experience and it compresses them in the
form of a schema, competing with other rival schemata. The results
of this schema are then fed back into the system, where they affect
its standing with respect to rival schemata (Gell-Mann, 1994). In hu-
man societies, for example, a schema is a set of customs, traditions,
myths; what Dawkins named a meme: a unit of cultural transmission
(Dawkins, 1989). The interaction and competition between elements
in the system affect the behaviour of the whole system while at the
same time affecting the behaviour of the elements (Baicchi, 2015). We
can list the following elements in language that identify it as a CAS
(Beckner et al., 2009):
a. The system consists of multiple speakers interacting with each
other.
b. The system is adaptive, i.e. speakers’ behaviour is based on their
past interactions, and current and past interactions feed forward
into future behaviour.
c. A speaker’s behaviour is the consequence of competing factors
ranging from perceptual mechanics to social motivations.
d. The structures of language emerge from interrelated patterns of
experience, social interactions, and cognitive processes.
Steels (2000a) identifies several mechanisms by which linguistic
schemata emerge. Reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 2017)
which feeds back and reinforces linguistic elements that prove to be
successful. A second element is self-organisation, a mechanism that
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arises when there is a positive feedback loop in an open nonlinear
system (Kauffman, 1993; Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989). Elements that
are successful propagate, which in turn makes them more successful.
A third mechanism is structural coupling, where the success of one
element facilitates the success of another element. Steels (1998) and
Vogt (2005) carried out experiments to simulate the co-evolution of
concepts and lexicon in which feedback from successful communica-
tive acts led to the emergence of shared perceptual ontologies, which
in turn aided in the development of a lexicon shared by all speakers
in the population. Other experiments have modelled self-organisation
of linguistic elements such as vocal sounds (De Boer, 1997), recursive
grammars (Batali, 2002) or grammar (Steels, 2000b).
“Language is at the nexus of several complex adaptive systems: bi-
ological evolution, learning and culture” (K. Smith et al., 2003). Each
of these three systems is constrained by evolutionary pressures which
determine their adaptation, each of them operating on its own time-
scale. A language learner attempts to learn the language from its par-
ents. Differences between the language of the parent and the child
result in cultural evolution of the language itself. The language ac-
quired by the learner contributes to the reproductive fitness of that
individual. The use of language within a social context facilitates the
learning of languages that most contribute to communicative success,
pressuring for the selection of languages that are both learnable and
expressive (Brighton and Kirby, 2001).
A holistic approach to language evolution must consider it neither
as exclusively biological nor as exclusively cultural (Christiansen and
Chater, 2008), but rather as a result of evolutionary constraints, as
well as the interaction between them. Brain size is a biological con-
straint. The size of the brain determines 1. the number of dimensions
that the brain can meaningfully distinguish; and 2. the number of
possible interactions between these dimensions. Both contribute to
the conceptual complexity that the brain is capable of, and thus the
number of aspects of the world that individuals can communicate
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about successfully (Schoenemann, 2017). On the other hand, because
humans are embedded to a high degree in social interactions which
are vital to their survival, communicative success plays a central role
in an individual’s adaptive fitness and breeding success. Both pro-
cesses co-evolved: language adapted to the human brain and the
brain adapted to language (Deacon, 1997; Schoenemann, 2009).
2.2 modelling language evolution : an overview
2.2.1 Analytical and agent-based models
Vogt (2009) suggests three main types of models of language evolu-
tion. Each subsequent type offers greater possibilities of modelling in
increasing detail:
1. Analytical models: commonly employ methods from the the-
ory of dynamical systems to measure the frequency of a linguis-
tic trait in a population, describing macro-evolutionary effects.
This type of model is discussed in more detail in section 2.3.
2. Agent-based analytical models: assign a mathematical formula
to each agent determining the learning mechanism of the agent.
For example, Baxter et al. (2009), model usage of one of two
grammars, α and β, by user i in a population of n language
users with a variable xi, which represents the fraction of time
that user i employs grammar α (with 1 − xi representing the
fraction of time user i employs grammar β). At every time step
two users, i and j, interact socially. User i and j produce n and
m utterances respectively, totalling T utterances. Each user has
a specified receptiveness λ, which can be described as the will-
ingness to change her language depending on the grammar she
hears from the other user. xi changes according to the formula:
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here Hij specifies the relative weight that user i assigns to the ut-
terances of user j, equivalent to the social status of j as perceived
by i. λ and Hij are weights assigned to the fraction of utter-
ances produced by each user. Notice that this diffusion model
is very similar to mathematical models of opinion spreading
and other sociophysical models (Helbing, 2013). Similar models
have been proposed to investigate how languages may become
extinct when competing with other languages (Kandler, 2009;
Abrams and Strogatz, 2003; Kandler and Steele, 2008). These
models are based on a diffusion process affected by parameters
like spatial dispersion or a language’s low perceived status.
3. Agent-based cognitive models: in this type of model, agents
are not specified by a mathematical formula but by a compu-
tational cognitive model. These types of cognitive models often
contain mechanisms for parsing, creating and processing lan-
guage, perceiving an environment, memorising language or the
identity of other agents, etc. Section 2.4 analyses several exam-
ples of this type of model.
Distinguishing between these types is not straightforward: some
models start by setting down equations and employ simulations to
test their soundness; other models simulate evolution of linguistic
aspects and use mathematical or physical methods to analyse the re-
sults. Agent based models allow the researcher a wider scope when
it comes to analysing specific linguistic phenomena. While analyti-
cal based models offer great clarity and focus on establishing causal
relations, agent based models can be finer grained and define more
elements that could have a determinant effect on self-organisation
processes.
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2.2.2 Transmission mechanism
Another criterion by which we can classify models of language evolu-
tion is by the type of transmission mechanism it employs. Social psy-
chologists have developed experimental methods to test hypotheses
regarding the mechanisms responsible for the origin and persistence
of cultural variation (Mesoudi, 2014). We can identify the following
mechanisms:
1. The transmission chain method, or vertical transmission in the
terminology of De Vylder and Tuyls (2006). This method is sim-
ilar to the children’s game “Chinese whispers”. Originally de-
veloped by Bartlett (1932), it involves passing material along
a chain of participants, the output of each participant becom-
ing the input for the next. Many models of language evolution
use this mechanism, most prominently the Iterated Learning
Model (ILM) (see section 2.4.2). The links in the transmission
chain are successive generations of language users. Generations
can overlap, and reproductive fitness is determined by commu-
nicative success. Generations interact by adopting the roles of
teacher and learner, or adult and child, although random inter-
actions between individuals of the same generation are also pos-
sible, as is allowing the child to observe the interaction between
two adults (Vogt, 2005). Language evolution models commonly
investigate the emergence as well as the evolution of a language,
which requires the first generation of language users to have no
prior linguistic knowledge, though they may have an innate bias
(Griffiths and Kalish, 2007; Thompson et al., 2016; Kirby et al.,
2007).
An important parameter in this type of model is the amount of
data to which learners are exposed. By controlling the sparsity
of utterances that children can observe, the researcher can deter-
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mine the width of a linguistic bottleneck that constrains the learn-
ability of a language (Brighton and Kirby, 2001; Kirby, 2002).
Biologically inspired models (see e.g. Nowak and Krakauer, 1999;
Nowak, Plotkin, and Jansen, 2000; Komarova, Niyogi, et al.,
2001; Komarova and Nowak, 2001) also employ this mechanism.
It is an invaluable tool to examine the transmission from one
generation to the next, and the evolutionary drift that results
from such transmission. However, this tool imposes a structure
in the population that determines their roles and how they are
to behave. If one generation is a parent to the next, for instance,
then the parents will teach their children, and it is their instinct
to teach them well. Their behaviour is determined by their role
in the population. This is a very interesting assumption if one is
trying to study the effects of just such conditions. For instance,
a researcher may wish to study the effect of prolonged parental
care or neglect in the linguistic learning of their offspring, and
how that may affect the form adopted by a common language.
If greater care proves to be beneficial for the children’s linguis-
tic development, then that could be interpreted as a factor in ex-
plaining why individuals are prepared to dedicate so much care
to their children. This is a form of altruism that has prolonged
effects on the shaping of individuals and social products.
This type of conditioning, however, restricts the researcher who
is interested in examining the difference between types of coop-
eration determined by the benefit obtained not by the recipient,
but rather by the cooperator, which is a type of competition
between social strategies which can have an effect on the emer-
gence of language, and not only on its transmission.
2. The replacement method, horizontal transmission for De Vylder
and Tuyls (2006). This method involves establishing a norm in
a group of individuals and replacing them with new untrained
participants. It is commonly applied in the Naming Game liter-
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ature (Steels, 1997b; Steels, 1998; Steels, 2000b) (see below, sec-
tion 2.4.1). These models often aim to study the self-organisation
mechanism of linguistic adaptation. This requires an open sys-
tem, where new elements can be constantly added by new mem-
bers of the population.
Any new individual entering the population must go through a
process of learning the rules of a language already shared, to a lower
or greater degree, by the rest of the population. In this case, the evo-
lution of the language and how it is shared by the population de-
pends on the arrival of new members, rather than on the cooperative
behaviour of already existing ones. This, of course, could be an ex-
tremely interesting problem to study, for agents may choose to coop-
erate only with members of the population who already know the
language and are thus able to act together efficiently. The discrimina-
tion newly arrived individuals would have an effect on the language
shared by the group, perhaps even to the point of forming creole or
languages particular to sub-groups.
2.2.3 Type of language
2.2.3.1 Holistic languages
In a holistic language, complex semantic contents are expressed through
utterances that have no internal morphological structure (Wray, 1998).
The message conveyed by the utterance is not a function of internal
parts, but rather of the utterance as a whole. The naming game is a
good example of a holistic language. The meaning of the signal de-
pends on the signal as a whole, and not on parts of the signal. It is
the simplest type of language, making it very useful to model social
or cultural aspects of language, or focus on emergence more than
change. Models of evolution of holistic languages have used mainly
two types of forms. Agents can store either:
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1. A dictionary of meanings, which associates a word to one or
several possible meanings and assigns a weight to each single
association. This linguistic representation is open, it can be ex-
panded by adding new items as required and either removing
or decreasing the weights of existing associations. This form of
language is used in naming game simulations, beginning with
Steels (1995).
2. A matrix form language. In Hurford (1989), for example, indi-
viduals store transmission (figure 1) and reception (figure 2) ma-
trices.
Signals transmitted
w x y z
Objects a t1,1 t1,2 t1,3 t1,4
causing b t2,1 t2,2 t2,3 t2,4
transmission c t3,1 t3,2 t3,3 t3,4
Figure 1: Hurford (1989). Language transmission matrix.
Here, each entry tij is the probability of giving signal j while
attending to object i. The rows add up to 1.0.
Objects associated with signal by receiver
a b c d
Signals w t1,1 t1,2 t1,3 t1,4
received x t2,1 t2,2 t2,3 t2,4
y t3,1 t3,2 t3,3 t3,4
z t4,1 t4,2 t4,3 t4,4
Figure 2: Hurford (1989). Language reception matrix.
Here, each entry tij is the probability of having his attention
drawn to j while receiving signal i. The rows add up to 1.0.
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Several authors have developed interaction models in which
agents also store two matrices, one used when acting as a speaker,
or active matrix, and another when acting as listener, the passive
matrix (see e.g. Nowak, Plotkin, and Krakauer, 1999; Trapa and
Nowak, 2000; Komarova and Nowak, 2001) . An agent learns
by updating the matrix that corresponds to the role it is per-
forming in the interaction. Lenaerts et al. (2005) make use of
a similar representation and include non-square matrices to in-
vestigate the evolution of synonyms and homonyms.
2.2.3.2 Compositional languages
Many models have focused on the evolution of particular linguistic
traits, from very simple ‘Noun-Verb’ syntactic constructs (Nowak,
Plotkin, and Jansen, 2000) to recursive grammars (Batali, 2002). A
Fluid Construction Grammar (Steels, 2011) has also been employed to
formalise an agent’s language, (see e.g. Steels, 2004a; Spranger, Pauw,
et al., 2012; Spranger and Steels, 2012; Beuls and Steels, 2013). Kirby
(2000) uses a Probabilistic Attribute Grammar (PAG) (Stolcke, 1994), ’a
context free grammar enriched with statistical information and a way
of introducing attribute-value pairs as a semantic part of each rule’
(Kirby, 2000).
Of course, there are models in which both types of language co-
exist in the same population, so that some meanings are expressed
with a holistic signal while others are compositional (see below, sec-
tion 2.4.2.1, as an example).
Compositional models need to determine a process by which agents
induce or choose a grammar. Some mathematical models view the
grammar as an element in a set of possible grammars (Komarova,
Niyogi, et al., 2001). The interaction of the agents guides the whole
or part of the population toward a specific grammar, which is then
shared by all. Another approach is to determine cognitive processes
by which agents interpret the utterances they hear and induce a series
of linguistic rules that allows them to interpret and produce their own
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expressions. This latter approach lends itself better to modelling us-
ing cognitive agents. It is also more appropriate to investigate the rela-
tion between a population’s language and the environment in which
its members act.
2.3 mathematical models
A common analytical model is based on a differential equation stating
the dynamics of the frequency of individuals who use a particular lin-
guistic trait in a population of language users. This model assumes
that communication has an effect on individual fitness. An individ-
ual using a commonly understood linguistic trait is likely to perform
better, thus increasing reproductive fitness (Hashimoto and Ikegami,
1996; Nowak and Krakauer, 1999). The frequency of the linguistic
trait is determined by the fitness of individuals who use it, compared
to the fitness of individuals using other traits. Such models also in-
clude a probabilistic term that quantifies error in the transmission of
language from one generation to the next. Nowak, Komarova, et al.





xj f jQji − φxi i = 1, . . . , n (2)
where xj is the frequency of individuals using trait j, f j is the average
fitness of those individuals; Qij is the probability that a child learning
from a parent with linguistic trait j will end up using trait i; while
φ = ∑i xi fi is the average fitness of the population.
The next section presents an example of an analytic model of lan-
guage dynamics.
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2.3.1 Dynamical model of grammar convergence
Komarova, Niyogi, et al. (2001) develop a model to study the conver-
gence to a common grammar in a population of language users. The
model contains the following elements:
• A simple alphabet A of signals.
• A set Σ∗1 of all the possible strings which can be produced from
A.
• A set Σ∗2 of all the possible meanings.
• A set of grammars, G.
• Each grammar Gi generates a subset of Σ∗1×Σ∗2 , a set of sentence-
meaning pairs.
• Each grammar specifies a measure µi on Σ∗1 × Σ∗2 which repre-
sents how often each grammar may use a particular syntactic
construct to refer to a meaning.
• A matrix, A, which relates grammars to each other. Each entry
aij = µi(Gi ∩ Gj) is the proportion of meaning-pairs that gram-
mars Gi and Gj have in common. Hence aij is the probability
that a user of Gi speaks an utterance that will be understood by
a user of Gj.
• A matrix Qij accounts for errors in learning. It specifies the prob-
ability that a child learning from a speaker of Gi will learn Gj.
This matrix depends on A since the latter defines how closely
both grammars resemble each other.
Each individual in the population uses one grammar. The fraction of
speakers who use grammar Gi is xi. The fitness of an individual using
grammar Gi is:






(aij + aji)xj (3)
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where f0 is a background fitness, the same for all users.
In the case of a fully symmetric A, where aij = a for all i 6= j and
aii = 1, all grammars are initially equally likely, since they all have
the same distance from each other. In this case the fitness is:
fi = (1− a)xi + a + f0 (4)
A parameter for learning accuracy q is the probability to learn grammar
Gi given that the teacher uses Gi. Because all grammars are equidis-
tant, the learner is equally likely to learn any Gj for i 6= j. Thus every
entry in matrix Q is:
Qii = q, Qij =
1− q
n− 1, i 6= j (5)
Equation 2 becomes:
ẋj = (1− a)
[





n− 1 − xj
)]
−
(a + f0)(1− q)(nxj − 1)
n− 1
(6)
This equation has three fixed points: 1. a fixed point in which all
grammars are equally likely; 2. a fixed point in which one grammar,
Gi, is the most used; and 3. a fixed point in which one grammar Gj
is the least used. In the latter two cases, all other grammars have the
same frequency.
Similar models have been proposed for lexical convergence (Ko-
marova and Nowak, 2001) and simple syntactic rules (Nowak and
Krakauer, 1999). The next section describes this last model in more
detail.
2.3.2 Conditions for emergence of syntactic communication
Nowak and Krakauer (1999) employ common practices in evolution-
ary game theory to study how protolanguages can evolve in non-
linguistic societies, as well as what conditions would make natural
selection favour a language design based on syntax. The game is
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played by a group of individuals who can produce a number m of
sounds. They transfer information to each other about n objects. Lin-
guistic representation takes the form of a matrix P, the active matrix,
where pij is the probability for a speaker that object i is associated
with sound j. Matrix Q, the passive matrix, contains entries qji de-
noting the probability that sound j is associated with object i. In an
interaction between two individuals, A and B, the speaker’s language
L is given by P and Q, whereas the listener has a language L′, given
by P′ and Q′. When trying to convey information about an object i
the speaker selects signal j with probability pij, and the listener infers
object i with probability ∑mj=1 pijq
′
ji. The overall payoff for communi-
cation between A and B is then taken as the average of A’s ability to













If communication is successful both individuals see their fitness in-
crease by F. In each round of the game every individual communi-
cates with every other individual, and the rewards for each one are
summed up. For the next round, individuals produce offspring pro-
portional to their fitness. Children acquire language from their par-
ents by sampling their response to each object.
Trapa and Nowak (2000) investigated the existence of a Nash equi-
librium and an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) for this game. They
determine that if P is a permutation matrix and Q is its transpose,
then the language L(P, Q) is a strict Nash equilibrium and an ESS.
This very simple mathematical model does not include learning
through interaction. Nowak, Plotkin, and Jansen (2000) added this
interactive learning to the model, together with other assumptions:
• A language contains n words.
• Individuals are born without any knowledge of words.
• In any new interaction only one word can be learned, i.e., agents
are constrained cognitively.
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• Words are memorised independently of each other, that is, agents
do not learn dependencies between words.
The population dynamics xi, i.e. the relative number of individuals
that know the word Wi, is:
ẋi = Rixi(1− xi)− xi (8)
where −xi denotes a constant death rate. The rate constant Ri = bqφi
is the average number of individuals who acquire the word Wi from
an individual who knows it and:
• b the total number of word learning events per individual dur-
ing a lifetime
• q is the probability of memorising a word after one encounter
• φi is the frequency of occurrence of the word Wi in spoken lan-
guage
This kind of language can be considered non-syntactic: a word refers
to an event. The model proposes a syntactic language used to refer
to objects and actions, through nouns and verbs respectively, so that










where φ(Ni) and φ(Vj) refer to the frequency of occurrence of noun
Ni and verb Vj. The factor b/2 appears because either the noun or the
verb are memorised in each interaction.
When does syntactic communication lead to a higher fitness than
non-syntactic communication? Suppose there are n objects and m ac-
tions. Suppose further that a fraction p of the mn possible events













The fitness of syntactic communication exceeds that of non-syntactic
communication provided:
(m2n + mn2)




This inequality holds if the size of the system exceeds a critical value,
that is, if the number of relevant events becomes large enough, in
which case natural selection could favour a language design where
messages could be formulated that were not learned before.
2.3.3 Critical review
Mathematical models are an extremely valuable tool to reproduce
analyse phenomena. They provide researchers with the possibility
of focusing on a small number of parameters and simulate the be-
haviour of the whole system depending on the values adopted by
them. Observable effects are usually found on the macro-level, phe-
nomena which can be measured within the whole group or society
but which are the product of an accumulation of causes at the level of
individual interaction. In order to do that, models must abstract away
a number of elements which may prove invaluable in understanding
the emergence and shaping of social products.
1. Models usually parameterise communicative success. The ele-
ments of a language are determined by how successful they
are at providing satisfactory communication between agents. A
model determines the communicative success of an element by
assigning a probabilistic value to it and observing how the sys-
tem behaves if this value changes. Further understanding may
be gained by allowing the elements themselves to adapt depend-
ing on how successful they prove to be.
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2. Mathematical models very often make no or very basic assump-
tions about the cognitive abilities of the interacting individuals.
A linguistic token is either understood or it is not, an action is
performed correctly or incorrectly, agents do not guess. Commu-
nication has many more grey areas, successful communication
can be straightforward or immensely complicated. However, lin-
guistic rules are determined by how agents are able to produce
and understand utterances, as well as their understanding of
the object that they are communicating about, the environment
and the task at hand.
3. Linguistic elements are transmitted from one individual to an-
other in a probabilistic way. There is also a probability that the
social object is transformed during transmission, that it is not
clearly interpreted or understood, or remembered wrong. As
with other elements in mathematical models, these probabili-
ties are assigned by the researcher as a further parameter. A
more refined method is to allow the agents and their cognitive
capacity determine how and what is transmitted. An individ-
ual may hear an expression from another individual and must
determine what is meant by it. In order to do that it must rea-
son within the confined limits of the interaction and learn and
remember what was communicated and how.
4. Mathematical models introduce concepts such as fitness and
payoff which provide another level of meaning to the process
of selection. Linguistic elements are selected because they facili-
tate communicative success, and this success has a quantifiable
effect on an individual’s fitness.
It is important that models be kept as simple as possible if they are
to enlighten rather than confuse phenomena. Models may remain sim-
ple, however, while still taking into account not only how the mem-
bers of a group use the language, but also how they understand it
and internalise it. Computational models allow the researcher to sim-
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ulate the behaviour of the language within populations of agents that
show limited by well defined cognitive affordances. It is the agents’
linguistic and environmental capacities that determine what is pro-
duced, understood and transmitted.
2.4 computational models
2.4.1 Horizontal transmission: the Naming Game
Wittgenstein (2001) introduced the concept of language game to ground
language in the way it was employed by its users, studying “language
and the activities with which it is entangled”1 as a unit. An example
of a simple language is as follows: the game is played by a builder and
his assistant at work. There are four types of stones: blocks, pillars,
slabs and beams. The builder calls out a word for the type of stone he
needs, and the assistant fetches a stone. If the assistant brings the type
of stone that the builder wanted, then we can say that the assistant
knew what the word meant, and the language game was successful.
This, Wittgenstein claimed, can be considered a “complete primitive
language” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 13). Just as a move of a piece of
chess can only be understood as part of the game in which the move
is chosen, so the meaning of a word can be understood in the context
of the language game in which it is used.
Steels (2005) adapted an extended the language game concept into
a framework which has proved to be extremely useful in language
evolution research. He proposed a method based on computer sim-
ulations of interactions between agents situated in an environment.
Steels identified four elements that are required to achieve a minimal
form of communication in a language game:
1 “Ich werde auch das Ganze, der Sprache und der Tätigkeiten, mit denen sie ver-
woben ist, das “Sprachspiel" nennen.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 16)
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1. The agents need to be engaged in a cooperative task. This in-
volves being situated in the same environment, which is the
object of their interaction.
2. Agents need to have a medium in which signs can be con-
structed, i.e., a repertoire of sounds or gestures.
3. Agents can take turns.
4. Agents need to be able to share attention.
Steels (1995) investigated the emergence and evolution of lexica, on-
tologies (Steels, 1998) and grammar (Steels, 2000b). The simplest of
language games, the naming game, was designed to analyse the self-
organisation of a lexicon in a community of agents with no previ-
ous linguistic knowledge. Baronchelli, Felici, et al. (2006) describe the
game in the following way:
The game consists of a set of agents situated in a controlled en-
vironment with a limited number of objects. Two agents are chosen
randomly at each interaction; one is assigned the role of speaker, the
other the role of listener. Their interaction is played out according to
the following sequence of rules:
1. The speaker selects an object from the environment.
2. The speaker retrieves a word from its inventory associated with
the object selected, or, if there is no such word, creates a new
word.
3. The speaker speaks out the word.
4. The listener tries to identify the object by searching for that
word in its inventory. If the word is included in the listener’s
inventory the it points to the object associated to that word.
5. If the listener identifies the correct object, then the interaction is
successful. As a result, both players maintain in their inventories
only the winning word, deleting all other words.
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6. If the word is not included in the listener’s inventory, then the
game is considered a failure. As a result, the listener updates its
inventory by adding an association between the new word and
the object selected.
7. Every association between word and object is weighted with a
score.
We can identify several key elements of the language game frame-
work that contribute to non-centralised emergence and dynamism of
linguistic features:
• Random assignment of roles: Every agent can be randomly as-
signed either role. An agent’s language can always be altered if
it plays the role of listener.
• Invention: The system is open-ended, new words can be intro-
duced at any time, depending on whether the agent acting as
speaker has previously learned a word for a specific object. If
the language game is designed to replace agents by introducing
new ones, then new words are effectively introduced at every
stage of the game.
• Alignment: Agents align their languages after successful inter-
actions. Different language game implementations have exper-
imented with different alignment strategies, from erasing all
other items in the inventory to updating the weights of connec-
tions between words and meanings through lateral inhibition
(Steels and Loetzsch, 2012).
The naming game methodology has been employed in a large num-
ber of simulations investigating many aspects of language evolution.
These include: encoding of lexical aspects through morphological
markers (Gerasymova et al., 2012); emergence and evolution of mark-
ers for grammatical agreement (Beuls and Steels, 2013); evolution of
case systems to mark event structure (Van Trijp, 2012) and evolu-
tion of grounded spatial language (Spranger, 2016). It has become
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a paradigm of computer simulation models of language forming and
evolution. Languages form and are shaped through a process of self-
organisation, responding to evolutionary, social and cognitive pres-
sures. These pressures can be simulated and their effect observed.
However, there has been so far little modelling of an individual’s be-
haviours. Linguistic self-organisation responds only to communica-
tive success, rather than any selection process that the agents them-
selves may be experiencing.
2.4.1.1 Analysis of the Naming Game
This simple protocol has been shown to converge to a unique lex-
icon shared by the entire population (De Vylder and Tuyls, 2006).
Baronchelli, Felici, et al. (2006) show that the behaviour of the num-
ber of words stored in the system with respect to population size is
governed by a power law distribution with exponent 3/2. This ap-
plies also to Nw(tmax), the time in which the maximum number of
words is reached.
Agent based models often specify a system topology which sets up
the connections between individuals and determines which agents
can interact (Helbing, 2012). The behaviour of the naming game has
been shown to depend strongly on the underlying topology (Baronchelli,
Loreto, et al., 2006). A mean-field topology allows every agent to inter-
act with all other agents. This was the case in the original naming
game. Agents placed in a regular d−dimensional lattice can only in-
teract with their 2d nearest neighbours. Baronchelli, Dall’Asta, et al.
(2006) show that a topology of agents embedded in low-dimensional
lattices is significantly less demanding on the agents, who have to
memorise fewer words. Dall’Asta et al. (2006) compare the dynamics
of the system when agents are embedded in several different homoge-
neous and heterogeneous networks.
32 modelling language evolution
2.4.2 Vertical transmission: Iterated learning
Pinker and Bloom (1990) claimed that features of grammar such as
linear order, phrase structure or major lexical categories require an in-
nate set of cognitive traits in humans, and must therefore be the result
of evolutionary adaptation through biological natural selection. Kirby
(1998) set out to prove through computer simulations how there may
be other explanations for the emergence of syntactic features with-
out recourse to natural selection, individual fitness or communicative
success. The simulations addressed the poverty of the stimulus problem
(Chomsky, 1980), i.e., grammar cannot be learned by children learn-
ing a language since they never have access to anything but a limited
subset of possible linguistic production. K. Smith et al. (2003) claimed
that it is precisely this scarcity which imposes evolutionary pressures
on the language to develop structure, a pressure they name bottleneck.
Similarly, Hurford (2002) employed simulations of grammar emer-
gence and evolution to show that only generalisable languages be-
come stable when learners are only presented with a subset of all the
grammar contained in the agents’ internal representations.
The ILM (Kirby, 1998; Kirby, 2001) is a language game modelling
the transmission of linguistic behaviour over time. It is a transmission
chain method, as described in section 2.2. ILM simulates transmission
of linguistic behaviour through generations of agents, where the lin-
guistic output of one generation serves as the input for the next. It is
made up of four components:
1. A meaning space: a set of possible meanings. Kirby (1998), for
instance, defines a meaning as a triple of attribute-value pairs.
The three attributes are Agent, Patient, Predicate, whereas values
can be of two classes: Objects or Actions. Other representations
for meanings have been used: K. Smith et al. (2003) represent
meanings as points in a multi-dimensional space, where each
dimension has discrete values; Vogt (2005), as explained in more
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detail later in section 2.4.2.1, encodes meaning as a point in an
n-dimensional conceptual space (Gärdenfors, 2000). Vogt’s exper-
iment employs a 4-dimensional conceptual space, where each
dimension corresponds to a perceptual quality: one for each
red, green and blue component, and one for shape.
2. A signal space: a string of random characters with a bounded
length.
3. One or more learning agents.
4. One or more adult agents.
A fixed number of games is played at each iteration. After each
iteration a subset of the adult agents is taken out of the game and re-
placed by the same number of learners, while promoting an equally
sized group of current learners to the status of adults. It is assumed
that these new adults have learned enough of the language. Interac-
tions always take place between an adult and a learner. As we see,
the ILM involves a simplified model of population dynamics, as well
as a vertical transmission of language..
Individuals have no initial linguistic knowledge, so that at the be-
ginning of the game no agent is able to say anything. Therefore, as
in the naming game, agents are assigned the capacity to invent new
signals and pair them with a meaning. Different strategies for en-
coding and parsing signals have been explored, as have different
linguistic representations, such as probabilistic attribute grammars
(Kirby, 1998), definite-clause grammars (Kirby, 2001), compositional
rules (Hurford, 2000b), or bidirectional graphs of nodes for meanings
and signals (K. Smith et al., 2003). We will explore one of these meth-
ods in more detail below 2.4.2.1.
More recent research has focused on identifying the contribution of
both biology and culture on the evolution of language (Kirby, 2017).
An alternative approach to ILM makes explicit the contribution of the
learner to the process of cultural evolution (Griffiths and Kalish, 2007).
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Learning is modelled as hypothesis selection, where the learners com-
bine the data obtained from observed utterances with a prior inductive
bias which represents whatever biological constraints the individual
is equipped with. In a Bayesian framework, learners select the most
likely hypothesis by computing the probability of each, given their
collected data and biological bias by means of the Bayes relation:
P(h|d) ∝ P(d|h)P(h) (11)
where P(h|d) is the probability of hypothesis h given the data d;
P(d|h) is the likelihood that the data was produced by the hypothe-
sis, and P(h) is the prior probability of the hypothesis. As an exam-
ple of applications of this extended model, simulations carried out
by Thompson et al. (2016) show that cultural transmission can lead
to linguistic universals without requiring a strong innate constraint:
learners can learn a language universal even when their biological
bias favours a different universal, and could easily acquire the non-
majority type language given the appropriate data.
2.4.2.1 Iterated learning in a language game: Talking Heads experiment
Vogt (2005) presented a simulation of the emergence and induction of
compositional structures in the language of a population of agents. A
language is compositional if “the semantic values of complex repre-
sentations are determined by the semantic values of their parts” (Vogt,
2005). In contrast to compositional structures, holophrases are holistic
utterances whose semantic value is not determined by their parts, but
rather convey a meaning as a whole. It is a common hypothesis that
protolanguages were based on holophrases (Wray, 1998). The purpose
of the simulation is to investigate how compositionality may arise
from exploiting regularities found in holophrastic utterances (Wray,
1998). It does this by implementing and extending methodologies de-
scribed above: it extends the Talking Heads experiment of Steels, Ka-
plan, et al. (2002), based on the language game methodology. Linguis-
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tic evolution is set within a population of agents who can learn from
previous generations in an iterated learning process. It is worth con-
sidering these two elements in a bit more detail, since they represent
some of the most significant research trends discussed thus far.
1. The Talking Heads experiment investigated the emergence and
evolution of language by presenting an architecture that allowed
cognitive agents to map perceptually acquired data to symbolic
categories. An agent’s conceptual repertoire is a co-evolutionary
process simultaneous with the construction of its lexical system.
The experiment consists of two robots equipped with a camera
facing a white board displaying scenes that contain geometrical
figures. Agents are capable of segmenting the image into ob-
jects. They can collect sensory data about each object, such as
colour, position, size, shape, etc., which correspond to different
sensory channels. A perceptual stream is thus a vector of all
values of each of the sensory channels. At each interaction an
agent is loaded into each of the robots, and they play a guess-
ing game with the objects in the scene. The agent performing
the role of speaker selects one of these objects, which then be-
comes the topic of the communicative interaction. If the other
agent has no adequate category to discriminate this topic, then
it will create a new category, which corresponds to a new set
of features. Likewise, if the speaker does not have a symbol to
express the category, it will create a new one. Thus, a shared
lexicon and its underlying conceptual categories are shaped by
the pressure of successful or unsuccessful communication. Both
co-evolutionary processes are selectionist: categories and sym-
bols will be discarded or refined depending on their success in
communicative actions (Belpaeme et al., 1998).
2. The iterated learning model simulates linguistic evolution by iter-
ating games over generations of a population that is divided
into two groups: adults and learners. Adults have passed the
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stage of learners and are assumed to have learned the language.
At each iteration, learners master the language by interacting
with adults. At the end of each iteration adults die off, and learn-
ers take the place of adults, being replaced by a new generation
of learners.
Figure 3: Vogt’s Talking Heads experiment interface
Figure 3 shows the world as perceived by agents participating in
the experiment. It consists of a scene made up of objects of 10 possible
different shapes and 12 possible different colours. An agent has six
possible different sensory channels: RGB values for colour, an S value
for shape and X and Y values for the position of the object.
Each agent constructs its own private ontology by finding one
or more categories for an object that distinguishes it from all other
objects in the scene. Categories are represented by prototypes c =
(c1, . . . , cn) which are points in an n-dimensional conceptual space.
The points in the space that are closest to this prototype are defined
as the category represented by this prototype. A conceptual space
can be formed by combining the different possible sensory channels:
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a colour space can be formed using all three values of the rgb fea-
tures, or a ’redshape’ space can combine the values of features r and
s.
Each agent constructs its own probabilistic grammar starting from
an initially empty set. The grammar is defined as a set of rules R,
which might be either holistic or compositional. Some rules rewrite
to compositional rules and others rewrite to single word utterances.
Non-terminal rules can be combined with other rules through a com-
position operator. Each rule i has a weight si which indicates the ef-
fectiveness of the rule in previous interactions. The weight of a com-
positional sentence can be computed as the product of the weights
of each of the rules employed in the composition. These weights are
used to select among competing rules when encoding or decoding an
expression.
Agents have several mechanisms to induce the grammar. Whenever
the private grammar is not enough to communicate a meaning, be
it because the speaker cannot produce an utterance or because the
listener cannot interpret it, then the grammar must be expanded: the
speaker may invent new knowledge and the listener may induce new
knowledge.
• If the speaker cannot produce an utterance, then a new one has
to be invented. Utterances are constructed from random letters
taken from a subset of the English alphabet. The speaker has
two ways of constructing a new utterance:
1. The speaker may exploit an already existing compositional
rule if it allows it to encode a part of the sentence. It does
not create any new compositional rules, but can create a
new rule that covers the part of the meaning that was miss-
ing, and associate to it a newly constructed word.
2. The speaker can create a new holistic rule, and associate a
new word with it.
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• If the listener cannot interpret the utterance, then it has to in-
duce its meaning. The listener constructs grammatical schemas
based on similarities between utterances that it has heard in
previous interactions. This type of learning is done through
an alignment-based learner (Zaanen, 2003). The learner employs
three different induction mechanisms:
1. Exploitation. When a learner is able to decode only a part
of the sentence, then it adds a new rule to cover the part
remaining part.
2. Chunking is used when an utterance-meaning pair is not
parseable but a part of it aligns with stored utterance-
meaning pairs. In this case, the learner will add a new rule
for each of the chunks.
3. Incorporation is done when no compositional structure can
be induced, in which case the learner will add a new holis-
tic rule to its grammar.
In addition to these mechanisms, learners can also generalise
and merge. Generalisation is a broader type of chunking: the
learner will apply chunking to all rules that apply to a partic-
ular chunking step. Merging (Kirby, 2002) reduces redundancy
in the grammar. There are two types of merging:
– Rules with different non-terminal labels that are effectively
the same are merged.
– Rules that have the same non-terminal labels and the same
word-forms but with different meanings covering the same
conceptual space are merged.
Table 1 show an imaginary set of rules developed by an agent.
S,A,B,C,D are syntactic categories, determined by which dimensions
of the conceptual space they refer to. Utterances have been rendered
in English to make them readable; in the model, however, they are
made up of random characters.
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R1: S/rgbs→ A/rgb B/s
R2: S/rgbs→ C/rb D/gs
R3: S/rgbs→ redsquare[1r, 0g, 0b, 1s]
R4: A/rgb→ yellow
Table 1: Grammar developed by agents in Vogt (2005)
The simulation keeps track of the evolution of the language mea-
suring four different aspects:
1. Compositionality: the proportion of expressions that were en-
coded or decoded using compositional rules.
2. Coherence: the fraction of agents that produced the same utter-
ance to name the same object.
3. Accuracy: the fraction of agents that could successfully interpret
the utterances produced by other agents of the population.
4. Similarity: the average proportion of the grammar of adults that
is acquired by learners at the end of each iteration.
Vogt provides a simple mechanism for the agents to develop their
own grammatical rules, and to use those rules to produce utterances
in their interactions with other agents. This mechanism also provides
a simple way to decode expressions received from other individuals,
by trying to match the expression received with one that the agent
would produce using its own set of rules. The weights in the rules
let the agent decide which rules to try to match first, in case there
are several potential rules which could contribute in decoding the
expression.
2.4.3 Critical review
The agents involved in computational models of language evolution
act and interact in a vacuum. They are situated in an environment,
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they have objects that they point to and recognise and about which
they communicate. But what is their motivation? Every model of lan-
guage evolution assumes that agents are involved in cooperative in-
teractions. As pointed out by Steels (2005), see above 2.4.1, agents
interact in a shared environment and with shared intentions, they
are communicating about the same task. But they have nothing to
gain by communicating. Languages are shaped and transformed by
their contribution to communicative success, but in what way does
communicative success affect the individuals? Would communicative
success always mean the same thing, or would a harsher environ-
ment, one where performing a task can be very costly, actually make
a difference to the fitness of agents? A model of emergence of lan-
guage would offer valuable insight if it were to include the following
elements:
1. Agents communicate in order to perform an action which ben-
efits both participants. Successful communication means that
both can coordinate their actions and perform a joint task.
2. Performing a joint task is beneficial for both individuals. This
means that the agents that perform the task are rewarded in
terms that increase their fitness.
3. Performing the task is costly. There is a pressure on agents to
perform in the environment. This pressure affects the agents’
fitness levels.
4. Communicating is costly. In this way, the effect of not develop-
ing a common language can be expressed and measured.
5. Both costs contribute to the some of the agents’ decision to com-
municate or not. Because performing the action is costly, agents
are encouraged to cooperate whenever the benefit outweighs
the cost. Because communication is costly, agents are pressured
into behaving in a way that enables an efficient language to
emerge.
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6. Modelling the emergence of language in terms of cost and bene-
fit allows the researcher to study the effect of evolutionary pres-
sures on linguistic elements.
7. Linguistic elements are competing, in terms of being selected
and preferred by agents. But agents, or rather, agents’ be-
haviours are also competing, and the model can illuminate what
effect each behaviour will have on the language, and under
what conditions.
The next chapter will review several approaches to modelling be-
haviour in biological and social evolution. Focus on the evolution of
cooperation will help to clarify how such models will be applied in
this thesis to the study of how cooperative behaviours may influence
the emergence of language.
2.5 summary
This chapter has provided an overview of models of language evo-
lution. Most models view language as a complex adaptive system,
evolving under biological, cultural and learning constraints. Lan-
guage is constrained by human’s cognitive capacity to learn, which in
turn is affected by language. Individuals with greater cognitive capac-
ities can develop more effective ways of communicating. At the same
time, communicating effectively improves the reproductive fitness of
those individuals, so that they are more likely to transmit their en-
hanced cognition and learning capability to future generations. Lan-
guage and brain co-evolve.
I have discussed several classifications of language evolution mod-
els. A taxonomy suggested by Vogt (2009) classifies models accord-
ing to their increasing detail, from population to individual language
user. Analytical models propose a differential equation which gov-
erns the dynamics of a particular linguistic trait within the whole
population. Agent-based analytical models set down a diffusion equa-
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tion which define how an individual will acquire that trait. Agent-
based cognitive models offer great variability in the way an agent
acquires and processes language. A further distinction is made be-
tween the language transmission mechanism chosen by the model.
The transmission chain model involves generations of language users
who interact as teachers and learners. Language change is triggered
by each generation of teachers dying out and the learners taking their
place, while a new generation becomes the new learners. The replace-
ment method sees individuals being replaced by new untrained par-
ticipants one by one. The transmission is horizontal and a process
of self-organisation takes place. A final distinction is established be-
tween holistic and compositional language models.
I analysed several mathematical models. These models are inspired
by evolutionary biology and seek to establish the conditions which al-
low the language to stabilise around fixed points. Another model in-
vestigates the conditions that enable the emergence of syntactic com-
munication. Through mathematical models the researcher is able to
directly quantify the effect of varying parameters on the language
viewed from a macro-level.
A section on computational models has reviewed the simplest pos-
sible model, the naming game. It has then presented some analysis
carried out on simulations of the naming game. I have also discussed
the ILM, first more generally and then in somewhat more detail by pre-
senting an actual experiment. The Talking Heads Experiment (Vogt,
2005) models the emergence of holistic expressions, first, and then of
compositional structures which the agents develop by applying sim-
ple grammar induction methods.
The language interactions that are investigated in this thesis occur
between agents that display different types of cooperative behaviour.
In the next chapter I discuss models of cooperation that can be found
in the literature, the rational behind them and the focus each of them
places on an aspect of helping behaviour.
3
M O D E L L I N G C O O P E R AT I O N
3.1 cooperation is a puzzle
The title of this section can be interpreted in two ways. Cooperation
is a puzzle because its existence has perplexed evolutionary scientists
working within the paradigm of natural selection of the fittest indi-
viduals. But it is also like a jigsaw puzzle: scientists have managed
to gradually find new pieces which fit with other pieces to give an
increasingly clearer picture, not only of cooperation, but of evolution
also.
While writing On the Origin of Species in the late 1850s, Charles
Darwin realised that honeybees posed a threat to the credibility of
his theory of natural selection (Dugatkin, 2006). The problem was the
existence of sterile castes in insects such as bees, wasps and ants.
These workers are true altruists. In the first place, they
do not reproduce but instead provide all sorts of resources
to queens and the individuals who do reproduce. That
alone would make them altruists, in the sense of incurring
a personal cost that in turn benefits others. Some, but not
all, sterile workers will also defend the hive tirelessly, if
need be, with their own lives. (Dugatkin, 2006)
Natural selection is intrinsically selfish (J. L. Brown, 1983; Hamil-
ton, 1964), favouring the evolution of traits that benefit solely and
directly the individual who possess them. Traits such as sharp teeth,
visual acuity or crypsis enhance an individual’s chances of reproduc-
ing successfully, its reproductive fitness, thus increasing the probability
that those traits will be inherited by future generations (Sachs et al.,
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2004). Darwin (1871) suggested that selection must operate at mul-
tiple levels. At one such levels, natural selection would operate on
groups. A trait present in some of the members of a group that con-
tributed to increasing the fitness of the whole group would provide it
with an edge over competing groups and allow it to increase in num-
ber, spread and supplant other tribes. Natural selection would prefer
a gene, rather than an individual (Dawkins, 1989).
Cooperation within a group is also perplexing, however. Individu-
als within the group which carry an altruistic gene would eventually
disappear, since the probability of it being inherited by descendants
decreases as does the reproductive fitness of altruists. Altruism would
be recessive, and eventually the whole group would consist of non-
altruists.
A further missing piece in the puzzle is the level of cooperation
observed in humans. There are many instances of inter-specific coop-
eration in animals. Egg trading is a kind of mating behaviour in simul-
taneously hermaphroditic fish, in which individuals give up eggs to
be fertilised in exchange for the opportunity to fertilise the eggs of a
partner (Fischer, 1988). In other species of fish some individuals move
away from the school in order to attract a predator’s attention, thus
reducing the risk of an attack on the school and increasing the risk of
being attacked (Dugatkin and Mesterton-Gibbons, 1996). Many mam-
mals such as lions or wolves hunt or protect territorial boundaries in
groups. Apes groom each other and protect injured members of the
group, as well as signalling predators at risk to themselves (Tomasello,
2009). Most non-human examples of cooperation take place within a
close group of individuals, bonded by family relations and sharing a
common pool of genes.
Homo sapiens is exceptional in that cooperation extends beyond
close genealogical kin to include even total strangers on a much larger
scale than other species (Bowles and Gintis, 2011). The evolution of
cooperation at such level must have required the evolution of mecha-
nisms that ensure the continued existence of cooperators, preventing
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cheaters and non-cooperators from dominating completely. The evo-
lution of these mechanisms is likely to have had a profound impact on
the evolution of human cognition (Tomasello, 2014), and it lies at the
heart of human social and cultural institutions (Skyrms, 2004; Boyd
and Richerson, 2009). It is a reasonable proposal that the unique as-
pects of human cognition were driven by social cooperation (Moll and
Tomasello, 2007), from symbolic reasoning (Deacon, 1997), to moral
values and emotions (Burton-Chellew et al., 2010; Boehm, 2012). The
evolution of cooperation is one of the top 25 questions facing scien-
tists today, according to the editors of Science (Kennedy and Norman,
2005), a clear sign of its scientific relevance.
Several reviews have been published in recent years that offer
an overview of research on the evolution of cooperation (Redouan
Bshary and Bronstein, 2004; Hammerstein, 2002; Lehmann and Keller,
2006; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Sachs et al., 2004; West et al., 2007;
Yamamoto and Tanaka, 2009). The next section offers a condensed
summary of the very vast literature on the subject, focusing on what
is most relevant to this document. This is followed by a discussion of
game-theoretical models used by researchers to study the evolution
of cooperation, including cooperative communication.
3.2 evolution of cooperation
Cooperation is an act by one individual, A, paying a cost, c, for an-
other individual, B, to receive a benefit, b (Nowak, 2006b). One initial
distinction must then be made between two types of cooperation: in
one type, mutualism, individual A pays a cost that benefits B, but A
also benefits from the cooperation act. In the other type, A pays a cost
but does not benefit from the cooperation. Mutualism fits a common
pattern of selfish behaviour that increases the fitness of the individ-
ual (Bowles and Gintis, 2004); the fact that another individual also
benefits is simply a by-product (De Jaegher and Hoyer, 2016; West
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et al., 2007). The second type, altruism, can only evolve within certain
conditions. An altruism gene, G, is necessarily recessive, since any
individual possessing that gene would see its reproductive fitness re-
duced, thereby reducing the probability of the gene being acquired by
the next generation. Haldane (1932) suggested that the evolution of
altruism can be explained if the behaviour of the individual resulted
in an increment to the fitness of the group to which the individual
belonged. This increment would be proportional to the frequency of
altruistic members in the group. He also showed that there could be
an initial increase of gene G provided the starting gene frequency was
high enough and the cost low enough compared to the benefit to the
group. Hamilton (1963) further showed that altruism could evolve in
small groups which share common genes. Using Wright’s coefficient
of relationship r (Wright, 1922), he suggested that altruism would be
selected if the gain to a relative of degree r is k-times the loss to the





Thus a gene causing altruistic behaviour towards broth-
ers and sisters will be selected only if the behaviour and
the circumstances are generally such that the gain is more
than twice the loss; for half-brothers it must be more than
four times the loss; and so on. To put the matter more
vividly, an animal acting on this principle would sacrifice
its life if it could thereby save more than two brothers, but
not for less. (Hamilton, 1963, p. 355)
Hamilton’s rule determines the condition for kin selection and ex-
pands the notion of fitness to include close relatives. Thus coopera-
tion can be classified by whether it provides direct or indirect fitness
(J. L. Brown and E. Brown, 1981; Grafen, 1984), with indirect fitness
including the fitness of close relatives, ensuring the selection of the
gene, rather than the individual.
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This type of explanation is too restrictive, however, since we can ob-
serve altruism in non-related individuals or even between members
of different species. Trivers (1971) proposed another mechanism for
the evolution of altruistic behaviour: reciprocal altruism, also known as
direct reciprocity (Nowak, 2006b). This mechanism relies on repeated
cooperative interactions between both individuals:
One human being saving another, who is not closely
related and is about to drown, is an instance of altruism.
Assume that the chance of the drowning man dying is one-
half of no one leaps in to save him, but that the chance that
his potential rescuer will drown if he leaps in to save him
is much smaller (. . . ). Were this an isolated event, it is clear
that the rescuer should not bother to save the drowning
man. But if the drowning man reciprocates at some future
time, and if the survival chances are then exactly reversed,
it will have been to the benefit of each participant to have
risked his life for the other. (Trivers, 1971, p. 35)
Conditions for the evolution of direct reciprocity are quite restric-
tive. It is unclear whether natural selection will favour reciprocal al-
truism in sizeable groups. Several analyses suggest that reciprocal
altruism can arise when pairs of individuals interact repeatedly (Bor-
man and Levitt, 1980; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984;
Peck and Feldman, 1986; Boyd and Lorberbaum, 1987). Boyd and
Richerson (1982) suggested that direct reciprocity would not be se-
lected in groups larger than a handful of individuals because larger
groups decrease the likelihood of two individuals interacting repeat-
edly. Also, individuals that do not cooperate but benefit from the
actions of altruistic individuals would tend to see their reproductive
fitness increased, so non-cooperative behaviour would end up being a
dominant strategy. Evolution would be dependent on individuals fol-
lowing a contingent strategy called tit-for-tat (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981): cooperate the first time you interact with another individual,
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but continue to cooperate only if the other individual also cooper-
ates.
Cooperation can evolve in larger groups of unrelated individuals
through a mechanism consisting of networks of individuals who are
willing to help other individuals without expecting to be helped in
return. Alexander (1987) imagines that individual A may help indi-
vidual B although it receives no direct reciprocal benefit. However, B
might help individual C, who then helps individual D who finally re-
turns the help to A. In all these cases, contingent behaviour is based
on local information: an individual knows what happen in the inter-
actions in which it takes part, but does not know the behaviours along
the chain (Boyd and Richerson, 1989). This mechanism is known as in-
direct reciprocity. Models have suggested that this type of mechanism
is involved in the social status and reputation attributed to individ-
uals in a group (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Martinez-Vaquero and
Cuesta, 2013). Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) suggest that conveying
the information required in this mechanism would have played a role
in the development and evolutionary structure of language.
A third and final mechanism which allows the evolution of altru-
istic behaviour in large groups containing non-cooperators is known
as strong reciprocity or altruistic punishment (Boyd, Gintis, et al., 2003;
Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Bowles and Gintis, 2011). Many humans
have a predisposition to punish those who do not reciprocate, even
at a cost to themselves which reduces their fitness relative to other
group members. Studies have found compelling evidence for such
a mechanism from ethnographic studies of simple societies (Boehm,
1984) as well as from controlled laboratory experiments (Yamagishi,
1986; Fehr and Gächer, 2002). Several researchers Gintis et al. (2005),
Boehm (2012), and Dugatkin (2006) have made the case that altruistic
punishment lies at the core of the origins of moral values as well as
sentiments like guilt and anger (Burton-Chellew et al., 2010).
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Figure 4: Types of cooperation. Cooperation takes different forms depend-
ing on whether the focal agent benefits from engaging. If the inter-
action is beneficial for the agent, i.e. if the benefit to the focal agent,
b, is greater than the cost paid, c, then the cooperation is a case mu-
tualism. If the cost is greater than the benefit, however, this is an
altruistic action. In this case, a further distinction is made depend-
ing on whether the agent can expect reciprocity from the recipient
agent in future interactions, direct reciprocity, or from another agent
not involved in the interaction, indirect reciprocity. Strong reciprocity
ensures cooperation when altruistic agents are willing to incur a
cost to punish non-cooperators.
3.3 game theoretical models of evolution
The theory of games was first formalised by Von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (2007) in reference to human economic behaviour. Game the-
ory researchers set up and analyse highly abstract models of interact-
ing agents and study the consequences of their possible actions. A
central assumption of classical game theory is that players behave ra-
tionally, according to some criterion of self-interest. Players involved
in an interaction may be anything, from bacteria to states that pos-
sess nuclear weapons: the concept of agent itself is an abstraction.
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Game theory is only interested in the way actions chosen by an agent
depend on the actions chosen by all other agents. Researchers have
developed game models for a wide range of applications: firms com-
peting for business, politicians competing for votes, road and network
traffic, animals competing for mating rights, concepts of social justice,
etc (Osborne, 2000).
Game models are highly varied depending on the phenomena
under scrutiny, and include elements such as information available
to the players, whether the game is repeated, whether both agents
choose an action simultaneously or whether agents can learn from
the interaction, thus affecting their strategy. There is, however, a basic
set of elements that every game must have (Osborne and Rubinstein,
1994):
1. A set of players.
2. A set A of actions from which the players make a choice.
3. A set C of possible consequences of these actions.
4. A consequence function g : A → C that associates a consequence
with each action. This is usually referred to as the payoff.
5. A preference relation  on the set C, known as a utility function.
A solution to a game is called a Nash equilibrium. It is a set of actions,
one chosen by each player, such that no player would receive a better
outcome by choosing a different action, given the actions chosen by
all other players.
Modifying two of the elements of a game theoretical model makes
it readily applicable to evolutionary biology (Maynard Smith, 1982).
First, substituting rational utility by Darwinian fitness provides a nat-
ural way of measuring the impact of a biological trait or behaviour: an
action will be selected that most increases the fitness of the individual.
Second, the concept of solution can be substituted by that of an ESS.
A strategy is a behavioural phenotype specifying what the individual
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will do in any given situation. An ESS is a strategy such that, if most of
the members of a population adopt it, then no mutant strategy could
invade that population (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973).
3.4 game-theoretic modelling of cooperative be-
haviour
Rousseau (1984) proposed a thought experiment in which every mem-
ber of a hunting party must decide whether to cooperate with others
and hunt a stag or abandon the party and settle for a hare, thus re-
ducing the chances of his companions of hunting a stag:
If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well re-
alised that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a
hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we
cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it
without scruple, and, having seized his prey, cared very
little, if by so doing he caused his companions to miss
theirs. (Rousseau, 1984).
Scientists have used such thought experiments as representations
of basic social situations. A formal representation of simple models
like this can help acquire mathematical insight into social and evo-
lutionary phenomena, such as cooperation (Skyrms, 2004). Figure 5







Figure 5: Payoff matrix for the stag hunt game
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This representation is known as a bi-matrix normal form game.
Each row in the payoff matrix stands for an action available to player
1, whereas each column represents an action available to player 2.
Each entry mij represents first the payoff to player 1 and then the
payoff to player 2. We can assume that a player’s preferences are
ordered: every player prefers the highest possible payoff.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been the model employed in a vast part
of the research on the evolution of cooperation1 (Rapoport et al., 1965;
Trivers, 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; Nowak
and Sigmund, 1990; Nowak, 2006a; Cressman, 1992; Clements and
Stephens, 1995; Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin, 1997; Doebeli and
Hauert, 2005; Raihani and R. Bshary, 2011).
Figure 6 shows the payoff matrix for the prisoner’s dilemma. At







Figure 6: Payoff matrix for the prisoner’s dilemma game
Here R is the “reward” for mutual cooperation; P is the “punish-
ment” for mutual defection; T is the “temptation” to defect; and S is
the “sucker’s” payoff. A prisoner’s dilemma is defined by the payoff
relation T > R > P > S, although most experiments have also in-
vestigated the relation 2R > S + T so that coordinated alternations
between (C,D) and (D,C) outcomes are less profitable to the players
than repeated (C,C) outcomes (Colman, 2003).
1 The name comes from an imagined scenario in which two prisoners find themselves
under interrogation. Each prisoner has to choose between keeping quiet (cooperate)
or betraying the other (defect). In this scenario, the payoffs shown in figure 6 are the
sentence years.
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Both players are tempted to defect, since the payoff for this action
is the highest possible, if the other player cooperates. If the other
player defects, then it is better to defect, since the payoff P > S. The
Nash equilibrium is thus (D,D). However, if they both defect, then
they both end up worse than if they had both cooperated. Hence the
dilemma: both players are worse off by choosing the action that was
most beneficial individually.
If the game is played more than once by the same players, then de-
fection need not be a Nash equilibrium. We can assume that rational
agents are likely to learn that in this case it is in their best interest
to cooperate, and will assume that the other player has reached the
same conclusion. Iterated games can test strategies that allow players
to choose an action depending on what actions were chosen by other
players in previous interactions, which action to choose when players
meet for the first time and whether they can be sure that the current
interaction is the last one, in which case they can try to profit from not
being held to account in the future. Such strategies determine their
long-term behaviour. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) reported results
from a competition of computer simulations of cooperation strategies
using the prisoner’s dilemma. The best results were obtained by a ’tit-
for-tat’ strategy, by which a player always starts by cooperating and
thereafter imitates what the other player did in the previous inter-
action. Nowak, Sasaki, et al. (2004) showed that a single cooperator
using a ’tit-for-tat’ strategy would invade a population of defectors
with a probability that corresponds to a net selective advantage.
3.4.1 Modelling altruism
There have been different approaches to model helping behaviour.
One of the earliest models was proposed by Peck and Feldman (1986)
who investigate the evolution of helping behaviour within a popula-
tion in which two types of behaviour are possible. The two behaviours
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differ in the type and amount of ‘goods’ they produce and in the way
they are distributed:
• Self-directed behaviour, S, produces goods that are received
only by the performer of this behaviour.
• Group-directed behaviour, G, produces goods that are dis-
tributed evenly by both members of the pair.
Since fitness is determined by the relative values of the goods pro-
duced by each behaviour the authors set the value of goods produced
by group-directed behaviour to 1 and vary the value, V, produced by
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Figure 7: Peck and Feldman (1986). Helping behaviour payoff matrix.
Boyd and Richerson (1989) modelled the possible evolution of reci-
procity by investigating the evolutionary stability of direct and indi-
rect reciprocity in large groups. They study two possible scenarios
which differ in the information available to the players:
1. In the first model individuals only know the other player’s ac-
tions in previous shared interactions.
2. A second model allows for players to know whether the other
player has consistently cooperated with other players in previ-
ous interactions.
Both models assume b > c > 0 always, and are represented by the
same payoff matrix, depicted as figure 8:
A different approach is Nowak and Sigmund’s model of helping
(Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a). They in-
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Figure 8: Boyd and Richerson (1989). Reciprocity matrix.
vestigate indirect reciprocity by modelling a situation in which play-
ers interact with each other with a negligible probability of ever en-
countering the same co-player again. The interaction is between a
donor, who pays a cost c, and a recipient, who receives a benefit b.
The simulation assumes b > c > 0 always. If the donor does not





Figure 9: Nowak and Sigmund (1998b). Indirect reciprocity payoff matrix
Each player has an image score s. Every time a player performs
an altruistic act its score is increased by one unit. If it does not co-
operate, the score is decreased by one unit. Potential donors decide
to help depending on the image score of the recipient. A strategy is
given by an integer k: a player with strategy k will provide help if the
recipient’s score is at least k. Donors that decide to help pay a cost,
but they increase their score and are therefore more likely to receive
help in the future. This model assumes that agents display cognitive
capabilities which render them able to assign, recognise and remem-
ber such scores, a form of social tagging which can extend further
than the immediate group.
These models rely on identifying mechanisms that make altruism
possible, such as, for example, reciprocity or punishment. A different
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approach would be to pit altruistic behaviour against another type of
cooperation with which it may even coexist, and test whether under
certain conditions altruism would be selected. This can be done by
simulating the dynamics under varying conditions of a population in
which one or both traits are present. A trait that grants its possessor
an advantage in terms of fitness is more likely to be selected.
3.4.2 Evolutionary and population games
Evolutionary games are a common tool to investigate evolutionary
phenomena (Samuelson, 1997). Originally designed to study biolog-
ical evolution (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak and Sigmund,
2004), they have been widely applied in social and cultural evolution
(Boyd and Richerson, 1988; McElreath and Boyd, 2007; Mesoudi, 2011)
or socio-economics issues (Naldi et al., 2010).
An evolutionary game allows scientists to investigate the dynamic
relations between two or more competing traits. It is commonly made
up of two elements (Sandholm, 2010):
1. A population game describing the strategic interaction between
the agents. It consists of:
• A population of agents, P, who interact with each other.
• A set of actions available to agents, A = {a1, . . . , am}. Ac-
tions are decisions made by the agents in their interactions.
• A set of strategies, S = {s1, . . . , sn}. A strategy determines
which action to take during every possible interaction.
Strategies may be pure, which determine actions uniquely,
or stochastic, which define a probability distribution over
possible actions.
• A set of population states, X = {x ∈ R; ∑i∈S xi = mi}. The
scalar xi ∈ R+ represents mass of players in population p
choosing strategy i ∈ S.
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• A payoff function F : X → Rn assigning a vector of payoffs
to each social state. Fi = X → R assigns a payoff to strategy
i ∈ S.
Every interaction has an impact on the fitness of the partici-
pating agents, determined by the payoff function. An agent’s
fitness will thus be the sum total of the payoffs obtained in all
its interactions, which will in turn depend on the distribution
of each of the strategies across the population.
2. A revision protocol. The game specifies a procedure by which
agents change or inherit a strategy. Some common procedures
are (Taylor et al., 2004; Sandholm, 2012):
• A Moran process (Moran, 1962): defines a procedure for a
population with a fixed number of agents and overlapping
generations. At every time step an individual is randomly
chosen for reproduction, while another is randomly cho-
sen for death, thus ensuring that the size of the population
remains fixed. Natural selection is modelled by ensuring
that the likelihood of selection depends on fitness: individ-
uals with higher fitness are more likely to be selected for
reproduction.
• A Fisher-Wright process (Imhof and Nowak, 2006): is a pro-
cedure defined for a fixed number of individuals in non-
overlapping generations. The distribution of each of the
strategies at each generation depends on the frequency of
each strategy at the previous generation.
• An imitation process: defines a procedure for a population
of fixed size. It does not require that individuals repro-
duce, thus allowing dynamicity in a population consisting
of only one generation. This process is quite common in so-
cial and cultural evolution research (Helbing, 1992; Fuden-
berg and Imhof, 2008; Sandholm, 2012). One or several in-
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dividuals are chosen randomly at regular intervals. These
agents will be allowed to revise their strategy by compar-
ing their own fitness to that of other randomly chosen
agents. Whether the agents decide to imitate more success-
ful individuals can be probabilistic or deterministic. An
imitation protocol does not require new agents entering
the population, and hence no new learning process. The
evolution of a social product in a population with such a
protocol can be monotonic, or at least any disruptions will
not be caused by transmission between generations.
The revision protocol causes the frequency of each of the strategies
to shift. The distribution over the frequencies can be unstable or it
can eventually converge to a fixed equilibrium point. If the entire
population converges to one of the strategies over the others then it
is an ESS and we say that the population fixates to this strategy (Antal
and Scheuring, 2006).
3.5 modelling cooperative communication
Research into the evolution of cooperative communication has cen-
tred mostly on the mechanisms that allow the evolutionary stability
of honest communication. In competing environments individuals
might gain an advantage by deceiving others (Desalles, 2000). Sev-
eral models have been proposed to investigate the effect of coopera-
tive and competitive behaviour in signalling games. Signalling games
were proposed by Lewis (1969) to study the conventionality of mean-
ing. A game consists of a sender, S, who possesses some information,
t, about the world and wishes to share it with another player, the
receiver, R (Skyrms, 2004). The sender chooses a signal, m, from a
reduced number of potential messages and the receiver responds by
choosing an action, a. The payoffs in the original game make it a coop-
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erative game, with both players being rewarded if receiver interprets
the signal correctly.
Noble (2000) has simulated the effect of competition and coop-
eration in the evolution of communication by modelling signalling
games in which agents not only send honest signals, but can also
cheat and signal the wrong information to other, and potentially ri-
val, agents. Both players find themselves in an environment which is
in one of two possible states, high or low. A high state indicates that
the sender has found food, whereas the low state means there is no
food present. The sender is aware of this state, and can signal this
information. Signalling is costly, however, so senders decide whether
to share the information with the receiver or not. The receiver can
respond positively by performing an action, such as approaching the
sender to share the food; or respond negatively, by not performing
any action. Players receive a benefit only if the state of the environ-
ment is high. Figure 10 shows the payoff matrix for this game. Here
bR, cR, cS and cR are the benefit and cost for the receiver and sender
respectively. Noble shows that honest signalling is an ESS if:
bS > cS > 0




Neg. Response 0,0 0,0
Pos. Response 0, −cR bS, bR − cR
No Signal
Neg. Response −cS, 0 −cS, 0
Pos. Response −cS,−cR bS − cS, bR − cR
Figure 10: Noble (2000). Payoff matrix for cooperative signalling game.
Ackley and Littman (1994) proposed models in which the signal
may be beneficial for receivers but the signallers are indifferent.
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Oliphant (1996) applied reciprocal altruism to the evolution of suc-
cessful communication. In his simulations, an agent could perform
two types of communicative acts: a cooperative act and a retaliatory
act, which would provide other agents with wrong information, as a
form of punishment based on previous interactions.
While these models contain many aspects that are relevant to this
document, such as the dependency on the state of the environment
and the effect of communication on the players’ fitness, it is some-
what limited in only considering honest against dishonest signals.
Signals are a way of interacting with the environment, or denying
other individuals the possibility of doing so, rather than with other
agents. It also disregards learning: improving the signals does not
make them more effective or contribute to the fitness of the players.
Wang and Steels (2008) explore a model called the Reciprocal Nam-
ing Game (RNG), a combination of the signalling game and the nam-
ing game, discussed in section 2.4.1. In this model agents can recog-
nise each other, keep a record of cooperative behaviour and direct
their altruistic behaviour towards those who previously offered co-
operation. Payoff for both players depends on the action taken by R,
p = 1 if the the message was interpreted correctly, otherwise p = 0.
S can adopt a strategy of lying about t, in which case R adapts by ig-
noring information contained in m. As in the naming game, S selects
one of two objects in the environment, only in this case one of the
objects is the target, or the right object, while the other is used as a
distraction. S selects the object according to its strategy, either provid-
ing correct or incorrect information. Each agent has a social memory in
which they store a rating of each individual they encounter. Agents
also have different strategies with respect to their lexical memory:
short term memory deletes signal-meaning associations that fall be-
low a threshold. Figure 11 shows the payoff matrix for the RNG, where
each entry rik represents the payoff for S and R respectively.
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p=1 p=0
S cooperates 0.6,0.6 0,0
S defects 0,1 1,0
Figure 11: Wang and Steels (2008). Payoff matrix for the reciprocal naming
game.
A measure of lexical agreement is group coherence, summarised by
a group lexicon of the most popular words. Result show that retalia-
tion allows deception to be tolerated. Because R guesses the meaning
of a signal it does not know, agents can interpret this as defection,
thus punishing agents who are actually cooperative. Therefore, lexi-
cal agreement depends not only on a complete lack of deception, but
also on the ability to detect it. The game also shows that long term
memory helps to achieve coherence. As was observed in Axelrod and
Hamilton (1981), one mistake in an interaction can destroy confidence
between players, hindering future cooperative interactions. Coopera-
tive relationships become even more robust with long term memory.
This research has many elements that are relevant to this document.
Agents learn from other agents, and their language is affected by
the other individuals’ willingness to cooperate. Again, it investigates
altruism by identifying a mechanism that makes it socially advanta-
geous, rather than observing whether it can really compete against
other forms of short-term beneficial cooperation.
3.6 extended games and decision trees
All the game-theoretical models of cooperation reviewed in this chap-
ter are in normal form (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008). Interactions
in normal form games are one-shot affairs: players choose an action
simultaneously and receive the payoff. Which action they choose de-
pends on their strategy, which in turn depends on an expectation
of the strategy of the other player. Cooperative behaviour can be in-
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vestigated if interactions are iterated; only then are mechanisms like
punishment and fear of punishment significant. This is appropriate
from an evolutionary point of view: an individual’s reproductive fit-
ness depends on that individual’s complete history of interactions.
An alternative is the extensive form, where the player’s decisions
are a consequence of the other player’s decisions within that same
interaction. Games in extensive form are represented as trees, with
each layer representing the decision of alternating players. The payoff
for each player is determined after the interaction is over and is a
function of the history of decisions made during the interaction.
Other game-theoretical model take into account the cost to player
as a function of the effort invested. In the following two sections two
such models are discussed.
3.6.1 War of attrition
Maynard Smith (1982) proposed the war of attrition, which models
animal’s display habits in confrontational interactions, whether com-
peting for territories, resources or mates. Contestants display, and the
winner is the one who displays the longest. Display is costly, which
means that players cannot display for ever, if only because it delays
the start of breeding. Moreover, the cost of displaying increases the
longer it goes on. How long should a player display? Each player se-
lects a cost that it is prepared to pay to obtain a value V. For players
A and B the costs would be mA and mB. The winner would be the
one selecting the higher cost. However, that would not be the cost to
pay, since the length of the encounter is determined by the loser. The
payoff matrix is:
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Player A Player B
mA > mB V −mb −mB
mA = mB (V/2)−mb (V/2)−mb
mA < mB −mA V −mA

















Figure 12: Cressman et al. (2014). Foraging decision tree
model
3.6.2 Decision tree models
Cressman et al. (2014) proposed a model of the payoff received by
a predator choosing a territory in which to forage, as shown in fig-
ure 12. The predator is hunting two different types of prey, A and B.
At the top of the tree, it chooses a territory in which the probability
of finding no preys is p0, of finding a prey of type A is pA, and of
finding a prey of type B is pB. If the predator finds a prey, then it
must decide whether to attack it, which it does with probability pA
and pB respectively, or not attack with probabilities 1− pA and 1− qB.
Attacking a prey carries costs πA and πB respectively. The payoffs to
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the predator are a function of all the probabilistic decisions made dur-
ing the hunting, and of the cost of attacking. This is an example of
a model in which the end cost of the foraging process depends on
the decisions made throughout the process. Such a model can show
the effect of learning if the forager directs its behaviour in ways that
reduce the cost and thus increase the benefit of foraging.
3.7 a note on model design
Normal form games such as those reviewed in this chapter are not the
most appropriate if one wishes to investigate the effect of a behaviour
on an emergent cultural product, such as language.
One way to model this would be to add a variable to the payoffs of
a normal form game. This variable would function as a weight to the
cost of cooperating. When the game is played iteratively, the variable
would decrease as a function of the player’s decisions, so that the
more players cooperate the cheaper it becomes to cooperate.
Perhaps a more appropriate way to model the increasing efficiency
of language, and decrease of its cost, would be to emulate the way
language does indeed become more efficient: by using it. The effect
of the communication cost could be contained in the interaction it-
self, so that the more that agents strive to learn a language, the more
effectively they will be able to use it in the future. This is a way of
modelling long-term strategy: being willing to pay more now in order
to pay less in the future.
A game like this would look more like an extensive game. The pay-
off to the players would be a function of all the decisions made during
the interaction and of their joint willingness to cooperate. Modelling
helping behaviour would look somewhat like the decision tree in sec-
tion 3.6.2. The payoff would be a function of the efforts of one indi-
vidual to help another.
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In the next chapter I present such a model, in which the helper
decides during the interaction whether it wants to continue paying
the cost of helping, and can defect at any point.
3.8 regarding social learning
Simon (1990) suggested a theory that accounts for altruism on the
human tendency to learn from others, or to accept social influence, a
tendency he calls docility. In his theory, altruism is not the product
of natural selection, but rather the result of social learning, a pro-
cess which contributes to an individual’s fitness in two ways: first, it
provides knowledge and skills that are useful in the individual’s ac-
tivities, particularly in transactions with the environment. Second, it
allows the individual to acquire goals, values and behaviours which
are supported by others.
Boyd and Richerson (1988) proposed a somewhat different mecha-
nism, conformist transmission, which is preferential selection of be-
haviours individuals encounter more frequently. A behaviour that is
already prevalent in a population is reinforced by those adopting it,
because it offers greater support from other individuals who already
display the trait.
Both mechanisms rely on a form of social learning based on imita-
tion: individuals steer their behaviour in order to be accepted in the
group. This trait itself is selected because the support offered by a
large fraction of the population has a positive impact of the indi-
vidual’s fitness. Copying successful individuals is a common social
learning mechanism, in human (Rendell et al., 2011; Schlag, 1998), as
well as in animal societies (Horner et al., 2010), both in learning use-
ful skills (Ottoni et al., 2005) and behaviours (Pike and Laland, 2010).
Whether cooperative behaviour is the product of genetic evolution or
of social adaptation and learning is a question that is outside of the
scope of the model presented in this thesis. The objective here is to
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test how the behaviour may affect the emergence of a cultural prod-
uct, in this case language, and to determine conditions under which
this emergence may happen. Cultural learning is more appropriate to
the purpose of this model, because individuals do not need to learn
the language from scratch, thus influencing its form and the elements
that make it up. The model aims to isolate the effect of the coopera-
tive behaviour, discarding other possible causes such as how reliably
it can be transmitted or learned.
3.9 summary
This chapter has discussed recent efforts to understand the evolution
of cooperative behaviour. Motivated by the assumption that coopera-
tion has likely played a determinant role in the evolution of human
cognition and social traits (Boyd and Richerson, 2009), researchers
have attempted to model and simulate the evolutionary advantages
of increasingly refined types of cooperation: working together for mu-
tual benefit; altruistic behaviour which means that the agent must pay
a cost for the benefit of another agent; and two forms of altruism, one
in which the agent can expect to be directly reciprocated by the bene-
ficiary, and another is which the agent may receive the help of another
agent not involved in the interaction, or indirect reciprocity.
The chapter has also presented several models that simulate how
cooperative behaviour offers agents an evolutionary advantage which
may explain its selection. These models, inspired by the tools devel-
oped within the evolutionary game theory framework, simulate the
effect of cooperative behaviour on the fitness of agents by computing
the benefits obtained by the agent engaged in such behaviour against
the costs incurred. A behaviour which increases the agent’s fitness
is a trait that offers an evolutionary advantage, thus increasing the
likelihood of it being selected by transfer to future generations.
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Different types of cooperation make increasing demands on the
cognitive and cultural capacities of the agents involved. A game in
which agents cooperate only if it is in their own interest requires
only that the agent recognise that the reward is greater than the cost.
Direct reciprocity, however, requires individuals capable of remem-
bering previous interactions and who shun others who have shown
unwillingness to cooperate in the past, because individuals who are
willing to receive help but no help others (thus obtaining the benefit
without paying the cost) would see their own fitness increased over
those who display cooperative behaviour. Likewise, for indirect reci-
procity to be advantageous individuals must be able to recognise so-
cial tags assigned to non-cooperative agents. Cooperation can evolve
and become stable in a population if altruistic individuals are will-
ing to punish non-cooperators, a strong enforcement of reciprocity.
This suggests a process of co-evolution between cooperation and cog-
nition (Tomasello, 2014), by which greater levels of cooperation have
made increasing cognitive demands on individuals, which in turn
has allowed cooperation to extend to larger groups or even outside
of immediate groups.
The remaining chapters of this thesis explores the effect of different
cooperative behaviours on the emergence of a particularly important
social construct: language. As discussed in this and the previous chap-
ter, several authors have employed game theoretical models to investi-
gate the evolution of cooperation. Others have used them to research
the evolution of language. None, however, have studied the interac-
tion between the two; the next chapter will present the methodology
by which I will attempt to fill this gap.

4
M E T H O D O L O G Y
In this chapter I present a model in which agents interact linguisti-
cally to carry out a joint action. Agents display two types of helping
behaviour. They can be either altruistic or mutualistic. A mutualistic
individual will help another if it can expect to obtain a benefit as
a result. An altruist will help another individual even if it results
in a fitness penalty to itself. An agent’s fitness depends on its help-
ing behaviour and on its ability to communicate effectively, an abil-
ity acquired by interacting with other agents. This model allows me
to compare the effect of both types of behaviour on the emergence
and evolution of a common language (Clements and Stephens, 1995;
Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin, 1997)
The following chapters report on four different multi-agent based
computer simulation studies aimed at investigating the impact of
both types of behaviour on increasingly complex populations and lan-
guages. The studies are of two different types. In the first type, agents
interact exclusively with other agents who have the same strategy, in
two different groups. In the second type, altruistic and mutualistic
agents interact with each other. The population is mixed and both
types of behaviour compete to dominate over the group. This chap-
ter describes the design of both types. First, however, I introduce the
game model, detailing the payoffs to both agents at each step of the
interaction. It then discusses the agents themselves, their cognitive




Figure 13 shows the Coordinated Language Game model. It follows
the progress of a communicative interaction between two agents.
Agents assume two very different roles: one agent is the speaker and
the other is the listener. These two roles are equivalent to the speaker-
hearer roles in naming games (see section 2.4.1), adult-child in the
ILM (2.4.2) or sender-receiver in signalling games (3.5). Roles are as-
signed randomly. During its lifetime, an agent ends up playing both
roles approximately the same number of times.
(r− ca, 0)
(r− (cc + ca),−cc)
(r− (2cc + ca),−2cc)
. . . . . .
(r− ((n− 1)cc + ca), (−(n− 1)cc)






Figure 13: Decision tree representation of the coordination
language game. Here r is the reward, ca is the cost
of carrying out the action, cc is the coordination
cost and n is the number of attempts the agents en-
gage in. Each full node represents a decision point:
the listener has a chance to evaluate whether to
continue helping the speaker (H) or abandon the
interaction (D or defect). A small node represents
the end of the interaction, either because it is suc-
cessful or because the listener has defected. Next
to every end node is the payoff obtained by the
speaker and listener respectively.
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The tree traces the decisions made by the listener throughout the
interaction. At the beginning, the listener encounters a speaker who
wants to perform an action in the environment which could poten-
tially be beneficial for both. Performing the action is rewarded with
an amount r, but it requires paying a cost, the action cost ca. If both
agents act together they share the cost of carrying out the action.
However, the agents need to communicate effectively to be able to
coordinate their efforts successfully. Coordinating their efforts is time
consuming, squandering valuable time which could be employed in
other activities. It also requires cognitive effort and a certain level of
trust on the other player. Coordinating efforts is thus costly, and the
cost depends on how well they can communicate. Being able to com-
municate effectively can therefore provide a significant advantage to
players who can act together quickly. This cost is called the coordina-
tion cost, cc.
The interaction proceeds as follows:
1. At the root of the tree, the listener decides whether to help (H)
the speaker or to defect (D). Its decision is based on the expe-
rience gained in previous interactions. If it decides not to help,
the speaker performs the action alone, paying the full action
cost, but also receiving the full reward. The listener pays noth-
ing and receives nothing. The payoffs are (r− ca, 0), where the
first entry is the speaker’s payoff and the second the listener’s.
2. If the listener decides to help, they engage in a linguistic in-
teraction which follows the usual protocol of language games
discussed in section 2.4.1. The speaker produces an utterance
that refers to the action. It may be learned or invented, de-
pending on whether the speaker has acquired it in previous
interactions. If the listener understands, or guesses, the action
correctly, they perform it together and receive as payoff the
reward minus the coordination costs and half the action cost,
(r− (cc + (ca/2)), r− (cc + (ca/2))).
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3. If the listener does not identify the right action, however, it must
decide whether it wants to continue helping. Defection means
that the speaker must perform the action alone, paying the full
action cost and the coordination cost incurred. The listener must
only pay the cost for failing to communicate. Payoffs are (r −
(cc + ca),−cc).
4. The listener may decide to continue trying to help, in which case
it makes another attempt at interpreting the action correctly.
5. After each attempt, the listener has the choice of defecting. If it
does at any point in the interaction without having chosen the
right action, both agents pay the cost of however many times
they have tried, −ncc, where n is the number of failed attempts.
Defecting at any time during the interaction has payoffs (r −
(ncc + ca),−ncc).
6. If the agents are able to complete the task and perform the
action successfully they both receive the reward. The benefit
to them is then the reward minus half the total cost. The to-
tal cost is half the action cost and the coordination cost for
the failed attempts. Payoffs after a successful interaction are
(r− (ncc + (ca/2)), (r− (ncc + (ca/2)))).
4.1.1 Altruism and mutualism
The game is played by two types of agents, altruistic and mutualistic.
Whereas an altruistic listener always helps, a mutualistic one decides
whether to engage in, and continue with, the interaction by calculat-
ing the benefit it can expect to obtain from it. It does not know the
exact cost, since it cannot predict how long it will take to understand
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the speaker, but it can compute an expected cost using the costs of
previous interactions. The probability of cooperating p is:
p =
r− (ce) + ncc
r
(13)
where ce is the expected cost and n is the number of guesses already
attempted. Notice how the agent includes the coordination cost al-
ready incurred in the current interaction. The first decision is not
affected by this cost, since n = 0. But as the interaction progresses,
the probability of defection increases.
The mutualistic agent computes the expected cost, ce, by averaging







ca + nt−icc (14)
where t is the current interaction and nt−i is the number of attempts
at interaction t− i. Here k can be thought of as an agent’s self-interest
memory window. In the studies reported in this thesis, this window
is always 1, i.e. agents remember only their last interaction.
4.2 simulation elements
4.2.1 Agents
An agent has perceptual, strategic and cognitive knowledge.
• It can distinguish colours, shapes and directions. It can discrim-
inate objects based on these attributes.
• It is able to recognise all the possible actions that can be carried
out in the environment.




An agent has a semantic space: a set of meanings about which agents
communicate. The meanings are made up of three semantic cate-
gories: shape, colour and direction. A meaning is a triplet of attribute-
value pairs, one attribute each for shape, colour and direction. A mean-
ing corresponds to an action. Each attribute can be paired with two
possible values: shape can be either ball or box; colour either green or
red; and direction can be either right or left. There are eight possible
meanings, which correspond to the eight possible actions offered by
the environment.
They also have an alphabet of symbols, Σ, which they use to pro-
duce utterances. Agents have no initial linguistic knowledge, i.e. they
have no mappings between symbols and meanings.
The way agents learn language varies slightly depending on the
type of language. This will be discussed in further chapters. Common
to all studies is that only the listener learns, not the speaker. Agents
only learn from positive feedback; that is, they only store or reinforce
a connection between symbols and meanings when they have identi-
fied the action correctly.
4.2.2 Environment
Agents interact in an environment which consists of three cells. In
the middle cell, where they meet, are four objects: a red box, a red
ball, a green box and a green ball. These four objects are present at
every interaction. Binary values for all semantic categories ensures
that agents can only identify objects and direction through language.
The environment allows a set of actions, A, of size eight. The speaker
knows which action ai ∈ A must be performed while the listener
does not. This is similar to a signalling game, as discussed in sec-
tion 3.5. The action is always to move one of the objects to one of
the neighbouring cells. The meaning of the action always contains all
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three category meanings, and these three are enough to identify the
action. I therefore dispense with the use of verbs. In what follows I
assume that the triple of attribute values red ball left is equivalent to
the action ‘Move the red ball left’.
4.2.3 Interaction protocol
Agents interact in a way similar to the guessing game (Steels, Kaplan,
et al., 2002; Steels, 2004b; Vogt, 2015). Two agents are chosen ran-
domly from a population, and are assigned roles also randomly. The
speaker knows which action is to be performed. It searches its inter-
nal language and looks for a symbol or set of symbols associated to
the meanings contained in the action. If it finds one, it uses it to pro-
duce an utterance. If it does not, then it produces one randomly. A
cooperative listener tries to identify the action by decoding the utter-
ance searching its own internal language for an association between
the utterance and the meanings associated to an action. A successful
interaction means that the listener has identified the action correctly.
After every unsuccessful attempt, the listener has the choice to try
again or defect.
4.3 parameter space
The studies investigate the behaviour of populations of agents who
cooperate under the pressure of two costs: the action cost, ca, and the
coordination cost, cc. Our studies measure whether, and under what
conditions, two different types of cooperative behaviour affect the
evolution of language. I therefore run simulations of the development
of language under increasing costs.
The strategy is simple. Costs are sampled at discrete intervals from
a range of increasing costs. The range of values of ca is (0.01r, 1.15r),
whereas the range of cc is (0.1ca, 1.15ca). Parameters are fixed at each
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possible combination of these values and a batch of simulations is
carried out under each value pair. Every simulation was run at least
20 times, to ensure that the measures extracted could be tested for
normality (Lindsey, 2004).
4.3.1 Measures
To keep track of language convergence I employ consistency (Gong et
al., 2004), a pragmatic measure of similarity between two languages.
Intuitively, consistency measures the likelihood that any randomly
chosen pair of agents would communicate accurately, regardless of
the roles assigned to each agent. Accurate communication requires
that two conditions are met:
1. Both agents interpret each other’s utterances correctly, i.e. they
identify the right action.
2. Both agents encode and decode the utterances uniquely. If the
agent’s internal language produces a set of candidate utterances
that can express one meaning, the weights associated to the
mechanisms that produce the utterances must have a unique
maximum value. The agent would not have to choose randomly
between several equally likely utterances. Conversely, the set of
weights associated to all candidate mechanisms that decode an
utterance must have a unique maximum value. Agents would
not have to choose randomly between two equally likely inter-
pretations.
The consistency is averaged over all possible encodings, i.e., the to-
tal number of actions that could be expressed given the environment.
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is the number of pairs of agents that communicate an action
accurately out of all the possible pairs of agents. Here |A| is the
cardinality of the set of actions A, Saij is a pair of agents, i and j, that
can communicate action a ∈ A accurately, and N is the population
size.
I propose a measure of similarity for the compositional languages
developed in the experiments reported below, chapter 6. This mea-
sure, compositional spread, requires a firmer grasp on how agents de-
velop their compositional grammars during interactions, so a detailed
discussion of this measure is better left until such time. I explain com-
positional spread in section 6.2.2.
4.4 design of studies
The studies were designed to verify the effects of altruistic and mutu-
alistic behaviours on different stages of language evolution. The main
design concept was to allow a smooth transition from one stage to the
next, without jumps that would introduce extraneous parameters.
4.4.1 Type I study: independent populations
The Type I study sets up two independent populations of purely al-
truistic and mutualistic agents respectively. Agents interact only with
other agents of the same type. Here, the cooperation strategies do
not compete with each other. In this type of study I can observe and
compare the effects of both types of cooperation in isolation. The ef-
fect on the language of each population can only be attributed to the
behaviour of that group, not to the interaction between both types
of cooperation. In the first study, for example, we measure the speed
at which language converges in both populations. Because both be-
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haviours act independently, we can safely assume that any differences
in the speeds can only be attributed to the behaviour.
This type of study involves formulating a hypothesis about possi-
ble differences in the evolution of the languages of both populations,
and testing the hypothesis from samples extracted from both groups.
4.4.2 Type II study: mixed population
In Type II studies, altruistic and mutualistic agents interact in one
single mixed population. This type of study allows us to study the
competition between both behavioural traits.
Both behaviours compete for selection in the population. The be-
haviour determines the reproductive fitness of the individual. In an
evolutionary process, the behaviour that provides the individual with
a fitness advantage enjoys a greater probability of being passed on to
future generations. In the absence of further competing behaviours
or other evolutionary pressures, it will eventually spread through-
out the whole population and will be evolutionary stable. In this set
of studies I wish to avoid introducing new generations of language
learners to simplify the parameter space as much as possible. New
language users would have disruptive consequences in the trajectory
of the language which lie outside the scope of this document. It is
possible, however, to emulate reproductive selection by means of a
revision protocol. As described in section 3.4.2, a revision protocol is
a mechanism that allows individuals to change their behaviour. The
probability of agents adapting a new behaviour is proportional to
the difference in the average fitness of both behaviours (Sandholm,
2010). The revision protocol adopted here is a simple deterministic
imitative process. Several individuals from the population are cho-
sen randomly. They take on the role of imitators. An equal number of
indivuals is chosen, also randomly, to act as role-models. Every imita-
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tor compares its own fitness to that of a role-model and changes its
behaviour if its own fitness is smaller.
This study introduces a further parameter, an initial number of
altruistic agents. My aim is to test whether a very small number of
altruists will be capable of dominating the entire population. Because
the fitness of an altruist depends not only on its own behaviour but
also on the behaviour of those it interacts with, I investigate what
is the minimum initial number of agents required to dominate the
population. Also, I wish to determine whether this initial number
has an impact on the evolution of language.
4.5 summary
This chapter has introduced the game-theoretical model employed in
the four simulation studies that will be discussed in the next chapters.
The model consists of a set of payoffs for each player at every possi-
ble exit from the game. The game consists of a series of decisions
made by the listener, who must decide whether to help the speaker
to carry out an action. Performing the action might be beneficial for
the listener also, in which case helping is not altruism but rather mu-
tualistic behaviour. By varying the conditions that determine these
payoffs I can compare the performance of each behaviour in the pop-
ulation. The model also allows us to estimate the effect of both types
of behaviour on the evolution of language: succesful communication,
and thus learning, depends on the cost that agents are willing to pay
to help other agents.
I have defined altruism as an individual’s willingness to cooperate
regardless of the cost to itself. Mutualistic behaviour is motivated by
self-interest: agents will help another agent if they expect to benefit
from it.
The text then goes on to describe the elements of the model: the
agents, their cognitive capabilities and the enviroment they interact in.
80 methodology
I have then summarised the language game and its protocol, the mea-
sures used to follow the evolution of the language and the model’s
parameter space. This space is made up of two costs, an action and a
coordination cost.
Consistency is a measure of the likelihood that a random pair of
agents can communicate accurately.
Finally, the chapter included a description of Type I and II studies.
Type I sets up two populations of agents, one altruistic, the other
mutualistic. From these two groups I can sample measures and test
hypotheses. Type II has altruistic and mutualistic agents interacting
in a mixed population. The study features a revision protocol, which
allows us to observe the system’s dynamics and eventual fixation.
5
F I R S T C A S E : E M E R G E N C E O F H O L I S T I C
L A N G U A G E
In this chapter I report on two studies that investigate the effect of al-
truistic and mutualistic behaviours on the emergence of a holistic lan-
guage. A holistic language associates a single utterance, a holophrase,
with a meaning (Wray, 1998; Wray, 2000).
The purpose of the first study is to simulate the dynamics of
language emergence in two separate groups. As described in sec-
tion 4.4.1, one group consists entirely of altruistic agents, the other
of mutualistic agents. In this idealised scenario, I am interested in ex-
amining whether both groups converge to a common language, and
how fast they do so. The reasoning is that, even if altruistic agents
have to pay a greater cost, their willingness to help other agents will
eventually lead to long-term fitness gains by developing a shared lex-
icon, thus reducing the cost of communicating.
My hypothesis in this first test is as follows:
Altruistic behaviour has a positive effect on the conver-
gence to a common language within a population of
agents engaged in a language game. A group of altruistic
agents will converge to a common language faster than
a similar population of agents displaying mutualistic be-
haviour.
The second study is aimed at verifying whether altruistic behaviour
does indeed lead to a fitness advantage in a population in which al-
truistic agents interact with mutualistic agents. The simple revision
protocol described in section 4.4.2 ensures that whichever strategy
provides greater fitness benefits to the individual will end up spread-
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ing throughout the entire population. I am interested in determining
whether such a population can develop a common language.
I begin by describing the agents’ language and their language learn-




A population P consists of n agents. The agents are situated in the
environment described in section 4.2.2. Agents communicate about
actions that they perform jointly. There are eight possible actions in
the environment. The set of actions, A, is thus of size eight. Because
I am interested in the effect of cooperation on the convergence to a
common language, our model reduces the language to a minimum. I
therefore assume that all agents are capable of producing and perceiv-
ing the same eight different symbols1. More or fewer symbols would
likely lead to synonymy and polysemy respectively, an unnecessary
complication. Every agent has therefore a set of symbols, S, of size
eight.
An agent’s language consists of a series of associations of symbols
and actions. Every agent stores a 8× 8 matrix, L, like the one shown
in figure 14. This is similar to linguistic representations discussed in
section 2.2.3.1.
Every entry li,j in L is the probability that word si is associated
with action aj. For every action, a player holds a distribution over all
symbols s ∈ S, that is:
∑
s∈S
aj = 1, for every aj ∈ A (17)
1 For the inquisitive reader, these symbols are [’bli’, ’blo’, ’ama’, ’ita’, ’don’, ’go’, ’du’,
’kap’]








































kap l8,1 . . . . . . l8,8
Figure 14: An agent’s language matrix. Each entry li,j is the probability of
action sj being associated with symbol ai.
Since agents do not have a previous language at the beginning of the
game, every entry in the matrix is initialised to the same value 1/8.
5.1.2 Learning in the interaction
A communicative interaction proceeds as follows:
1. A task is assigned randomly to the speaker. This task consists
of performing an action, aj, i.e. moving one of the objects in the
middle cell to either the right or left neighbouring cell.
2. The speaker selects the symbol si where i is the maximum value
of column j. If there are several symbols with the same value,
then the speaker selects one of them randomly.
3. The listener receives symbol si and attempts to identify the ac-
tion aj by selecting the column j with the maximum value in
row i. If several columns share the same value, the listener se-
lects one of them randomly.
4. If the action is unsuccessful, the listener, should it decide to con-
tinue, chooses the next highest value in row i. This is repeated
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until either the interaction succeeds or the listener decides to
defect.
5. After a successful interaction the listener aligns its language
to that of the speaker. It does this by updating the values
of its language matrix using a learning mechanism common
in language game literature called lateral inhibition (Steels and
Loetzsch, 2012; Garcia-casademont and Steels, 2015), which in-
creases the matrix entry li,j, where si is the symbol used and aj






i,k if k = j
ltik − δlti,k if k 6= j
(18)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the learning rate and k is the column corre-
sponding to the correct action. The column is then normalised
to ensure that a distribution over the symbols is maintained.
Notice that, because agents choose maximum values deterministi-
cally rather than by sampling, they will use the same language when-
ever all language matrices have the same unique maximum value for
each row and each column. If agents chose by sampling over columns
or rows, then a common language would require that all matrices are
the same permutation matrix. A permutation matrix contains a single
1 for each row and column and a 0 everywhere else.
5.1.3 Language similarity
A population has attained a common language when the language is
fully consistent: any randomly chosen pair of agents in the popula-
tion would communicate accurately and uniquely (see section 4.3.1).
As mentioned above, the language matrices of all agents need not be
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equal for the population to reach full consistency; it suffices that ev-
ery agent’s matrix has the same unique maximum value for every row
and column. Because agents hold distributions over the symbols in S
for each action, one can obtain a measure of probability distance for
each action, and then go on to average over all actions. The probability
distance for each action can be computed using the Jensen-Shannon
divergence:















here n is the number of agents, A is the set of actions, θkj is agent k’s
distribution over the set of symbols S for action aj ∈ A and πk is a
weight assigned to distribution θkj. Since there is no reason to favour
a particular agent, all distributions are assigned the weight π∗ = 1/n.




where |A| is the cardinality of set A.
The average Jensen-Shannon divergence ranges from 0 to 1, with 0
meaning that all distributions are equal for all actions. In effect, this
requires that all language matrices are the same permutation matrix.
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5.2.1 Simulation setup
As discussed in section 4.4.1, simulations are carried out on two
groups of ten agents, made up of altruistic and mutualistic agents
respectively. For all simulations the reward value, r, is fixed at 100.
A simulation’s parameters consist of an action cost, ac, which is ex-
pressed as a fraction of r; and a coordination cost, cc, a fraction of ca.
Both parameters are tested at discrete intervals ∆ = 0.1, over ranges
ca = [0, 1.2]r and cc = [0, 1.2]ca. I run thirty simulations under every
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possible combination of both parameters. To test our hypothesis, I use
as sample the number of interactions required by each group to reach
full consistency. One caveat: to limit the running time of the simula-
tions a maximum number of interactions was set at 150,000, and often
a group does not reach full consistency by then. The simulations were
executed in python 3.6.2.
5.2.2 Results
5.2.2.1 Learning rate
Before focusing on analysing cost pairs I investigate the significance
of the agents’ learning rate, δ in equation 18. This is done by run-
ning thirty simulations under increasing values of ca and δ, with a
fixed cc = 0.1ca. Figure 15 shows the trajectories of consistency for
two populations displaying altruistic and mutualistic behaviours re-
spectively for increasing learning rates. The increase in consistency
for altruistic agents is noticeably steeper and requires fewer interac-
tions to reach full consistency. Figure 16 shows the median number
of required interactions for 30 simulations. One can observe how the
drop between the values obtained with a learning rate of 0.10 and 0.20
is very pronounced in the altruistic population. One can also notice
that the trajectories are similar within each group, with the notable
exception of δ = 0.1 in the altruistic population. This suggests that
the learning rate has no significant impact on how fast a population
reaches full consistency, and differences between populations can be
attributed to behaviour.
2 Simulations can be found in the following repository https://github.com/
mariano-mora/holistic_simulations
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Figure 15: Consistency trajectories for two populations of
agents displaying altruistic (top) and mutualistic
(bottom) behaviour. Each curve represents the av-
erage over thirty runs of consistency under a dif-
ferent learning rate. Altruistic populations reach
full consistency in shorter time, their linguistic
evolution showing steeper trajectories. Notice how
there does not appear to be a correlation between
learning rate and speed of convergence within
each population, except for δ = 0.1 in the altru-
istic population. This suggests that the learning
rate does not influence significantly the speed of
convergence to a common language.
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Figure 16: Number of interactions required to reach full con-
sistency in two populations displaying altruistic
and mutualistic behaviours respectively. Each bar
represent the median of 30 runs. While the num-
ber of interactions required at each value of δ
is very different in both populations, there is no
significant difference for varying learning rates
within the same population, except when δ = 0.1
in the altruistic population.
Figure 17: Average Jensen-Shannon linguistic distance as a function of in-
creasing learning rates, δ, for populations of altruistic (top) and
mutualistic (bottom) agents. Curves show the trajectories of the
average Jensen-Shannon divergence under a range of learning
rate values δ = [0.1.0.9]. Action and coordination costs are fixed
at ca = 0.4r and cc = 0.4ca. Each curve represents the mean of
30 simulations, shaded areas along each curve represent the stan-
dard deviation.
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Figure 17 may help to illustrate how the learning rate affects con-
vergence to a common language. Each curve represents the mean tra-
jectory of the average Jensen-Shannon divergence under a different
learning rate. Here action and coordination costs are fixed at ca = 0.4r
and cc = 0.4ca. Because every agent’s matrix is initialised to the same
value (see above 5.1.1), the distance is initially 0. An agent’s initial
interaction is always going to require it to choose a symbol randomly.
The distance grows as agents encounter new actions for the first time
as speakers, since they will choose random symbols every time. Even-
tually the agents’ languages reach a maximum dissimilarity, after
which point they begin to converge. A higher learning rate has the
effect of increasing the maximum distance and requiring fewer inter-
actions to reach it. The number of interactions required to reach full
convergence, where all language matrices are equal, does not change
significantly with different learning rates. An exception is δ = 0.1,
which slows down the speed of convergence, while also reducing the
maximum distance.
I compare the number of interactions required to reach full con-
sistency in both populations for several learning rates under fixed
ca = 0.5r and cc = 0.5ca. The results of the thirty simulations are
not normally distributed (results of normality tests are shown in ap-
pendix 11). They are therefore tested non-parametrically. The null
hypothesis is that the number of interactions for both populations
are similarly distributed, whereas the alternative hypothesis is that
the mutualistic group will require more interactions. Table 3 shows
the results of right-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests for equality of dis-
tributions in both populations. Low p-values support a rejection of
the null-hypothesis that both populations are similarly distributed
and supports the alternative hypothesis. The similarities in statistics
again suggest that the learning rate parameter does not significantly
affect the results, which should be explained through the difference
in cooperation strategies.
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Learning rate stat p-value ES Σalt Σmut
0.10 2378.5 3.73e-15 0.78 1396.5 3653.5
0.20 2498.0 3.97e-18 0.86 1277.0 3773.0
0.30 2499.0 3.72e-18 0.86 1276.0 3774.0
0.40 2459.0 3.99e-17 0.83 1316.0 3734.0
0.50 2493.0 5.35e-18 0.86 1282.0 3768.0
0.60 2500.0 3.50e-18 0.86 1275.0 3775.0
0.70 2500.0 3.50e-18 0.86 1275.0 3775.0
0.80 2500.0 3.51e-18 0.86 1275.0 3775.0
0.90 2500.0 3.49e-18 0.86 1275.0 3775.0
1.00 2500.0 3.51e-18 0.86 1275.0 3775.0
1.10 2500.0 3.52e-18 0.86 1275.0 3775.0
1.20 2500.0 3.52e-18 0.86 1275.0 3775.0
Table 3: Right-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests of number of interactions re-
quired to reach full consistency in two populations displaying altru-
istic and mutualistic behaviours respectively. The samples are ob-
tained by running 30 simulations under each of the different learn-
ing rates on both populations. Very low p-values support rejecting
the null hypothesis that language converges at similar speeds in
both populations and accepting the alternative hypothesis that a
greater number of interactions is required in populations displaying
mutualistic behaviours. ES, Σalt and Σmut statistics are explained in
appendix A.2
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5.2.2.2 Costs
Figure 18 displays the number of interactions required to reach full
consistency in both populations.
Figure 18: Number of interactions required to reach full consistency in two
populations displaying altruistic and mutualistic behaviours over
ranges of ca and cc. Each sample point represents the average
number of interactions for thirty runs of each value in the action
and coordination costs axis.
Each sample point represents the average of thirty runs under the
pair of values in both the action cost and coordination cost axes. Be-
cause altruistic agents always help other agents regardless of the cost,
the surface representing the average number of interactions is rela-
tively flat over all the space. Mutualistic agents’ decisions are affected
by higher costs. This means that the number of interactions required
to reach full consistency increases as either of the cost ratios increases.
Notice that, because simulations limit the maximum number of simu-
lations at 150,000, red areas in the graphic represent ca and cc parame-
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ter pairs under which the population does not converge to a common
language.
This suggests that low costs provide mutualistic agents with an in-
centive to engage in helping behaviour, having learned to expect that
such cooperation will result in a benefit to themselves. As costs in-
crease, however, mutualistic agents will shy away from helping, and
it will require more interactions for the lexicon to converge. The effect
of increased costs may be evaluated by comparing the two groups at
each of the different ca and cc values. The samples for each batch of
simulations are not normally distributed, as shown in appendix A.1;
I therefore use a non-parametric method to test the hypothesis. Be-
cause both populations are independent and my hypothesis expects
larger values in the mutualistic population, I employ a right-tailed
Mann-Whitney U test (Corder and Foreman, 2014). In this test, the
null hypothesis states that the distributions for both populations are
equal, whereas the alternative hypothesis is that the samples from
a mutualistic population are greater. Table 4 displays the results of
these tests. Included are measures of effect size, as well as the rank
summation of each of the populations, all of which are explained in
appendix A.2.
Low coordination or action costs result in p-values> 0.05, which
do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis. However, as costs in-
crease in either axis t-statistics decrease significantly, thus supporting
the hypothesis that higher costs increase the number of interactions
required to reach full consistency in a mutualistic population. Fig-
ure 19 may help to visualise the effect of increasing costs on whether
p-values are below or above the α threshold. Interestingly, both popu-
lations display similar distributions when the coordination cost is low
with respect to the action cost, even when the action cost is greater
than the reward.
Figure 18 may be illustrative of the linguistic dynamics in both pop-
ulations. 20a displays the linguistic evolution of a randomly chosen
altruistic agent throughout its interaction life for all eight different
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action coord stat p-value ES Σalt Σmut action coord stat p-value ES Σalt Σmut
0.10 0.05 500.0 0.23 0.09 865.0 965.0 0.65 810.5 0.00 0.69 554.5 1275.5
0.15 377.5 0.86 0.14 987.5 842.5 0.75 789.0 0.00 0.65 576.0 1254.0
0.25 465.0 0.42 0.03 900.0 930.0 0.85 833.0 0.00 0.73 532.0 1298.0
0.35 495.0 0.26 0.08 870.0 960.0 0.95 868.5 0.00 0.80 496.5 1333.5
0.45 499.5 0.23 0.09 865.5 964.5 1.05 888.0 0.00 0.84 477.0 1353.0
0.55 303.5 0.99 0.28 1061.5 768.5 1.15 898.0 0.00 0.85 467.0 1363.0
0.65 467.0 0.40 0.03 898.0 932.0 0.40 0.05 465.0 0.42 0.03 900.0 930.0
0.75 417.0 0.69 0.06 948.0 882.0 0.15 668.5 0.00 0.42 696.5 1133.5
0.85 428.5 0.63 0.04 936.5 893.5 0.75 887.5 0.00 0.83 477.5 1352.5
0.95 578.5 0.03 0.24 786.5 1043.5 0.50 0.05 459.0 0.45 0.02 906.0 924.0
1.05 470.0 0.39 0.04 895.0 935.0 0.35 877.0 0.00 0.81 488.0 1342.0
1.15 556.0 0.06 0.20 809.0 1021.0 0.65 892.0 0.00 0.84 473.0 1357.0
0.20 0.05 350.0 0.93 0.19 1015.0 815.0 1.05 900.0 0.00 0.86 465.0 1365.0
0.15 495.0 0.26 0.08 870.0 960.0 0.60 0.05 659.0 0.00 0.40 706.0 1124.0
0.25 536.0 0.10 0.16 829.0 1001.0 0.55 900.0 0.00 0.86 465.0 1365.0
0.35 505.0 0.21 0.10 860.0 970.0 0.95 600.0 0.00 0.86 465.0 810.0
0.45 613.5 0.01 0.31 751.5 1078.5 0.70 0.05 733.5 0.00 0.54 631.5 1198.5
0.55 555.5 0.06 0.20 809.5 1020.5 0.45 900.0 0.00 0.86 465.0 1365.0
0.65 554.0 0.06 0.20 811.0 1019.0 0.95 750.0 0.00 0.90 465.0 1075.0
0.75 636.5 0.00 0.36 728.5 1101.5 0.80 0.05 802.5 0.00 0.67 562.5 1267.5
0.85 598.0 0.01 0.28 767.0 1063.0 0.75 750.0 0.00 0.90 465.0 1075.0
0.95 697.5 0.00 0.47 667.5 1162.5 0.90 0.05 778.0 0.00 0.63 587.0 1243.0
1.05 724.0 0.00 0.52 641.0 1189.0 0.55 750.0 0.00 0.88 465.0 1075.0
1.15 783.0 0.00 0.63 582.0 1248.0 1.15 690.0 0.00 0.89 465.0 966.0
0.30 0.05 433.5 0.60 0.03 931.5 898.5 1.00 0.05 569.0 0.00 0.75 241.0 1034.0
0.15 442.5 0.55 0.02 922.5 907.5 0.55 320.0 0.00 0.88 210.0 456.0
0.25 520.5 0.15 0.13 844.5 985.5 0.85 300.0 0.00 0.88 210.0 420.0
0.35 585.5 0.02 0.26 779.5 1050.5 1.10 0.05 551.0 0.00 0.70 259.0 1016.0
0.45 644.0 0.00 0.37 721.0 1109.0 0.45 460.0 0.00 0.92 210.0 736.0
0.55 705.0 0.00 0.49 660.0 1170.0 0.95 460.0 0.00 0.93 210.0 736.0
Table 4: Mann-Whitney right-tailed results for different action and coordi-
nation costs. Columns show the Mann-Whitney U statistic, p-value,
effect size, rank summation for the altruistic population and rank
summation for the mutualistic population. The null hypothesis H0
is that both populations are stochastically similar. The alternative
hypothesis HA is that the number of interactions required by the
mutualistic populations are greater than the number required by
the altruistic populations. ES , Σalt, Σmut statistics are explained in
appendix A.2
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Figure 19: p-values for right-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests of the number of
interactions required to reach full consistency over different ac-
tion and coordination costs in two populations of agents display-
ing altruistic and mutualistic behaviours respectively. P-values
greater than α = 0.05 support the null-hypothesis that both pop-
ulations are similar. When both action and coordination costs are
low, there is no significant difference between altruistic and mu-
tualistic behaviours’ convergence to a common language. A low
action cost can make up for high coordination costs, whereas, sig-
nificantly, a low coordination cost means that both behaviours are
similar even when the action cost is half of the reward.
actions. After an initial period in which the distributions are similar,
a single action-pair association eventually wins out, as shown by the
fact that each action has a single different active row. This cannot be
said of the language evolution of a mutualistic agent, as shown in 19b.
Here the agent cannot decide whether it should move the red ball or
the green ball right when receiving the symbol ’ita’.
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(a) Altruistic agent
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(b) Mutualistic agent
Figure 18: Language evolution of two agents. The figure displays the evolu-
tion of the distributions of over symbols si ∈ S for all eight ac-
tions. (a) shows the language of an agent randomly chosen from
the altruistic population, whereas (b) is the language of a ran-
domly chosen mutualistic agent. Here the mutualistic population
does not converge to a common language, since agents cannot
decide which symbol corresponds to several actions.
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5.3 experimental study ii
As in the previous study, this experimental study explores the effect
of altruistic and mutualistic behaviours on the emergence of language.
In this case, however, both types of behaviour coexist in one popula-
tion. As described in section 4.4.2, agents play an evolutionary game,
where agents are allowed to evaluate and change their cooperation
strategy through a simple imitation process.
This study introduces a further parameter: the initial proportion of
altruistic agents, α.
As in the previous study, a measure of the spread of a shared lan-
guage is obtained through the language consistency.
5.3.1 Simulation setup
I have run simulations of the Coordination Language Game (CLG) on
populations of 100 agents. Initially, every agent is either altruistic or
mutualistic. Each simulation explores the evolution of the population
under different values of three parameters: the action cost, ca, the co-
ordination cost, cc, and the initial proportion of altruistic agents in the
population, α. I explore the range of all three parameters in increasing
discrete intervals ∆, ranging from 0.05 to 1.15 in the case of ca and cc
and from 0.05 to 0.95 for α. This means that both costs are eventually
greater than the reward. Because the model showed greater variance




0.01, for 0 < ca ≤ 0.15
0.10, for 0.15 < ca ≤ 1.15
The revision protocol is described in section 4.4.2. Briefly, randomly
selected agents change their behaviour by imitating more successful
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individuals. In this study, 5 imitators and 5 role-models were selected
every 40 interactions.
Agents remember the cost of their last interaction only, that is n = 1
in equation 13. Every simulation was run 20 times and stopped when
the model displayed no more dynamic behaviour, because the popu-
lation had fixated at one of the possible strategies and the agents had
converged to a common language. A maximum number of interac-
tions was set at 150,000.
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5.3.2 Results
(a) Percentage of simulations that fixate at altruism
(b) Percentage of simulations that converge to common language
Figure 19: Figure (a) displays the cooperation strategy fixations. Each cube
shows the results of 20 simulations under a parameter triplet
{cia, c
j
c, αk}. The cube’s colour displays the percentage of simula-
tions that fixated at either strategy. Percentages range from all mu-
tualistic (dark blue) to all altruistic (bright red). To facilitate view-
ing I have shaded all cubes representing parameter triplets under
which all runs fixated at a mutualistic strategy. Figure (b) dis-
plays the percentage of simulations under each parameter triplet
in which full linguistic consistency was reached. I have shaded
the simulations where no common language was reached to facil-
itate viewing. Note the dissimilarity between both graphs along
very low values of the action cost.
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5.3.2.1 Population dynamics
Every simulation fixated at one of the cooperation strategies, i.e. all
agents had the same strategy at the end of every simulation. This
suggests that the game has no internal equilibrium point in which
altruistic and mutualistic agents can coexist sustainably in a popula-
tion. Which strategy dominates depends, as expected, largely on the
costs and to a lesser degree on the initial number of altruistic agents.
Figure 19a displays the dominant strategies as a function of ac-
tion and coordination costs, as well as initial proportion of altruistic
agents. Each cube shows the results for a parameter triplet {cia, c
j
c, αk},
its colour displaying the percentage of runs that fixated at either strat-
egy, where 1 (bright red) indicates that all runs fixated at an altruis-
tic strategy. To facilitate viewing I have removed cubes representing
triplets where all 20 runs fixated at a mutualistic strategy.
The figure shows the interplay between the cost of carrying out the
action and the cost of coordinating it.
• As costs increase mutualism becomes a dominant strategy. If
ca > 0.35r and cc > 0.75ca mutualistic strategy offers a fitness
advantage that will make altruistic agents copy them.
• Altruism is dominant if cc < 0.25ca for higher values of the
action cost, i.e. ca > 0.25r. A low coordination cost will result in
a fitness advantage for altruistic agents even for ca > r.
• Low values of both action and coordination costs show a greater
variance in fixating strategies. Mutualism will be advantageous
when both values are at their lowest: ca = 0.05r and cc = 0.05ca.
• Fitness is sensitive to the initial proportion of altruistic agents,
particularly if both costs are low. Mutualism will spread
through the population even if only 5% of the population are
initially altruistic. At low cost values mutualistic agents will in-
teract with a high probability, which means that they are very
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likely to share the costs, thus increasing their fitness and reduc-
ing the number of attempts required in future interactions.
Figure 20: Detail of cooperation strategy fixations for ca < 0.25r. This fig-
ure is a closer look at the low values of ca taken from figure 19a.
In this case cubes representing simulation in which every run
fixated at altruistic behaviour have been shaded to facilitate view-
ing.
5.3.2.2 Language stability
Figure 19b shows the percentage of simulations per parameter triplet
where the population reached a common, fully consistent language.
As in figure 19a, each cube represents a parameter triplet and its
colour displays the percentage of runs in which the population
reached full consistency. Cubes representing parameters under which
none of the simulations reached consistency are shown as shades to
facilitate viewing.
Results are very similar to those obtained for the population dy-
namics, suggesting that high costs will not allow agents to establish
a common language. A significant difference can be found along the
lowest action cost value, ca = 0.05r. Figure 20 shows the percentage of
fixating strategies for parameter triplets satisfying ca < 0.25r, a detail
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of the values shown in figure (a). Mutualistic behaviour can dom-
inate in a population under such restricted circumstances and still
converge to a common language, if the initial proportion of altruistic
agents is less than 35% of the population.
• As costs increase it becomes more and more unlikely that lan-
guage will converge. Similarly to the results shown in figure (a),
if ca > 0.35r and cc > 0.75ca it is unlikely that the population
will share a common language after 150,000 interactions.
• For low coordination costs, i.e. cc < 0.25ca, the population is
very likely to converge to a common language, allowing even
for very expensive actions.
• Low costs will result in language convergence regardless of the
dominant cooperation strategy. As shown saw in figure (a), low
action and coordination costs result in a fitness advantage for
mutualistic agents, whose commitment to helping suffices to
allow a common language to be established.
• Language convergence is also sensitive to the initial proportion
of altruistic agents in the population. It is noticeable that if 95%
of the agents are initially altruistic the population can reach a
common language even if communicating is costly with respect
to the cost of carrying out the action, for example, if cc < 1.05ca,
as long as ca < 0.45r.
5.4 summary
This chapter has reported on two experimental studies on the impact
of altruistic and mutualistic cooperative behaviour on the emergence
of a common language. The first study compares the speed at which
language converges in two independent populations, one made up
of altruistic agents, while agents in the other group are exclusively
mutualistic. Taking as samples the number of interactions required
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to reach full consistency, I tested the hypothesis that language will
converge faster in populations of altruistic individuals. Results of non-
parametric hypothesis testing strongly suggest that this hypothesis is
true, if the costs of performing and coordinating the joint action are
high enough. Results also point at the importance of low coordination
costs. If the cost of coordinating the language is low enough (cc <
0.10ca), a mutualistic population can develop a shared language at a
speed similar to that of an altruistic population, even if the cost of
performing the action is half of the reward.
These results stand also in a situation in which altruistic and mu-
tualistic individuals interact with each other in a mixed population.
The second study reported in this chapter suggests that at low action
and coordination costs, mutualistic agents enjoy a fitness advantage.
Mutualistic behaviour spreads throughout the whole population and
a common language emerges. Altruism is the dominant strategy if the
number of altruistic agents is initially more than 30% of the popula-
tion. If ca > 0.25r, however, mutualistic behaviour dominates, regard-
less of the cost of coordinating actions. In this case, the population
will not develop a common language.

6
S E C O N D C A S E : E M E R G E N C E O F C O M P O S I T I O N A L
S T R U C T U R E S
This chapter reports on two experimental studies aimed at investi-
gating the effect of altruistic and mutualistic behaviours on the emer-
gence of compositional structures in language. These two studies con-
tinue and extend the experiments described in chapter 5 above. In this
set of simulations, however, instead of associating symbols to actions,
agents use the utterances they hear to build an internal grammar
which includes compositional rules.
The studies follow the pattern set by the two previous experiments
and discussed in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. An initial experiment simu-
lates the language evolution in two independent groups of altruistic
and mutualistic agents respectively. This type of experiment allows
me to compare the language evolution in both groups.
I hypothesise that altruism will have a positive impact on the emer-
gence and development of compositional structures within a popula-
tion. This language will be shared by a larger fraction of the popu-
lation than in the case of a mutualistic population. More specifically,
the consistency of the language will be greater in a population of
altruistic agents.
In the second experiment, language evolves in a mixed population,
in which both behaviours compete for dominance. The aim is to de-
termine whether, and under what conditions, such a population will
develop a consistent language.
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R1: S[s1+s2+s3]→ A[s1=?], G[s2=?], E[s3=?] 1.000
R2: S[s1+s2+s3]→ G[s1=green], A[s2=?], E[s3=?] 0.000
R3: S[s1+s2+s3]→ E[s1=?], A[s2=?], G[s3=?] 0.000
R4: S[s1+s2]→ A[s1=?], B[s2=?] 0.000
R5: S[s1+s2]→ F[s1=?], E[s2=?] 0.000
R6: F[s1+s2]→ A[s1=?], G[s2=?] 0.550
R7: H[s1+s2]→ A[s1=?], E[s2=?] 0.001
R8: B[s1+s2]→ E[s1=?], G[s2=?] 0.001
R9: A[s=ball]→ “x" 1.000
R10: G[s=green]→ “e" 1.000
R11: E[s=right]→ “m" 1.000
R12: B[s=(red,right)]→ “wx" 0.000
R13: S[s=(green,ball,right)]→ “hth" 0.399
R14: S[s=(ball,right,red)]→ “jxpce" 0.196
Figure 21: An example grammar. Each rule’s left hand side is of the form
Syn[Sem] where Syn is a syntactic category (here S, A, B, etc.) and
Sem is a set of semantic attributes. Sem may be underspecified as
to semantic category, or fixed to specific one (shape, colour, direc-
tion). Sem may also be restricted to a single value or apply to the
two different values that belong to a category, shown here as a
question mark. The right hand side consists of either a sequence
of similarly specified daughter or a string terminal. Finally, each
rule is weighted from 0 to 1.
6.1 agent’s language
The agents’ linguistic processing relies heavily on the language exper-
iments developed by Vogt (2005), discussed on section 2.4.2.1. This
work, in turn, borrows from the linguistic models of Kirby (1998),
Kirby (2001), and Kirby (2002). This section begins by describing the
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linguistic form of an agent’s internal grammar. Agents use their gram-
mar as they develop it, encoding and decoding utterances to refer to
actions.
6.1.1 An agent’s grammar
As discussed in section 4.2.1.1, agents know three semantic categories:
shape, colour and direction. They have no notion of verbs, but such a
notion is not required. They know that objects are there to be moved
somewhere.
Figure 21 shows an agent’s internal language. It is a probability
attribute grammar (PAG) (Stolcke, 1994). A PAG is an extension of
stochastic context free grammar which can assign a set of features to
a non-terminal. Following Kirby (2000) a PAG contains:
1. a set of non-terminal symbols N
2. a set of terminal symbols Σ
3. a start non-terminal S ∈ N
4. a set of production rules R of the form X → λ, where X ∈ N
and λ ∈ (N ∪ Σ)
5. production counts C(r) for all r ∈ R
Each production rule can contain a semantic part made up of
attribute-value pairs. The left hand side of a rule is of the form
Syn[Sem] where Syn is a syntactic category and Sem is a set of se-
mantic attributes. Sem may be fixed to one of the semantic categories
defined in section 4.2.1.1: shape, colour and direction. It can also be as-
signed to two or three semantic categories. Sem may also be restricted
to a single value, or it can take either of the two possible values in
each semantic category.
Example 1
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Imagine an agent hears the utterance “wxy” and learns that it
means ‘red ball right’. In a subsequent interaction it learns the ut-
terance “wxz” with meaning ‘red ball left’. The learner realises that
the parts of the meaning these two utterances have in common cor-
respond to the semantic categories colour and shape. It also comes to
the conclusion that the symbols “y” and “z” are two different values
belonging to the semantic category direction. The agent then creates
the following simple grammar:
R1: A[s=(right)]→ “y”
R2: A[s=(left)]→ “z”
R3: B[s=(red, ball)]→ “wx”
R4: S[s1+s2]→ B[s=(red,ball)], A[s=?]
The agent has created two new syntactic categories. B has fixed
semantic content, it is connected to two specific semantic categories
and those particular values. R4 states that, whenever the agent needs
to refer to something that has attribute values red and ball, it can
use the expression “wx” followed by something else. The grammar
includes a further new syntactic category, A, which is linked uniquely
to the semantic category direction. This syntactic category, however, is
not fixed to any semantic values. The agent knows this because it has
already encountered two examples with different meanings. Rule R4
states that, after using “wx” for red ball, the agent is allowed to use
any of the values associated to syntactic category A.
Syntactic rules associated to two or three semantic categories are
very common in the languages developed by the agents in this game.
Because agents have no initial linguistic knowledge whatsoever, they
cannot construct utterances in their initial interactions. In this case the
agent will invent an utterance that refers to the action it has to per-
form. This action contains all three semantic categories, it is a holistic
expression. Kirby (2000) refers to this as Stage I in the game’s lin-
guistic evolution. The grammar in example 2 corresponds to Stage
6.1 agent’s language 109
II, in which semantic categories are lumped together in a syntactic
category, usually with fixed semantic values.
Example 2
Imagine further that the same agent, who already has the grammar
in example 1, is given the utterance “wdz” meaning ‘red box left’. It
compares the first two symbols of this utterance with the string ter-
minal in rule R3 and reaches the conclusion that it can add another
syntactic category to its grammar, one that is associated to the seman-
tic category colour with the fixed value red. In fact, the agent adds
four new rules, because it now knows that the symbol “x” refers to




R8: B[s1+s2]→ C[s=red], D[s=?]
Notice how rule R8 is a split of rule R3, since both rules have the
same syntactic category, only now R8 is not entirely fixed to the value
ball. The agent will create a further compositional rule which applies
this new knowledge:
R9: S[s1+s2+s3]→ C[s=red], B[s=?], A[s=?]
This is Stage III in Kirby (2000), and the utterance has been com-
pletely atomised.
A further example is provided in the next section, in which I dis-
cuss the mechanisms used by agents to induce their grammar.
6.1.2 Grammar induction
Agents build their internal grammar using the following mecha-
nisms:
1. Incorporation: When a listener cannot decode an utterance it
attempts to guess the right action. If correct, the agent adds the
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association between the action and the utterance as a holistic
rule. R13 in the grammar shown in figure 21 is an example of a
holistic rule.
2. Chunking. If the listener identifies two rules which share a com-
mon semantic value and common substrings at beginning or
end of their terminal strings, it associates the common substring
to the common meaning. This is the mechanism at work in ex-
ample 1 above. As another example, if the agent has learned the
following two holistic rules:
Ri: S[s=(ball,right,red)]→ “jxpce”
Rj: S[s=(ball,right,green)]→ “jxpcd”
it creates three new rules to account for the common as well as
the non-common parts.
Rk: H[s=(ball,right)]→ “jxpc”
Rl : G[s=red]→ “e”
Rm: G[s=green]→ “d”
Algorithm 1 is a pseudo-code description of the chunking pro-
cess. An agent creates three new rules, one with the common
semantic and symbolic parts of both input rules, and another
two rules for the unique parts. Neither input rule is discarded.
I follow Vogt (2005)’s alignment method in searching for com-
mon sub-strings at the beginning and end of utterances. In con-
trast to Kirby (2002)’s model, the learner does not remove the
original holistic rules. Keeping associations between words and
meanings is common practice in language game models, where
the predominance of particular rule is determined by the usage
of the agents, and selection of certain constructions over others
is determined by their contribution to successful interactions
(Steels, 1996; Steels, 2000b).
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Algorithm 1 Chunking grammar rules
Input: A grammar G with N rules R1 . . . RN
1: function Chunking
2: for Ri ∈ G do
3: for Rj ∈ G do
4: Stringi ← Ri[terminal symbol]
5: ai[]← Ri[semantic values]
6: Stringj ← Rj[terminal symbol]
7: aj[]← Rj[semantic values]
8: if
Stringi and Stringj begin or end with the same substring
AND
ai[], aj[] share at least one semantic value (ai ∩ aj 6= ∅)
then
9: create new rules
RN+1 with symbol = common substring and semantic attributes
= common semantic values
RN+2 with terminal symbol = non-shared substring of
Ri[terminal symbol], and semantic values = non-shared seman-
tic values from Ri
RN+3 with terminal symbol = non-shared substring of
Rj[terminal symbol], and semantic values = non-shared seman-





3. Generalisation: If the agent identifies two rules which differ
only in one meaning, it generalises to a more comprehensive
rule that includes all semantic values contained in both rules.
For example, the following two rules contain the same syntactic
categories in the same order. They differ only in that Rn contains
the semantic value ball whereas Rm contains box:
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Rn: S[s1+s2+s3]→ A[s1=ball], G[s2=green], E[s3=right]
Rm: S[s1+s2+s3]→ A[s1=box], G[s2=green], E[s3=right]
Generalisation expands the semantic value associated to syntac-
tic category A to allow any value of semantic category shape:
Rp: S[s1+s2+s3]→ A[s1=?], G[s2=green], E[s3=right]
Algorithm 2 runs through the steps employed by an agent to
generalise non-terminal rules. The agent effectively choose the
rule with the greatest weight and adds the new meaning to its
set of semantic values. The other rule is discarded.
Algorithm 2 Generalising grammar rules. An agent adapts a rule to fully
determine a semantic category if it observes the same syntax being applied
to the category’s two possible values.
Input: Two rules R1, R2 ∈ Grammar G
Output: Both rules have non-terminal symbols
1: function Generalising
2: Symbol1 ← R1[non-terminal symbol]
3: a1[]← R1[semantic values]
4: Symbol2 ← R2[non-terminal symbol]




only one value is different in a1[] and a2[]
AND
the single different values in both a1[], a2[] belong to the same
semantic category
then
7: choose rule Rmax(R1[weight],R2[weight]) and add to its set of meanings the
value contained in the other rule and remove the other rule.
8: end if
9: end function
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4. A merge process simply identifies repeated rules in a grammar.
Rules that have the same syntax, or expression, and the same se-
mantic values are considered to be the same. The agents chooses
the one with the greatest weight and discards the other one.
5. Syntactic categories are not merged, but rather are the result
of splitting common and non-common parts of terminal ex-
pressions. If two expressions have a common substring and
share one semantic value, then agents assume that the rest of
the string corresponds to the rest of the semantic values, and
hence the semantic categories. Thus, the two semantic cate-
gories are ”merged", although, strictly speaking they were never
separated.
6.1.3 Linguistic interaction
An agent makes use of its grammar as it builds it.
• Encoding: The speaker knows which action is to be carried out,
and it produces an utterance to communicate it to the listener. It
does this by employing the linguistic knowledge it has acquired
in previous interactions. This process follows three steps:
1. The speaker first looks for rules in its grammar that contain
all the semantic values in the action. These rules can be
compositional or holistic. Taking the grammar in figure 21,
an agent would have several choices to utter the command
“Move green ball right”: it could choose between R1, R2 or
R3 to concatenate rules R9 ◦ R10 ◦ R11 in different order. It
could also use holistic rule R5. The agent would choose R1
because of its greater weight.
2. If the speaker cannot find a rule that contains all semantic
categories and values required, it looks for the rule that
contains the highest number of semantic values and invents
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a string for the values that are missing. For example: if the
action is “Move red box right” the agent is not be able
to find a rule that contains all three values, since it has
not learned a rule for the single value box. It can however
exploit the fact that it has learned a word for red right and
employ R12. It then creates a new string for the missing
part and adds it to the string “iwj”.
3. If the agent cannot find a rule that contains any of the val-
ues required, it produces a holistic expression that made
out of random strings. For example, if the agent is to pro-
duce an utterance for the action “Move red box left” it will
not find any rules that contain the three values, neither
fully nor partly. In this case it produces a new string that
contains all the values.
• Decoding: After receiving the utterance from the speaker, the
listener tries to guess the action. It can guess the most likely
one by identifying elements in the utterance that coincide with
its own internal grammar. It then ranks all possible actions ac-
cording to the weight of the rules used to decode the utterance.
If the agent cannot interpret the utterance or if several rules are
equally weighted, then it chooses an action randomly.
6.1.4 Learning
Successful interactions allow the listener to acquire or induce new
rules. If an agent has not been able to decode the utterance, it adds it
to its grammar as a holistic rule. Otherwise, it reinforces the correct
rules through lateral inhibition:
ρt+1i ) =

ρti(1 + δ) if successful
ρti(1− δ) otherwise
(21)
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where δ = 0.9 is a constant learning rate and ρti is the weight of rule i
at interaction t. If the rule chosen is compositional, then all daughter
rules employed are also reinforced. All other rules with the same left
hand syntactic elements and semantic content are inhibited. Normal-
isation is performed also over rules with similar syntactic structure.
6.2 linguistic measures
6.2.1 A note on consistency
The definition of consistency as stated in section 4.3.1 is valid for
languages with compositional structures. In contrast to the holistic
languages explored in the previous chapter, two agents may com-
municate accurately about an action using a compositional language
without producing the same utterance. It is enough that both agents
understand each other’s utterance accurately. Consider two agents
who have learned the following rules:
Agent 1
R1 : S[s1+s2+s3]→ A[s1=red], B[s2=ball], C[s3=right] 1.0
R2 : A[s=red]→ “w” 1.0
R3 : B[s=ball]→ “x” 1.0
R4 : C[s=right]→ “y” 0.9
R5 : C[s=right]→ “z” 0.1
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Agent 2
R1 : S[s1+s2+s3]→ A[s1=red], B[s2=ball], C[s3=right] 1.0
R2 : A[s=red]→ “w” 1.0
R3 : B[s=ball]→ “x” 1.0
R4 : C[s=right]→ “y” 0.1
R5 : C[s=right]→ “z” 0.9
When referring to action “Move red ball right”, agent 1 concate-
nates rules R1 ◦ R2 ◦ R2 ◦ R3 to produce the utterance “wxy”. Using
the scores of these four rules produces a unique maximum value of
2.9. Agent 2 concatenates rules R1 ◦ R2 ◦ R2 ◦ R4 to produce utterance
“wxz”, with the same unique maximum value. However, both agents
understand each other’s utterances.
6.2.2 Compositional spread
For the agents in these experiments a fully developed compositional
language must include a rule that prescribes how to concatenate three
syntactic categories and terminal expressions for all six different se-
mantic values. The processes of chunking ensures that strings are
split into atomic values which cannot be split further and compo-
sitional rules are produced that indicate the ordering of the atomic
elements. The process of generalisation ensures that, given enough
samples, agents learn to apply the rule to the six different atomic
words. I refer to this as atomic compositionality, as the rules prescribe
how to compose together atomic words.
Two agents have a similar atomic compositional language if their in-
ternal grammars include such rules, and their maximally weighted
atomic and compositional rules are the same, i.e. their symbols are
equal and they apply to the same semantic values. A measure of how
commonly shared a language is in a population can be obtained by
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counting the members in the population who have similar maximally
weighted rules for each of the six possible atomic values, as well as the
same compositional rule. A measure of the spread is then obtained
by averaging over all seven possible maximally weighted rules.
More formally, a rule is a maximal atomic rule if it is terminal rule
whose semantic value is only one of the six meanings and no other
rule with the same semantic value is maximally weighted.
∃rmax := r ∈ G ∧ r.x ∈ Σ ∧ r[sym] ∈W
∧ r.weight ≈ 1.
∧ ∃!y(y[sym] = r[sym] ∧ y.weight ≈ 1.)
(22)
where G is a grammar, Σ is the set of terminals of the grammar and
W is the set of six semantic values. An agent’s grammar contains a set
A of maximal atomic rules if it contains at least one maximal atomic
rule. A maximal compositional rule can be similarly defined, only
with a compositional syntactic structure of three daughter rules and
a semantic content containing every semantic value.
The compositional similarity between two grammars is the number
of elements they have in common, averaged over all possible seven
maximum number of rules.
compositional similarityA1,A2 := ( ∑
ri∈A1,rj∈A2
ri = rj)/|A|max (23)
Compositional spread is obtained by averaging the similarity over the
entire population.
6.2.3 Test of learning algorithm
A series of simulations were run to test out the soundness of the
learning algorithm. In these simulations, the game was played by two
agents, one adopting the role of teacher, while the other was a learner.
The learner had no predefined language, being completely new to the
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number cover syntax semantic weight
R 21 S→ A·G·E [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 1.0
R 9 E→ "y" [green] 1.0
R 22 A→ "s" [right] 1.0
R 19 G→ "s" [square] 1.0
R 18 G→ "t" [circle] 1.0
R 3 A→ "e" [left] 1.0
R 15 E→ "n" [red] 1.0
R 4 B→ "tn" [circle, red] 1.0
R 5 B→ "sy" [square, green] 1.0
R 17 F→ "st" [circle, right] 1.0
R 10 F→ "et" [circle, left] 1.0
Table 5: Maximally weighted rules induced by a learner in a two-agent
teacher-learner game designed to test the soundness of the learn-
ing algorithm.
game, and always played the role of hearer. The learner always coop-
erated and tried to guess the meaning of the utterance until success.
The teacher had a fully developed language. In fact, the teacher was
agent number 1 in the simulation chosen as an example to discuss the
compositional language developed by a population. The language is
fully depicted in table 14 in appendix A.3. The teacher’s maximally
weighted grammar is shown in table 15 in the same appendix. The
teacher’s language was the result of a simulation of altruistic agents.
The resulting language is discussed in more detail below, see 6.5. This
test was repeated twenty times, each time with a different random
seed. The number of interactions was set at 3000, although in all sim-
ulations the grammar was fixed within the first 200 interactions.
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Table 5 depicts the maximally weighted rules of the language in-
duced by the learner. All simulations ended with the same maximal
rules, except two, in which rules R-17 and R-10 were not learned,
and rules R-4 and R-5 were learned but not maximally weighted and
never used. The maximal ternary and atomic rules are the same as the
teacher’s, as was expected. Consistency at the end of the game is 0.75,
which is explained by the presence of synonyms in the atomic rules,
with right and square sharing the expression "s". Compositional simi-
larity, measured by the number of maximal atomic and compositional
rules that the two grammars have in common, is 1.
The same batch of simulations were run with a language resulting
from the interaction within a group of mutualistic agents interacting
under high costs, ca = 0.95r and cc = 0.85ca. Mutualistic populations
under these conditions develop poorly shared languages, although an
agent’s internal language may be refined. Indeed, such an agent was
used as a teacher in a batch of twenty simulations, each of them with
a different random seed. The teacher’s maximally weighted rules are
contained in table 6, while the learner’s maximal grammar is shown
in table 7.
Both agents use the same compositional rule, R-0 for the teacher
and R-16 for the learner. However, this rule is not fully generalised,
since it cannot be used to refer to red objects. The teacher will use
holistic expressions for actions which include the meaning red, such
as the two last rules included in its grammar. Although they are not
maximally weighted, they have been included to illustrate how the
teacher will communicate. Rule-59 is more effective, so the learner
learns to use its rule R-25. Notice how the learner has included a bi-
nary rule, R-15, which applies to three meanings in two different se-
mantic categories. Consistency in all twenty simulations is, however,
high, reaching 0.75. In only three of the simulations did teacher and
learner end up using the same compositional rule. Average similarity
over twenty results was 0.35.
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number cover syntax semantic weight
R 0 S→ E·A·G [circle, square, right, left, green] 1.000000
R 50 H→ "goc" [circle, left] 1.000000
R 18 G→ "y" [red] 0.999331
R 20 H→ "hji" [circle, right] 0.999061
R 19 G→ "c" [green] 0.998374
R 22 S→ "bjg" [circle, left, green] 0.998177
R 57 B→ "xy" [circle, green] 0.995942
R 28 E→ "p" [square] 0.993864
R 21 A→ "s" [right] 0.982262
R 30 H→ "aky" [square, left] 0.981557
R 31 A→ "g" [left] 0.969975
R 59 S→ "pgmupcq" [square, right, red] 0.596491
R 83 S→ "hocslsnlzp" [square, right, red] 0.399304
Table 6: Teacher’s maximally weighted rules. The teacher was chosen from a
population of mutualistic agents that did not develop a fully shared
common language.
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number cover syntax semantic weight
R 16 S→ E·A·G [circle, square, right, left, green] 1.0
R 15 H→ E·A [square, right, left] 1.0
R 4 G→ "c" [green] 1.0
R 14 A→ "s" [right] 1.0
R 12 E→ "p" [square] 1.0
R 18 E→ "c" [circle] 1.0
R 13 A→ "g" [left] 1.0
R 21 S→ "pxs" [circle, right, red] 1.0
R 25 S→ "pgmupcq" [square, right, red] 1.0
R 20 S→ "yaky" [square, left, red] 1.0
R 1 S→ "yzj’ [circle, left, red] 1.0
Table 7: Learner’s maximally weighted rules. The agent learns from a
teacher belonging to a population of mutualistic agents that did
not develop a fully shared common language.
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Figure 22: Linguistic consistency dynamics against interactions. Action cost
is fixed ca = 0.15r. Each curve traces the trajectory under a differ-
ent coordination cost cc.
6.3 experimental study i
6.3.1 Simulation setup
As in the study reported in section 4.4.1, this experiment sets up two
independent groups of 10 agents. Again we run 20,000 simulations
under each pair of values in the parameter space. Both the action and
coordination costs are sampled at discrete intervals ∆ = 0.1, ranging
ca = [0.01, 1.15]r and cc = [0.05, 1.15]ca.
6.3.2 Results
6.3.3 System dynamics
Figure 22 shows a common model behaviour, tracking the progress
of a population’s language consistency. Here, the action cost is fixed,
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cc = 0.05r. Each curve shows the consistency’s trajectory under an
increasing cc. All trajectories display a similar pattern:
1. Consistency experiences a sharp initial increase. During the first
interactions, agents invent and learn holistic rules, assigning
an utterance to each action. At this stage agents are playing
a simple naming game and their language will tend to converge,
as shown in the experimental studies reported in sections 5.3
and 5.3.
2. As agents are presented with more utterances, the probability
of finding similarities between strings increases. They can there-
fore begin to chunk expressions into rules and create composi-
tional constructs. These rules are not shared initially by the rest
of the agents, which causes a decrease in the consistency.
3. Agents receive utterances built from compositional rules. This
provides them with the opportunity of chunking strings built
using those rules, which allows them to internalise those rules
themselves. This generally causes a subsequent increase in the
accuracy.
4. As each agent reinforces some rules and decreases the weights
in others, rules will tend to become fixated, causing the consis-
tency in the group to stabilise.
The production of utterances by agents follows a distinct pattern
throughout a simulation. This evolution is displayed in figures 23,
and, as a detail of the first 800 interactions, 24. An initial short pe-
riod in which agents create holistic rules is followed by a more ex-
tended one where agents employ holistic rules which they have al-
ready learned. Individuals partially invent utterances when they pos-
sess a rule with which they can encode part of the semantic content
of the action, and make up the rest. It is used sparingly during the ini-
tial period of 200 interactions, alternating with more frequent holistic
rules. After 600 interactions compositional rules begin to dominate
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Figure 23: Evolution of mode of utterance production in a simulation.
Agents tend to settle on compositional rules to create utterances
after an initial period in which holistic rules are preferred. No-
tice how holistic expressions are used sporadically throughout
the entire simulation.
over the rest of modes. However, holistic rules are employed sporad-
ically throughout the entire simulation, showing how some agents
have fixed a holistic expression to refer to an action.
6.3.4 Linguistic stability
The hypothesis is that an altruistic population would reach a higher
level of linguistic consistency than a mutualistic population. To test
this hypothesis, I have measured consistency in each simulation after
30,000 interactions; these measures constitute the population samples.
Shapiro as well as D’Agostino and Pearson normality tests on the
samples extracted from the 20 runs of each simulations support the
hypothesis that the samples are normally distributed.
Figure 25 shows mean consistency over 20 runs for each value of ac
and cc. Results for the altruistic group are quite uniform, displaying
little variance; this is to be expected with agents that disregard cost
and always cooperate. However, the mutualistic group is greatly af-
fected by increasing costs: consistency is similar to the altruistic group
for low action and coordination costs, but decreases as both param-
eters grow. The figure also shows that a low action cost can allow
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Figure 24: Detail of the initial 800 interactions of the simulation shown in
figure 23. A short period dominated by rules that are being cre-
ated by agents is followed by a greater use of already existing
holistic rules. After 600 interactions compositional rules begin to
dominate.
Figure 25: Mean consistency over 20 runs for altruistic and mutualistic pop-
ulations respectively, for a range of values of ca and cc.
communication to become very costly, even greater than the cost of
carrying out the action itself.
A Student’s t-test was employed to test whether these differences
are statistically significant – see Figure 26. p-values below 0.05
support the alternative to the null hypothesis that the samples ob-
tained from each group come from the same distribution. Although
p-values are low at many isolated spots in the heatmap, this can
be assumed to be due to a multiple comparisons effect over our
stochastic simulations; the consistently low area is where both cost
parameters have high values, confirming that the mutualistic group
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Figure 26: Student t-test results comparing final consistency from altruistic
and mutualistic populations respectively, for a range of values of
ca and cc.
shows reliably lower consistency in these conditions.
This result is strengthened by least squares linear regression taking
ca and cc as independent variables and targeting consistency. Tak-
ing all twenty results of each parameter couple as samples, rather
than their mean, and performing analysis on both altruistic and mu-
tualistic populations, the results of the regression analysis are shown
in table 8. The samples extracted from altruistic populations de not
lend themselves to linear regression analysis, as can be deducted from
the small coefficients which indicate a flat fit. Also, p-values > 0.05
as is the case for both action and coordination cost variables imply
that there is no linear relation between the variables and the target.
R2 = 0.0 means that none of the variance in the samples is explained
by the dependent variables.
Regression results are different for the mutualistic populations. Neg-
ative coefficients indicate an inverse relation between both variables
and the target, the slope of the surface tilting downwards. p-values
< 0.05 suggest that the hypothesis that there is a linear relation be-
tween costs and linguistic consistency cannot be rejected, and the
R2 = 0.221 value suggests that the linear fit covers some of the sam-
ple variance.
A stronger fit can be obtained by performing linear regression on
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coefficient t P>|t| R2 coefficient t P>|t| R2
constant 0.6104 60.279 0.00
0.000
0.8117 95.219 0.000
0.221ca 0.0103 0.869 0.385 -0.3058 -30.700 0.000
cc -0.0034 0.869 0.785 -0.2002 -19.240 0.000
Table 9: Linear regression results for independent variables cc and ca target
compositional spread
Altruistic Mutualistic
coefficient t P>|t| R2 coefficient t P>|t| R2
constant 0.8332 374.708 0.00
0.000
0.9346 181.638 0.000
0.413ca -0.0006 -0.329 0.742 -0.2860 -47.573 0.000
cc -0.0006 -0.329 0.742 -0.1974 -31.438 0.000
the compositional spread. Results of this analysis is shown in table 9,
having regressed over the compositional spread from all the simula-
tions, rather than averaging per parameter value. While the altruistic
samples show virtually no difference, other than an even flatter sur-
face slope, the inverse relation between costs and spread is somewhat
more pronounced than in the case of consistency. The slope is slightly
steeper and R2 is almost twice the value, indicating a better linear
fit. Figure 27 shows the surface fit between costs and compositional
spread. While the surface is almost entirely flat in the altruistic graph,
with samples spread out almost everywhere in the space, the surface
in the mutualistic graph slopes steeply towards the corner with great-
est action and coordination costs.
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Figure 27: Linear regression surface showing the best fit between costs
and compositional spread for both altruistic and mutualistic be-
haviour.
6.4 experimental study ii
6.4.1 Simulation setup
I carried out an experimental study equivalent to the study reported
in section 5.3, but in this case agents develop a language contain-
ing compositional rules. In this study one of the parameters was
dropped, the initial number of altruistic agents, due to the compu-
tational demands required to calculate the linguistic consistency. The
initial number of altruistic agents is fixed at half of the population,
ensuring that both behaviours compete on a level field. Batches of 20
simulations were executed under all possible pairs of action and coor-
dination costs. As in the holistic language study, the most interesting
behaviour occurred with low ca values; so ca was at smaller intervals
in that range. The discrete interval ∆ for ca is:
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∆ =

0.01, for 0 < ca ≤ 0.10
0.10, for 0.10 < ca ≤ 1.15
Population size is 30 agents. A maximum number of interactions
was set at 50,000. All simulations were programmed and executed in
Java 7. The average time for a simulation was around 4 to six hours.
Because a great number of simulations were run (20 different values
of action cost × 11 values of coordination cost × 15 to 20 simulations
each), they were run on several servers, with one processor being
applied to each simulation. A batch of simulations could run for 10
to 15 days. 1
6.4.2 Results
6.4.2.1 Population dynamics
Figure 28: Percentage of simulations where altruism was the dominant be-
haviour under all parameter pairs, (ca, cc). Dark red indicates that
all runs fixated at altruism.
Figure 28 shows the fixation patterns of the population. Dark red
cells represent parameter pairs in which altruism dominated. Results
are consistent with those obtained in the holistic language study. Al-
1 The code to run simulations can be found at https://github.com/mariano-mora/
compositional_simulations.
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truistic agents enjoy a fitness advantage as long as the costs are not
excessively high. However, it is remarkable that altruistic agents win
out against mutualistic if the coordination cost is low, even when per-
forming the action is greater than the reward.
(a) Evolution of the number of attempts under several values of ca
(b) Evolution of the number of attempts under several values of cc
Figure 29: Figure (a) shows the evolution of the number of attempts per
interaction for increasing values of ca. Here cc = 0.45ca Figure (b)
represents the number of attempts per interaction for increasing
values of cc. Here ca = 0.5r
In figure 29a we see the evolution of the average number of at-
tempts per interaction for increasing ca values. The coordination cost
is fixed at cc = 0.45ca. There is a very noticeable change after the
action cost reaches 0.70r. In figure 28 we can see that, for cc = 50,
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ca = 0.70r is the last action cost value under which the population fix-
ates at altruism. Action cost values higher than 0.70r show an abrupt
change in the behaviour of the agents, who are unwilling to engage
in cooperative interactions. The average number of attempts per in-
teraction is close to 0: agents almost never interact and there are no
altruistic agents left.
6.4.2.2 Language dynamics
Figure 30: Mean final consistency after 50,000 interactions. Each cell repre-
sents the mean of 20 runs under a parameter pair, (ca, cc).
Figure 30 shows the mean consistency after 50,000 interactions for
20 runs under each pair of ca and cc values. The dynamics of the
language coincides with the population dynamics. Notice that the
mean consistency is never greater than 0.5.
The inverse relation between costs and compositional spread can
be confirmed by regression analysis. As was the case with mutualis-
tic populations in section 6.3.4, compositional spread slopes sharply
towards the corner with the greatest action and coordination costs,
a sign of an inverse linear relation. The sloping surface in figure 31
shows this inverse relation.
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Figure 31: Multivariate linear regression surface between action and coordi-
nation costs as independent variables, and compositional spread
as target.
6.5 analysis of compositional language
This section offers a closer look at the compositional language that
emerges from the agents’ interactions. A closer inspection unveils sev-
eral characteristics of the language that are common to both types of
studies. I begin by discussing them, before going deeper into results
of both kinds of simulations. Table 14 in appendix A.3 displays a full
common language from a randomly chosen simulation. In this case, a
simulation of the interactions within a population of altruistic agents,
with action cost ca = 0.55 and coordination cost cc = 0.50. It might
prove a useful reference while discussing elements of the language.
6.5.1 The compositional language
This section takes a closer look at the compositional language cre-
ated by agents interacting through the language game. It begins by
6.5 analysis of compositional language 133
discussing some aspects of the language shared by all agents in the
population, as opposed to the agents’ private language.
6.5.1.1 The shared language
A common language is understood to be made up of rules contained
in every agent’s internal grammar. A rule is shared by two agents
if both have a rules with the same syntactic elements – be they
terminal or non-terminal –, and the same semantic content. The
weight associated to each rule may, and very often will, differ, since
a rule’s weight is determined by its success in an agent’s interaction
history.
The common language in appendix A.3 contains 94 rules. There are
six types of rules, depending on their syntactic and semantic struc-
ture:
• Compositional rules. A rule’s symbol is non-terminal. Its syn-
tactic structure is made up of the composition of either three or
two further rules.
– A rule that prescribes the composition of three further
rules must cover all three different semantic categories,
shape, colour and direction. I refer to this type of rule as a
ternary rule. The first three rules in table 14 in appendix A.3
are ternary rules.
– A binary rule prescribes how to perform the composition
of two daughter rules. It can cover two semantic categories,
in which case I call it a non-full binary, or all three seman-
tic categories, a full binary. In this last case, one of the
daughter rules must have a syntactic category which cov-
ers two semantic categories. In the common language in
appendix A.3 rule 4 is full-binary, while rule 8 is a non-full
binary.
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• Terminal rules. A rule whose symbol is a string. There are three
possible semantic distinctions:
– The rule covers all three semantic categories, in which case
it is holistic, for example rule 21 in the common language.
– The rule refers to two semantic categories. I call this a com-
pound rule. A rule like this is the result of splitting holistic
rules into common and non-common string and semantic
parts. Very often the chunking procedure finds two rules
with a common substring and a common semantic value.
Two of the resulting new rules will then have two semantic
values, forming a compound rule. An example is rule 34.
– An atomic rule refers to a single category, and a single se-
mantic value. Rule number 13 is an atomic rule. A lan-
guage with fully atomic maximal elements possesses a
compositional rule that dictates how to string together rule
atomic terminals.
Figure 32 shows the distribution of types of rules in the common
language as a percentage of the total number of rules.
Figure 32: Distribution of types of rules in the common language of a group
of altruistic agents, contained in appendix A.3.
Although all rules in the common language are shared by all agents
in the group, agents may employ them very differently, making use
of one or the other to encode utterances, or not at all. In this case,
50.6% of the rules of the shared language have actually been used
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by agents at least once, either to encode or to decode an utterance.
Figure 33 shows the average use over the entire population of the
common rules that have in fact been used.
Figure 33: Average use over the entire population of rules contained in the
common language.
An agent interacts with other agents an average 6000 times (30.000
total interactions between 10 agents who can interact in two differ-
ent roles). However, the average usage for the most frequently used
compositional rule in the common language is very low. The rea-
son is that the most frequently used rule does not actually belong
in the common language. An inspection of the maximally weighted
rules in all ten agents’ internal grammars depicted in table 15 in ap-
pendix A.3 shows that the maximally weighted compositional rule in
every agents’ grammar is:
R0: S[s1+s2+s3]→ A[s1=?], G[s2=?], E[s3=?]
which is fully generalised and atomised and applies to all six seman-
tic values. This rule and its usage has been added as the last bar
on the right in figure 33 – although, again, it does not belong stricto
sensu to the common language – to show how commonly used it is
in the population. However, agent 8’s maximal compositional rule is
somewhat different:
R0: S[s1+s2+s3]→ A[s1=left], G[s2=?], E[s3=?]
Agent 8 has not learned to generalise this rule so that it applies to
136 second case : emergence of compositional structures
both left and right, perhaps because the holistic utterance "ozegli" –
meaning ’move the red square right’ – is also very widespread in the
population.
A notion of the how common a shared language is in a population
can be obtained from table 10. It shows the most widely shared maxi-
mally weighted rule for all six different meanings in all twenty simu-
lations of a population of altruistic agents interacting under ca = 0.5r
and cc = 0.55cc. For each terminal utterance, the table shows how
many of the ten agents have that rule as the maximally weighted for
that semantic value. Included also is the spread of the most common
compositional rule. The table suggests two things:
1. The language is shared to a high degree, with most words being
shared by all or almost all the agents in almost every simulation.
This includes the compositional rule as well. When all agents
have all six atomic rules and a compositional rule in common,
then their utterances are all the same.
2. The language need not be fully consistent, however. The abun-
dance of synonyms means that many actions cannot be ex-
pressed in a unique way, and that many utterances have no
unique interpretation. The table’s last column contains the num-
ber of synonymous words that are maximal and commonly
shared.
This suggests that a measure of the spread of common rules in a pop-
ulation would provide a more thorough understanding of how ex-
tended a language is.
6.5.1.2 The internal language
The size of an agent’s internal grammar depends on its interaction
history. An agent adds any new utterance it encounters to its inter-
nal grammar in the form of a holistic rule. This provides it with new
opportunities to further expand its language by comparing the utter-
ance and its meaning with rules already contained in the grammar.
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Most of the rules in a grammar are seldom used when producing an
utterance, but may help the agent decode another agent’s utterance.
Utterances are produced employing rules whose weights are greater
than those of their competitors. An agent that interprets an utterance
successfully reinforces the rule or rules employed, while decreasing
the weight of competing rules. This reinforcement loop usually re-
sults in one rule being maximally weighted and being used almost
exclusively.
An agent’s internal language contains rules of the six types described
above. Figure 34 shows the composition of the internal grammars of
all ten agents in the population who share the common language
of appendix A.3. The languages’ average size is 426.7 rules. There
are no duplicate rules: two rules that have the same syntax struc-
ture, for non-terminals, or string and the same semantic values have
been merged. An agent may have at most six fully generalised ternary
rules, since there are only six different orderings in which one can ar-
range three elements. Notice, however, how one agent, number 8, has
more ternary rules. That is because an agent may have rules with
three syntactic categories which are not fully generalised, the differ-
ence in semantic values between rules referring to different semantic
categories.
The proportion of binary and holistic rules is greater than the pro-
portion of atomic rules. This is because an agent incorporates any
new utterance as a holistic rule. Any such utterance may not be part
of its grammar either because it has been composed using rules that
the agent does not possess, or because it has been partially decoded,
which means that part of the utterance is not known to the agent.
Adding the holistic rule to its grammar allows it to learn from it, com-
paring to rules it already knows and chunking parts of the utterance.
Chunking an utterance produces three rules, one with the common
parts and two with the non-common ones. It is twice as likely that
the common semantic content of a holistic rule is made up of one
value, rather than two, which means that two of the new three rules
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will be binary, while one is atomic. Hence the disparity in the number
of binary and atomic rules. Further chunking of the binary rules can
produce three more rules, in this case all three being atomic.
Figure 34: Types of rules in the internal languages of a population of ten
altruistic agents.
Inspecting the rules that an agent has actually used, either to
encode or decode an utterance, presents a slightly different picture.
The number of atomic rules grows as agents chunk higher order rules
further and use them to compose and interpret utterances. Figure 35
shows the proportions in which different types of rules have been
used by the agents, a), and the number of rules of each type that are
maximally weighted, b). An agent typically uses up to six or more
ternary rules, but will tend to maximise one. A developed language
consists in this case of one fully generalised ternary rule and six
atomic rules, one for each possible meaning. Holistic rules will be
a residue of the initial stages of language development, where all
communication is holistic and holistic rules are used and reinforced.
An agent reinforces successful rules and decreases the weight of
competing rules. Competing rules are of the same type: an agent will
decrease the weight of a rule which has the same syntactic structure
and semantic content as the one which has proved to be successful.
Once a rule has established a lead over its competitors it will be very
difficult for another rule to displace it. Although new rules are cre-
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Figure 35: Figure a) shows the types of rules that have been used by agents
in a population of altruistic individuals. b) shows the number of
maximally weighted rules per rule type. The dimensions of the y-
axis in both figures are very different, the size of a used grammar
averaging one hundred rules, while each agent has an average of
15 rules. The dimensions are displayed in this way to facilitate
viewing.
ated during an agent’s entire history, it is almost impossible that a
new rule takes over the top position.
Figure 36 shows the average number of rules for all six atomic
and eight holistic meanings in the population of appendix A.3. High-
lighted in red is the average order among all competing rules in
which the maximal rule was created. A rule added to a language
that already contains four (or less) rules with the same structure and
the same semantic value will not end up prevailing in the population.
6.5.2 Two groups case
Because altruistic agents cooperate regardless of the cost, all the lin-
guistic elements discussed in the previous section remain by and
large unaffected by changes in the costs of coordinating and carry-
ing out joint actions. The language of a group of mutualistic agents,
however, is very much affected by how costly it is for the agents to
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Figure 36: Average number of rules per atomic and holistic meanings.
Shown in red is the average order of creation of the rule that
ends up being maximally weighted.
cooperate. High coordination and action costs reduce the number of
interactions, and this the chances for agents to learn from each other,
so much so that there may be no rule that is shared by the entire
population.
Figure 37: Percentage of simulations in which the populations developed a
shared language. Twenty simulations were run for every pair of





































Simulation circle square right left green red compositional synonyms
word count word count word count word count word count word count word count
0 "y" 9.0 "k" 9.0 "oy" 5.0 "w" 9.0 "r" 10.0 "p" 9.0 E·A·G 10.0 0
1 "s" 10.0 "u" 9.0 "q" 10.0 "d" 9.0 "q" 10.0 "g" 9.0 A·G·E 10.0 2
2 "m" 10.0 "z" 10.0 "p" 10.0 "i" 10.0 "f" 10.0 "y" 10.0 G·E·A 10.0 0
3 "yihjca" 6.0 "f" 10.0 "f" 10.0 "q" 10.0 "j" 10.0 "p" 7.0 E·G·A 10.0 2
4 "z" 7.0 "x" 4.0 "x" 9.0 "y" 6.0 "x" 10.0 "z" 8.0 A·E·G 7.0 4
5 "q" 10.0 "a" 10.0 "t" 10.0 "z" 10.0 "y" 10.0 "b" 10.0 A·G·E 10.0 0
6 "l" 10.0 "t" 10.0 "m" 10.0 "t" 10.0 "t" 10.0 "l" 10.0 A·G·E 10.0 3
7 "m" 10.0 "r" 10.0 "r" 10.0 "h" 10.0 "a" 10.0 "r" 10.0 A·G·E 10.0 3
8 "t" 10.0 "s" 10.0 "s" 9.0 "e" 10.0 "y" 10.0 "n" 10.0 A·G·E 10.0 2
9 "x" 10.0 "k" 10.0 "map" 7.0 "i" 6.0 "k" 10.0 "a" 6.0 A·G·E 2.0 2
10 "v" 10.0 "x" 10.0 "w" 10.0 "v" 10.0 "l" 10.0 "c" 10.0 G·E·A 10.0 2
11 "z" 10.0 "v" 10.0 "m" 10.0 "sf" 9.0 "y" 10.0 "o" 9.0 A·E·G 10.0 0
12 "c" 9.0 "g" 10.0 "q" 10.0 "k" 10.0 "a" 10.0 "o" 10.0 E·A·G 10.0 0
13 "a" 7.0 "a" 6.0 "w" 5.0 "c" 5.0 "r" 4.0 "r" 7.0 E·G·A 4.0 2
14 "x" 10.0 "r" 10.0 "i" 10.0 "l" 10.0 "v" 10.0 "d" 10.0 A·G·E 10.0 0
15 "n" 10.0 "c" 10.0 "u" 10.0 "n" 10.0 "m" 10.0 "k" 8.0 G·A·E 9.0 2
16 "c" 10.0 "q" 5.0 "q" 5.0 "l" 8.0 "k" 8.0 "l" 10.0 A·E·G 8.0 2
17 "i" 6.0 "z" 9.0 "z" 8.0 "m" 9.0 "y" 10.0 "z" 10.0 E·A·G 2.0 3
18 "e" 10.0 "u" 10.0 "gerlfwq" 10.0 "u" 10.0 "c" 10.0 "e" 10.0 A·E·G 7.0 2
19 "a" 6.0 "p" 8.0 "a" 8.0 "i" 9.0 "b" 10.0 "a" 5.0 E·G·A 9.0 3
Table 10: Most commonly shared rules in all twenty simulations of a population of 10 altruistic agents with ca = 0.50 and cc = 0.55. The last column
shows the number of synonyms.
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Figure 37 shows the percentage of all twenty simulations per pa-
rameter pair, ca, cc where the population developed a common lan-
guage. It is rare for a population not to share at least one rule. The size
of the common language drops drastically as the costs increase above
60% of the reward and the coordination cost rises to more than a third
of the action cost. Rules shared and actually used by the agents, as
well as maximally weighted rules, also show a steep decline as the
costs increase. Figure 38 show the average size of common languages
for each pair of costs reached by populations of mutualistic agents. A
common language in a population of mostly cooperating agents, i.e.
when costs are so low that the probability of affecting an agent’s de-
cision to cooperate is very small, will typically consist of ninety rules,
as shown in the first graph. The number of those rules that have ac-
tually been used by agents is shown to average 24 when the costs
are very low, while the number of shared rules that are maximally
weighted by agents is half that. When costs increase to the maximum,
which means that cooperating is actually more costly than the po-
tential reward, most populations share no maximally weighted rules,
each agent having its own internal grammar.
Compositional spread offers a measure of similarity between the
internal languages of the members of a population (see section 6.2.2).
Individuals have a common compositional language if they share the
compositional rule as well as all the words for the six possible differ-
ent meanings, and all are maximally weighted. If the compositional
rule is fully generalised, i.e., agents apply it to all six meanings, then
all possible utterances are produced by employing this set of rules.
As is the case with other elements, the spread of the language is
not affected by varying costs in populations of altruistic agents. Mu-
tualistic agents, however, do not develop a common compositional
language that is shared by the entire or a great part of the population
when costs increase with respect to the reward obtained from coop-
erating. Figure 39 shows the compositional spread in populations of
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Figure 38: Sizes of languages in mutualistic populations under a range of
pairs of cost values, averaged over the populations of twenty sim-
ulations.. a) displays the average size of the language consisting
of rules shared by all agents. b) displays the average number of
those rules which have been effectively used by agents, while c)
shows the average number of common rules that are maximally
weighted by the individuals in the population.
altruistic and mutualistic agents over all possible pairs of action and
coordination costs. Spread results have been averaged over all twenty
simulations. The graphic shows very clearly the effect of increasing
costs on the level of commonality of the language shared by the pop-
ulation. Consistently with previous results, one can notice a sharp
contrast when ca > 0.55r and cc > 0.45ca. This can also be verified in
figures 40 and 41, which show details of the average spread of some
semantic values and of the compositional rule respectively.
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Figure 39: Average compositional spread for altruistic and mutualistic pop-
ulations for pairs of cost values. Results are averaged over all
twenty simulations for each pair.
Figure 40: Detail of average spread of the atomic rules for ’circle’, ’right’ and
’red’.
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Figure 41: Detail of average spread of the compositional rule
6.5.3 Single mixed group
The results discussed in section 6.4.2.1 show that an altruistic strategy
is quite resistant to increases in environmental and communication
costs. A population interacting in an environment in which carrying
out an action costs 60% of the reward and coordinating the action
is also 60% of the action cost will still favour altruistic behaviour
over mutualistic. The sturdiness of the cooperating behaviour is
carried across to the resulting language: populations where altruistic
behaviour dominates develop a language which is widely spread
and compositionally refined.
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Figure 42: Side by side of images of the average size of internal and common
languages.
Figure 42 displays side-by-side images of the average size of
internal and common languages. Agents develop very large internal
grammars, as is to be expected from the greater size of the pop-
ulation – 30 agents – compared to the ten agents which made up
the populations of the two-group experiments. Agent must acquire
many more rules, especially holistic rules, as a result of an increase
of the number of different agents they encounter throughout their
interaction history. An action cost of 55% of the reward together with
a high coordination cost (cc > ca) causes an abrupt drop in the sizes,
particularly that of the common language. The area of the graph
towards the corner with the greatest costs shows no or almost none
common language, with most populations not having developed a
single rule that is shared by all agents. The transition is abrupt, as
seen by the small number of squares that are not either a shade of
red or completely blue. Again, the size of the population decreases
the probability of all individuals learning the same rule unless that
rule has enough time and opportunities to establish itself.
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The number of rules in the common language that have actually
been used by individuals is similarly distributed, with abrupt de-
creases and drops to zero when ca > 0.55r and cc > 0.8ca. This is
shown in figure 43, where the left graph displays the average number
of rules in the common language which have been used by all agents.
The right graph shows the number of common rules that are maxi-
mally weighted by all agents. The area of the parameter square occu-
pied by mostly red rectangles presents an almost flat surface averag-
ing 7 maximal rules, indicating a high level of shared atomicity, most
agents sharing the ternary and six atomic rules. This corresponds to
a high level of compositional spread.
Figure 43: Average number of rules in the common language which have
been used by agents, left, and average number of maximally
weighted common rules, right.
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Figure 44: Average compositional spread.
Figure 45: Average spread of compositional rule.
Figure 44 shows the compositional spread averaged over all simu-
lations. A more detailed perspective can be gained from the average
spread of the compositional rule, figure 45, as well as from the spread
of the atomic rules for all six semantic values, shown in figure 46.
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6.6 summary
This chapter has reported on two studies that test the conditions un-
der which cooperating behaviour affects the emergence of a composi-
tional language. Agents are provided with a number of mechanisms
through which they can induce a probabilistic grammar from utter-
ances they receive from other agents. This grammar consists of a set
of rules that admit to semantic content. Agents create syntactic cate-
gories as they induce their internal grammar, gluing together seman-
tic categories. Agents can incorporate new expressions into their gram-
mar in the form of holistic rules; they can chunk expressions when
they identify common substrings in them; and they can generalise to
more comprehensive rules that can contain more general semantic
content. Agents use these rules to encode utterances. They can invent
new holistic expressions; or exploit rules that contain parts of the se-
mantic content required; or concatenate terminal string into composi-
tional expressions. A shared compositional language emerges when
agents reinforce successful rules, thus increasing their future use and
increase the probability that they spread throughout the population.
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Figure 46: Average spread of atomic rules for all six semantic values.
7
C O N C L U S I O N A N D F U T U R E W O R K
In this final chapter I make the case that the research presented in
this thesis effectively contributes to scientific knowledge. I examine
the original contributions of the research, how it fills some gaps that
had not been considered. The main findings are the results of the ex-
periments, which I recapitulate and review, before considering some
of the new lines of questioning that should be pursued in future ex-
periments.
7.1 contribution to knowledge
This work belongs to an expanding body of work on computer sim-
ulations of language evolution. It relies heavily on work by oth-
ers (Steels, 1997a; Hurford, 1989; Kirby, 2000; Vogt, 2005) and imple-
ments methods that have been tested in areas such as evolutionary
biology, social and cultural evolution, artificial intelligence, robotics,
etc. One of the strongest contributions of the research is that it selects
elements from different areas of knowledge and combines them to
fill gaps in the main field of computational simulations of language
evolution. Some of these elements are:
• The interactions between agents are embedded within a proto-
col in which communication has consequences for the agents them-
selves, not only their language.
• Modelling the interaction in terms of decisions over costs allows
us to study the evolution of the language as a result of adapta-
tion to selective pressures. This adaptation takes place as two
learning processes: behavioural and linguistic.
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• Separating two different categories of costs, environmental and
linguistic, makes it easier to analyse the contributions of both
adaptation mechanisms.
• The game model provides a way of quantifying the impact of
altruistic behaviour on the evolution of language against that of
mutualistic behaviour, making it possible to directly compare
two opposite cooperation strategies.
The main contribution to knowledge of this thesis are the results
of the experiments, which I briefly summarise in the next section
(see 7.2). Linguistic evolution follows distinctively different paths de-
pending on the cooperating behaviour of the population. That path
is also determined by the environmental and linguistic costs. More-
over, given certain limit cost values, there will be no language evolu-
tion at all. The population itself will evolve towards one behavioural
trait or another depending on the costs, and that evolution will be
determined not only by environmental costs, but also by the cost of
communicating.
A final contribution to the field is the methodology employed,
which introduces several elements that had so far been ignored in
most of the research on computational simulations. The interaction
protocol itself grants the agents the possibility of reconsidering their
willingness to interact. By extending the interaction into several dif-
ferent costly decisions we can evaluate the cost-effect of a progres-
sively more accurate and common language. A language that allows
agents to communicate quickly can thus have an effect in the fitness
of the agents themselves. This effect could have been expressed as a
variable that decreases proportionately as the number of successful
interactions increases, but results are a better representation of the
evolution of the language if this variable is determined directly by
the history of interactions within the population.
Another methodological contribution is the simulation process,
which studies the behaviour of the language in the population over
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the whole range of possible couples or triplets of values. Under such
a parameterisation the simulations inform us not only of differences
in the evolutionary paths, but under which conditions, and how dra-
matically, those paths begin to differ.
Finally, a statistical approach to the experiments validates the conclu-
sions that can be extracted from the analysis of the simulations. Very
often, computational simulations are not run in batches or repeated
enough times to account for outliers, stochastic variance or simply
statistical errors.
7.2 discussion of results
7.2.1 Holistic language experiments
Chapter 5 described two studies in which populations of agents de-
veloped a holistic language. Agents interacting in two independent
populations, which I have termed Type I study, showed that a popu-
lation of altruistic agents will converge to a common language faster,
i.e. it will require fewer interactions, than a population of mutualis-
tic agents if environmental and linguistic costs are sufficiently high.
The difference between populations becomes noticeable as soon as
the cost of carrying out the action is 40% of the potential reward that
agents obtain from the action. Moreover, if the costs of communicat-
ing is greater than 45% of the cost of performing the action, then
the difference between an altruistic and a mutualistic population be-
comes significant as soon as the action cost is 20% of the reward. It
is interesting to notice that the convergence to a common language
behaves differently in both populations even if communication costs
are very low. Altruistic agents will reach convergence faster as soon
as cc > 0.1ca and ca > 0.4r. Mutualistic populations do not reach a
common language if the costs are contained within the area defined
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by the limits (ca > 0.45r, cc = ca) ∪ (ca > r, cc > 0.4ca), as shown in
figure 18.
Low communication costs play a more significant role to the fitness
of agents in a population in which they must interact with agents of a
different strategy to their own. Altruistic behaviour spreads through-
out the entire population if the cost of communicating is less than
25% of the action cost, even if the cost of performing the action is
75% of the reward. Figure 19a shows how altruistic behaviour is
predominant in the area under the parameter plane delimited by
(ca < 1.1r, cc < 0.1ca) ∪ (ca < 0.2r, cc < ca). Costs above this plane
favour mutualistic behaviour, since altruistic agents incur in too high
a cost helping others, and this cost is not compensated by other agents
helping them. If both costs are low, however, either strategy can dom-
inate, as seen in figure 20. When ca < 0.05 the dominant strategy de-
pends on the initial proportions of both strategies. If the population
initially contains more than 20% of altruistic agents, then altruism
will end up dominating the population.
A mixed population can develop a common language regardless
of which strategy ends up dominating if the costs are within certain
limits. Figure 19b shows that convergence to a common language is
strongly linked to altruistic behaviour, so much so that parameter
triples that lead to a fixation at mutualistic behaviour almost always
imply that the population will not reach a common language shared
by the entire population. This does not apply to very low values of ac-
tion, communication costs and initial proportion of altruistic agents,
where, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the mutualistic strat-
egy dominates over altruism, and the population still develops a com-
mon language.
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7.2.2 Compositional language experiments
Results from the Type I study in independent populations of agents
that use a compositional language support the hypothesis that a
purely altruistic population would reach a greater level of linguistic
consistency than a purely mutualistic one. In other words, a greater
fraction of the population shares a greater fraction of the language. As
shown in figure 25, this result stands for ca > 0.35r when cc > 0.8ca in
general. This is corroborated by an analysis of compositional spread,
which provides a measure of the percentage of the population that
shares common rules for the composition of atomic rules, which are
terminal expressions referring to single meanings, or words.
A Yype II study mirrored the results from the analogous study
on holistic languages. In a mixed population, altruistic behaviour is a
dominant strategy for a large part of the parameter space. Mutualistic
behaviour dominates for a range of values determined by ca > 0.6r
and cc > 0.6ca, as shown in figure 28. Interestingly, either strategy
can dominate if the costs are very low, ca < 0.03r and cc < 0.25ca,
though altruism has a slight edge in that range as well. Development
of a common language follows a similar pattern, showing greater con-
sistency and spread in populations where altruism is the dominant
strategy, while failing to develop a single rule that is shared by all
agents when the costs increase above ca > 0.8r and cc > 0.6ca, see
figure 30.
An analysis of the compositional language that emerges from
the interaction shows that compositional rules concatenating atomic
words are common in populations in which agents are willing to in-
teract enough. Holistic rules are still shared by agents, and used spo-
radically. A rule cannot end up dominating over all competing rules
if it is created too late, when there are already more than four rules
with the same semantic content.
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7.3 conclusion
The results obtained in all four studies support the notion that altruis-
tic behaviour played a decisive role in the evolution of language. The
studies that form the bulk of this thesis were designed so that they
could be applied to different stages in the evolution of language. Each
study has attempted to verify and extend the results obtained in the
previous one. Evolution does not leap.
Environmental and linguistic costs represent a pressure under
which altruistic behaviour is a selective advantage: both cooperation
strategies are similar when both types of cost are low, a situation
in which mutualistic agents are not discouraged from helping oth-
ers and being in turn helped by others. Under such conditions, both
types of helping behaviours can lead to the emergence of a common
language. An increase in costs, i.e. an increase in the harshness of
environmental conditional that reduces the difference between the
cost of carrying out an action and the reward obtained from it, as
well as an increase in the cost of communicating, lead to altruistic
behaviour being the strategy that allows the emergence of language,
whereas mutualistic populations do not develop a common language
under harsher conditions. Altruistic behaviour also allows popula-
tions to develop a language when communicating is very costly, for
instance when the encoding and decoding of utterances requires a
high cognitive effort or communicative mistakes can be very costly
to the individuals. The emergence of a holistic language requires a
radically different set of cognitive capacities than does the emergence
of compositional structures. Also, the social and environmental pres-
sures that facilitated the evolution of holistic languages cannot be
compared to the ones that brought about the evolution of composi-
tional structures. This work, however, shows that altruism has played
an important part in both. Altruistic populations, either in a pure or
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a mixed population, develop a more sophisticated shared composi-
tional language than mutualistic populations.
7.4 future work
The cooperation model introduced in this thesis can be used to investi-
gate how other social mechanisms may have affected the evolution of
language, and vice versa. Other forms of cooperation have been pro-
posed as requirements for the evolution, not only of language, but
also of very diverse social constructs.
• The effect of memory In all four studies presented here, agents
had a memory window of one. The memory window deter-
mines the number of interactions that mutualistic agents take
into account when they compute the expected cost (see sec-
tion 4.1.1, equation 14). The expected cost directly determines
the probability of engaging in the interaction. Considering only
one previous interaction causes the agent’s behaviour to swing
from one interaction to the next (Baek et al., 2016; Hilbe et al.,
2017). A mutualistic agent who has paid a heavy price in one
interaction (either because its partner defected or because the
interaction took a large number of attempts) will decide not to
cooperate in the next one, or defect after only one attempt. This
resets its memory to a low value, and gives it a poor under-
standing of the real costs. This means that it is willing to help
at the next interaction, which in turn causes it to defect in the
subsequent one. The agent could eventually fall into a strategy
of alternating helping and defecting decisions, depending on
the probability of alternating the role of speaker and listener.
Although this is a clever strategy, especially when the costs are
shared equally, it is debatable whether this is a good represen-
tation of a self-interest seeking agent. Averaging the costs over
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a longer window of interactions would provide the agent with
a much more realistic notion of the costs.
• Direct and indirect reciprocity. The interaction model can eas-
ily be adapted to investigate the effect of both mechanisms on
the evolution of language. Nowak and Sigmund (2005) sug-
gested that indirect reciprocity may have been directly involved
in the evolution of language as a way to convey information to
fellow cooperators about unreliable cheaters. Wang and Steels
(2008) simulated the linguistic emergence of a lexicon among
agents who were willing to punish non-cooperators. It would
be very interesting to test the validity of those mechanism in
a model that allows the emergence of language to be a fitness
advantage.
• The effect of new generations, applying the ILM. It seems rea-
sonable to believe that the positive effect of altruism on the evo-
lution of language would be reinforced with the transmission
of language to a generation of learners. Since one generation
of altruists is capable of reaching significant linguistic consis-
tency, the rules of the language would already be shared by a
large enough fraction of the population that new generations
would be exposed to expressions produced from a relatively
small number of rules. One question that should be addressed
is the relation between altruism and the size of the linguistic
data that a learner is exposed to, the linguistic bottleneck.
• Do mutualistic agents benefit from the common language?
This question would have to be addressed from two angles.
First, the obvious way in which mutualistic agents would ben-
efit from interacting with altruistic agents is by enjoying their
help when they require it, i.e when they play the role of speak-
ers, while not helping when it is their turn to be the listener,
the free rider problem. However, because they do not cooperate
as listeners, they do not have a chance to learn the shared lan-
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guage. This means that their interactions as speaker will always
be particularly costly, because even altruistic agents with a good
knowledge of the common language will not understand them.
Investigating this possibility would not require measuring the
individual benefit to each agent of learning to communicate,
but rather the average communication gain for each coopera-
tion strategy, i.e the average number of attempts per interaction
for each strategy and the fitness benefits it provides.

A
A P P E N D I X
a.1 normality tests
Table 11 shows the results of two different normality tests carried
out on the samples obtained from running fifty simulations at each
learning rate value on both populations. Each sample represents the
number of interactions required to reach full linguistic overall consis-
tency for that particular simulation run. Although some p-values are
above the 5% α threshold, no batch is normally distributed on both
populations at any learning rate.
The same can be said of normality tests applied to simulation runs
for both populations under with different action costs. Table 12 dis-
plays results of two different normality tests on samples obtained
from fifty runs of simulations for each value of the action cost. Low
p-values do not allow us to infer that the samples are uniformly dis-
tributed.
a.2 mann-whitney non-parametric test
The Mann-Whitney U test is a non-parametric method to compare
two independent samples (Corder and Foreman, 2014). The two sam-
ples are combined and rank ordered together. A random rank order
would mean that the two samples are not different, while a cluster of
one sample’s values would indicate a difference between them. The
U statistic is determined through the following equation:







altruistic mutualistic altruistic mutualistic
Learning rate p-values p-values p-values p-values
0.10 6.35e-02 0.177 2.24e-02 0.360
0.20 3.07e-09 0.001 1.35e-14 0.016
0.30 3.79e-05 0.000 3.55e-08 0.002
0.40 4.24e-10 0.000 9.89e-17 0.010
0.50 5.64e-11 0.044 2.34e-16 0.143
0.60 2.54e-01 0.067 2.67e-01 0.064
0.70 1.86e-13 0.001 1.78e-22 0.067
0.80 2.98e-03 0.033 6.25e-04 0.009
0.90 5.56e-12 0.000 6.00e-21 0.000
1.00 3.34e-02 0.286 3.28e-03 0.219
1.10 2.43e-06 0.034 3.02e-07 0.002
1.20 4.14e-04 0.097 3.99e-05 0.017
Table 11: p-values from Shapiro-Wilk and D’Agostino-Pearson’s normality
tests on run results for various learning rates. p-values < 0.05
on both types of population allow us to reject the null hypothe-
sis that the samples are uniformly distributed. Differences in the
distributions of the two populations can, however, be tested using
non-parametric methods.
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Altruistic Mutualistic Altruistic Mutualistic
action coord stat p-values stat p-values action coord stat p-values stat p-values
0.10 0.05 0.95 0.17 0.96 0.26 0.50 0.05 0.95 0.22 0.95 0.15
0.15 0.96 0.33 0.89 0.00 0.25 0.94 0.10 0.94 0.09
0.25 0.94 0.10 0.95 0.16 0.75 0.98 0.93 0.78 0.00
0.55 0.97 0.64 0.83 0.00 0.95 0.97 0.58 0.91 0.02
0.65 0.96 0.33 0.89 0.01 0.60 0.15 0.90 0.01 0.49 0.00
0.85 0.97 0.54 0.95 0.16 0.55 0.96 0.24 0.88 0.00
0.95 0.96 0.30 0.21 0.00 0.85 0.94 0.12 0.86 0.00
1.05 0.98 0.75 0.99 0.99 1.15 0.91 0.02 1.00 1.00
1.15 0.93 0.06 0.95 0.19 0.70 0.05 0.75 0.00 0.89 0.00
0.20 0.05 0.82 0.00 0.91 0.02 0.35 0.94 0.07 0.90 0.01
0.25 0.93 0.07 0.90 0.01 0.75 0.97 0.44 0.72 0.00
0.35 0.93 0.05 0.97 0.65 1.05 0.92 0.04 1.00 1.00
0.55 0.92 0.02 0.89 0.00 0.80 0.05 0.84 0.00 0.87 0.00
0.75 0.92 0.03 0.81 0.00 0.35 0.95 0.17 0.93 0.04
0.95 0.74 0.00 0.90 0.01 0.75 0.89 0.00 1.00 1.00
1.15 0.87 0.00 0.87 0.00 1.05 0.86 0.00 1.00 1.00
0.30 0.05 0.95 0.22 0.93 0.04 0.90 0.05 0.93 0.05 0.89 0.01
0.25 0.94 0.07 0.90 0.01 0.35 0.98 0.93 0.87 0.00
0.45 0.88 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.65 0.93 0.05 1.00 1.00
0.75 0.97 0.42 0.88 0.00 1.05 0.90 0.01 1.00 1.00
0.95 0.94 0.09 0.85 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.90 0.04 0.70 0.00
1.15 0.94 0.08 0.90 0.01 0.45 0.93 0.16 0.63 0.00
0.40 0.05 0.96 0.30 0.97 0.53 0.65 0.97 0.81 1.00 1.00
0.35 0.83 0.00 0.95 0.19 0.95 0.94 0.30 1.00 1.00
0.65 0.96 0.29 0.93 0.06 1.10 0.05 0.94 0.28 0.86 0.00
0.95 0.97 0.58 0.91 0.02 0.55 0.88 0.02 1.00 1.00
1.15 0.95 0.16 0.84 0.00 1.05 0.94 0.23 1.00 1.00
Table 12: Statistics and p-values from Shapiro-Wilk normality tests on run re-
sults for action and coordination costs. Results show great dispar-
ity of p-values. High action or coordination costs (or both) result
in simulations not reaching full consistency and therefore all runs
showing the same maximum value of 150,000 interactions. Results
suggest that we should be sceptical of supposing an underlying
distribution for the process and differences should be tested by
means of non-parametric methods.
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where Ui is the test statistic for the sample of interest, n1 is the num-
ber of values for the first sample, n2 the number of values for the
second sample, and ΣRi is the sum of the ranks for the sample of
interest.
To compute whether the U statistic lies within the critical region a





where x̄U is the mean, n1 is the number of samples from the first pop-
ulation and n2 is the number of samples from the second population.
SU =
√
n1n2(n1 + n2 + 1)
12
(26)





where z∗ is the z-score for a normal approximation and Ui is the U
statistic for the sample of interest.
A commonly used effect size to determine the degree of association





where |z| is the absolute value of the z-score and n is the total number
of observations.




S: shape + colour + direction
A: direction
B: shape + colour
E: colour
F: shape + direction
G: shape
H: colour + direction
Table 13: Syntactic dimensions of the common language developed by a
group of interacting altruistic agents.
a.3 common language
Displayed on table 14 is a common language that emerged in one
of the simulations of interaction within a group of altruistic agents.
Here the action cost (ca = 0.55) while the coordination cost (cc =
0.50). The second column shows a rule’s syntactic category, whose
semantic dimensions are listed in table 13. The key-value dictionary
of syntactic categories is shared by all agents, though the pairing is
different at each simulation, since categories and semantic content
are linked as the need arises: a new syntactic category is required
whenever an agent chunks a previous rule and assigns meaning to
the parts. If the combination of semantic dimensions is new to the
group, then a new syntactic new is assigned to it.












Table 14: Common language of group of altruistic agents.
syntax symbols semantic syntax symbols semantic
1 S→ E·A·G [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 20 A→ "t" [right]
2 S→ G·A·E [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 21 S→ "ozegli" [square, right, red]
3 S→ G·E·A [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 22 S→ "ntfpnobxr" [square, right, green]
4 S→ H·G [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 23 G→ "p" [square]
5 S→ E·F [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 24 E→ "m" [green]
6 S→ G·H [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 25 G→ "e" [circle]
7 S→ B·A [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 26 E→ "r" [red]
8 B→ G·E [circle, square, green, red] 27 A→ "y" [right]
9 B→ E·G [circle, square, green, red] 28 S→ "rfe" [circle, left, red]
10 H→ E·A [right, left, green, red] 29 S→ "iwl" [circle, left, green]
11 H→ A·E [right, left, green, red] 30 S→ "m" [square]
12 F→ G·A [circle, square, right, left] 31 E→ "f" [red]
13 G→ "t" [circle] 32 S→ "iehh" [square, left, green]
14 E→ "y" [green] 33 G→ "r" [circle]
15 A→ "e" [left] 34 H→ "yt" [right, green]
16 E→ "n" [red] 35 A→ "g" [right]
17 G→ "s" [square] 36 S→ "eyt" [circle, right, green]
18 A→ "s" [right] 37 H→ "ft" [right, red]





















39 G→ "g" [circle] 58 B→ "sn" [square, red]
40 E→ "s" [green] 59 S→ "syziwf" [square, left, green]
41 H→ "mphsg" [left, green] 60 B→ "sy" [square, green]
42 E→ "s" [red] 61 S→ "nes" [square, left, red]
43 A→ "d" [left] 62 S→ "nst" [circle, right, red]
44 F→ "ro" [circle, left] 63 F→ "ts" [square, right]
45 E→ "g" [green] 64 S→ "yst" [circle, right, green]
46 B→ "ms" [square, red] 65 S→ "ytt" [circle, right, green]
47 F→ "t" [circle, right] 66 F→ "ss" [square, right]
48 G→ "f" [circle] 67 S→ "ntt" [circle, right, red]
49 B→ "op" [circle, green] 68 S→ "syt" [circle, right, green]
50 S→ "snt" [circle, right, red] 69 S→ "ttn" [circle, right, red]
51 F→ "yt" [circle, right] 70 S→ "stn" [circle, right, red]
52 S→ "tnvhwmdx" [circle, right, red] 71 S→ "esn" [square, left, red]
53 S→ "aqk" [circle, right, red] 72 S→ "nse" [circle, right, red]
54 A→ "m" [right] 73 S→ "tty" [circle, right, green]
55 S→ "ffbsqezp" [square, left, red] 74 S→ "sty" [circle, right, green]
56 B→ "tn" [circle, red] 75 S→ "str" [circle, right, red]












77 S→ "myt" [circle, right, green] 86 S→ "ety" [circle, left, green]
78 F→ "ts" [circle, right] 87 S→ "mro" [circle, left, green]
79 F→ "tt" [circle, right] 88 H→ "nf" [left, red]
80 S→ "yfs" [square, left, green] 89 S→ "etn" [circle, left, red]
81 S→ "eys" [square, left, green] 90 S→ "ssy" [square, right, green]
82 S→ "mmphsg" [square, left, green] 91 S→ "yts" [square, right, green]
83 S→ "esy" [square, left, green] 92 E→ "t" [red]
84 S→ "mft" [circle, left, green] 93 S→ "tsn" [square, right, red]
85 S→ "etr" [circle, left, red] 94 S→ "ssn" [square, right, red]
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Table 15: Agents’ maximally weighted rules
number syntax symbol semantic values weight
agent 1
0 R 0 S→ A·G·E [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 1.000000
12 R 12 F→ A·G [circle, square, right, left] 1.000000
18 R 18 G→ "t" [circle] 1.000000
19 R 20 E→ "y" [green] 1.000000
20 R 19 G→ "s" [square] 1.000000
21 R 22 A→ "e" [left] 1.000000
22 R 21 E→ "n" [red] 1.000000
23 R 23 A→ "s" [right] 1.000000
26 R 26 S→ "ozegli" [square, right, red] 0.999998
27 R 27 S→ "ntfpnobxr" [square, right, green] 0.999860
30 R 30 S→ "rfe" [circle, left, red] 0.998100
39 R 39 S→ "eyt" [circle, right, green] 0.982960
40 R 40 S→ "iehh" [square, left, green] 0.902291
44 R 43 S→ "iwl" [circle, left, green] 0.945128
56 R 55 S→ "ffbsqezp" [square, left, red] 0.998458
82 R 81 F→ "mphsg" [square, left] 0.995526
83 R 82 S→ "aqk" [circle, right, red] 0.990622
agent 2
0 R 0 S→ A·G·E [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 1.000000
18 R 18 E→ "y" [green] 1.000000
19 R 19 G→ "t" [circle] 1.000000
20 R 21 A→ "e" [left] 1.000000
21 R 20 G→ "s" [square] 1.000000
22 R 22 E→ "n" [red] 1.000000
23 R 23 A→ "s" [right] 1.000000
27 R 26 S→ "ozegli" [square, right, red] 1.000000
28 R 28 B→ "tfpnobxr" [square, green] 0.999835
32 R 32 H→ "yt" [right, green] 0.999937
35 R 35 F→ "t" [circle, right] 0.996042
37 R 37 S→ "ffbsqezp" [square, left, red] 0.998548
40 R 40 S→ "rfe" [circle, left, red] 0.967260
43 R 43 B→ "op" [circle, green] 0.998467
86 R 86 B→ "tanejfhru" [circle, red] 0.991345
87 R 87 F→ "mphsg" [circle, left] 0.959639
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number syntax symbol semantic values weight
agent 3
0 R 0 S→ A·G·E [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 1.000000
18 R 19 G→ "t" [circle] 1.000000
19 R 20 A→ "e" [left] 1.000000
20 R 18 G→ "s" [square] 1.000000
21 R 21 E→ "y" [green] 1.000000
22 R 24 E→ "n" [red] 1.000000
23 R 23 A→ "s" [right] 1.000000
26 R 26 S→ "ozegli" [square, right, red] 0.999992
27 R 28 S→ "ntfpnobxr" [square, right, green] 0.999698
38 R 38 S→ "iwl" [circle, left, green] 0.913422
40 R 39 B→ "rf" [circle, red] 0.931200
44 R 43 H→ "mphsg" [left, green] 0.991306
51 R 51 S→ "ffbsqezp [square, left, red] 0.997423
52 R 52 H→ "sn" [right, red] 0.990095
67 R 67 H→ "uyqldu" [right, green] 0.994088
90 R 90 H→ "anejfhrud" [left, red] 0.998508
agent 4
0 R 0 S→ A·G·E [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 1.000000
18 R 18 G→ "t" [circle] 1.000000
19 R 19 E→ "y" [green] 1.000000
20 R 20 A→ "e" [left] 1.000000
21 R 21 G→ "s" [square] 1.000000
22 R 22 E→ "n" [red] 1.000000
23 R 23 A→ "s" [right] 1.000000
25 R 25 S→ "ozegli" [square, right, red] 0.999939
26 R 26 S→ "ntfpnobxr" [square, right, green] 0.999832
33 R 33 S→ "rfe" [circle, left, red] 0.995783
36 R 36 B→ "rf" [circle, red] 0.983187
44 R 44 S→ "iwl" [circle, left, green] 0.920450
49 R 49 H→ "sn" [right, red] 0.982922
56 R 56 H→ "mphsg" [left, green] 0.995160
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number syntax symbol semantic values weight
agent 5
0 R 0 S→ A·G·E [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 1.000000
18 R 18 G→ "t" [circle] 1.000000
19 R 19 E→ "y" [green] 1.000000
20 R 20 A→ "e" [left] 1.000000
21 R 21 G→ "s" [square] 1.000000
22 R 22 E→ "n" [red] 1.000000
23 R 23 A→ "s" [right] 1.000000
25 R 25 S→ "ozegli" [square, right, red] 0.999939
26 R 26 S→ "ntfpnobxr" [square, right, green] 0.999832
33 R 33 S→ "rfe" [circle, left, red] 0.995783
36 R 36 B→ "rf" [circle, red] 0.983187
44 R 44 S→ "iwl" [circle, left, green] 0.920450
49 R 49 H→ "sn" [right, red] 0.982922
56 R 56 H→ "mphsg" [left, green] 0.995160
agent 6
0 R 0 S→ A·G·E [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 1.000000
12 R 12 H→ E·A [right, left, green, red] 1.000000
18 R 18 G→ "t" [circle] 1.000000
19 R 19 A→ "e" [left] 1.000000
20 R 21 E→ "y" [green] 1.000000
21 R 22 G→ "s" [square] 1.000000
22 R 23 E→ "n " [red] 1.000000
23 R 20 A→ "s" [right] 1.000000
25 R 26 S→ "ozegli" [square, right, red] 1.000000
26 R 27 S→ "ntfpnobxr" [square, right, green] 0.999835
30 R 29 B→ "rf" [circle, red] 0.999145
33 R 32 H→ "yt" [right, green] 0.997884
41 R 40 S→ "iwl" [circle, left, green] 0.942288
77 R 77 S→ "rfe" [circle, left, red] 1.000000
78 R 78 F→ "ts" [square, right] 0.995115
89 R 89 H→ "anejfhrud" [left, red] 0.992830
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number syntax symbol semantic values weight
agent 7
0 R 2 S→ A·G·E [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 1.000000
2 R 0 S→ E·G·A [circle, square, right, green, red] 1.000000
5 R 5 S→ A·E·G [circle, square, left, green, red] 1.000000
12 R 12 H→ A·E [right, left, green, red] 1.000000
19 R 22 E→ "y" [green] 1.000000
20 R 21 A→ "e" [left] 1.000000
21 R 20 G→ "s" [square] 1.000000
22 R 24 E→ "n" [red] 1.000000
23 R 19 A→ "t" [right] 1.000000
24 R 23 G→ "t" [circle] 0.999967
27 R 27 S→ "ozegli" [square, right, red] 1.000000
33 R 32 B→ "rf" [circle, red] 0.999676
38 R 38 S→ "iwl" [circle, left, green] 0.941433
42 R 42 H→ "sn" [right, red] 0.964153
71 R 71 S→ "eyt" [circle, right, green] 0.985516
agent 8
0 R 0 S→ A·G·E [circle, square, left, green, red] 1.000000
9 R 19 A→ "e" [left] 1.000000
20 R 20 G→ "t" [circle] 1.000000
21 R 21 G→ "s" [square] 1.000000
22 R 22 E→ "y" [green] 1.000000
23 R 23 E→ "n" [red] 1.000000
24 R 24 A→ "s" [right] 1.000000
27 R 27 S→ "ozegli" [square, right, red] 0.999990
28 R 28 B→ "rf" [circle, red] 0.999425
29 R 29 S→ "ntfpnobxr" [square, right, green] 0.999137
41 R 41 S→ "iwl" [circle, left, green] 0.998400
43 R 43 S→ "iehh" [square, left, green] 0.927233
48 R 48 B→ "ffbsqez" [square, red] 0.999610
49 R 49 B→ "sm" [square, green] 0.997977
62 R 62 S→ "ffbsqezp" [square, left, red] 0.993623
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agent 9
0 R 1 S→ A·G·E [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 1.000000
19 R 19 A→ "e" [left] 1.000000
20 R 20 G→ "t" [circle] 1.000000
21 R 22 E→ "y" [green] 1.000000
22 R 23 E→ "n" [red] 1.000000
23 R 21 A→ "s" [right] 1.000000
24 R 27 G→ "s" [square] 1.000000
27 R 28 S→ "ozegli" [square, right, red] 0.999998
30 R 30 S→ "ntfpnobxr" [square, right, green] 0.999903
39 R 38 S→ "eyt" [circle, right, green] 0.997824
46 R 43 S→ "ffbsqezp" [square, left, red] 0.997579
49 R 48 H→ "mphsg" [left, green] 0.997534
50 R 49 H→ "yt" [right, green] 0.941448
55 R 55 S→ "iehh" [square, left, green] 0.993389
agent 10
0 R 1 S→ A·G·E [circle, square, right, left, green, red] 1.000000
10 R 10 S→ A·B [circle, square, right, green, red] 1.000000
12 R 12 B→ G·E [circle, square, green, red] 1.000000
18 R 18 G→ "t" [circle] 1.000000
19 R 19 E→ "y" [green] 1.000000
20 R 23 A→ "e" [left] 1.000000
21 R 20 E→ "n" [red] 1.000000
22 R 22 G→ "s" [square] 1.000000
23 R 21 A→ "s" [right] 1.000000
26 R 28 S→ "ozegli" [square, right, red] 1.000000
27 R 26 S→ "ntfpnobxr" [square, right, green] 0.999888
34 R 34 H→ "ffbsqez" [left, red] 0.999750
36 R 35 S→ "rfe" [circle, left, red] 0.997383
38 R 38 S→ "iwl" [circle, left, green] 0.973665
58 R 55 H→ "mphsg" [left, green] 0.995123
74 R 74 S→ "snt" [circle, right, red] 0.989273
Agents’ maximally weighted rules
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